FFP

Failed States Index
IX2013

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The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. We promote sustainable security through research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers. A leader in the conflict assessment and early warning field, The Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing states. Our objective is to create practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers.

www.**failedstatesindex**.org

FP
Foreign Policy

A list of the top 60 countries of the
Failed States Index are published in the
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The Fund for Peace is grateful for the support of:

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Overview

The Failed States Index is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, data from three primary sources is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Failed States Index. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of painstaking expert social science research.

The 2013 Failed States Index, the ninth edition of the annual Index, is comprised of data collected between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2012 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2013 are not covered by the 2013 Index.

An Important Note

The Failed States Index scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. For an explanation of the various indicators and their icons, please refer to page **10**.

The Index

Analysis

About

For further analysis on individual countries, read FFP's Country Profiles online at www.statesindex.org.

The Failed States Index Rankings 2013

Rank			Score (out of 120)
Very High Alert			
1.		Somalia	113.9
2.		Congo (D. R.)	111.9
3.		Sudan	111.0
4.		South Sudan	110.6
High Alert			
5.		Chad	109.0
6.		Yemen	107.0
7.		Afghanistan	106.7
8.		Haiti	105.8
9.		Central African Republic	105.3
10.		Zimbabwe	105.2
11.		Iraq	103.9
12.		Côte d'Ivoire	103.5
13.		Pakistan	102.9
14.		Guinea	101.3
15.		Guinea Bissau	101.1
16.		Nigeria	100.7
Alert			
17.		Kenya	99.6
18.		Niger	99.0
19.		Ethiopia	98.9
20.		Burundi	97.6
21.		Syria	97.4
22.		Uganda	96.6
=23.		Liberia	95.1
		North Korea	95.1
25.		Eritrea	95.0
26.		Myanmar	94.6
27.		Cameroon	93.5
28.		Sri Lanka	92.9

29.		Bangladesh	92.5
30.		Nepal	91.8
31.		Mauritania	91.7
32.		Timor-Leste	91.5
33.		Sierra Leone	91.2
34.		Egypt	90.6
35.		Burkina Faso	90.2
Very High Warning			
36.		Congo, Republic	90.0
37.		Iran	89.7
= 38.		Mali	89.3
		Rwanda	89.3
40.		Malawi	89.2
41.		Cambodia	88.0
42.		Togo	87.8
43.		Angola	87.1
44.		Uzbekistan	86.9
45.		Zambia	86.6
46.		Lebanon	86.3
47.		Equatorial Guinea	86.1
48.		Kyrgyz Republic	85.7
49.		Swaziland	85.6
50.		Djibouti	85.5
= 51.		Solomon Islands	85.2
		Tajikistan	85.2
53.		Papua New Guinea	84.9
54.		Libya	84.5
55.		Georgia	84.2
56.		Comoros	84.0
57.		Colombia	83.8
58.		Laos	83.7

= 59.		Mozambique	82.8
		Philippines	82.8
61.		Madagascar	82.7
= 62.		Bhutan	81.8
		Gambia	81.8
64.		Senegal	81.4
65.		Tanzania	81.1
66.		China	80.9
=67.		Bolivia	80.8
		Fiji	80.8
		Israel	80.8
70.		Guatemala	80.7
High Warning			
71.		Lesotho	79.4
72.		Nicaragua	79.2
73.		Algeria	78.7
74.		Ecuador	78.6
75.		Honduras	78.3
=76.		Azerbaijan	78.2
		Indonesia	78.2
78.		Benin	77.9
79.		India	77.5
80.		Russia	77.1
= 81.		Belarus	76.7
		Turkmenistan	76.7
= 83.		Bosnia	76.5
		Moldova	76.5
		Tunisia	76.5
86.		Turkey	75.9
87.		Jordan	75.7
88.		Maldives	75.4
89.		Venezuela	75.3

90.		Thailand	**75.1**
91.		Sao Tome and Principe	**74.6**
92.		Serbia	**74.4**
93.		Morocco	**74.3**
94.		Cape Verde	**73.7**
= 95.		Dominican Republic	**73.2**
		El Salvador	**73.2**
= 97.		Mexico	**73.1**
		Vietnam	**73.1**
= 99.		Gabon	**72.9**
		Micronesia	**72.9**
101.		Cuba	**72.8**
102.		Saudi Arabia	**72.7**
103.		Peru	**72.3**
104.		Paraguay	**71.8**
105.		Armenia	**71.3**
106.		Suriname	**71.2**
107.		Guyana	**70.8**
108.		Namibia	**70.4**

Warning

109.		Kazakhstan	**69.8**
110.		Ghana	**69.1**
111.		Samoa	**68.7**
112.		Macedonia	**68.0**
113.		South Africa	**67.6**
114.		Belize	**67.2**
115.		Cyprus	**67.0**
116.		Malaysia	**66.1**
117.		Ukraine	**65.9**
118.		Jamaica	**65.6**
119.		Albania	**65.2**
120.		Grenada	**64.6**

=121.		Botswana	**64.0**
		Seychelles	**64.0**
123.		Brunei	**63.2**
124.		Bahrain	**62.9**
125.		Trinidad & Tobago	**62.6**
126.		Brazil	**62.1**

Less Stable

127.		Kuwait	**59.6**
128.		Antigua & Barbuda	**58.0**
129.		Mongolia	**57.8**
130.		Romania	**57.4**
131.		Panama	**55.8**
132.		Bulgaria	**55.0**
133.		Bahamas	**54.7**
134.		Montenegro	**54.4**
135.		Croatia	**54.1**
136.		Oman	**52.0**
137.		Barbados	**50.8**
138.		Greece	**50.6**

Stable

139.		Costa Rica	**48.7**
140.		Latvia	**47.9**
141.		Hungary	**47.6**
142.		United Arab Emirates	**47.3**
143.		Qatar	**47.1**
144.		Argentina	**46.1**
=145.		Estonia	**45.3**
		Slovakia	**45.3**
147.		Italy	**44.6**
148.		Mauritius	**44.5**
149.		Spain	**44.4**
150.		Lithuania	**43.0**

151.		Malta	**42.4**
152.		Chile	**42.3**
153.		Poland	**40.9**

Very Stable

154.		Czech Republic	**39.9**
155.		Uruguay	**38.4**
156.		Japan	**36.1**
157.		South Korea	**35.4**
158.		Singapore	**34.0**
159.		United States	**33.5**
160.		United Kingdom	**33.2**
=161.		France	**32.6**
		Portugal	**32.6**
163.		Slovenia	**32.3**
164.		Belgium	**30.9**

Sustainable

165.		Germany	**29.7**
=166.		Austria	**26.9**
		Netherlands	**26.9**
168.		Canada	**26.0**
169.		Australia	**25.4**
170.		Ireland	**24.8**
171.		Iceland	**24.7**
172.		Luxembourg	**23.3**
173.		New Zealand	**22.7**
174.		Denmark	**21.9**
=175.		Norway	**21.5**
		Switzerland	**21.5**

Very Sustainable

177.		Sweden	**19.7**
178.		Finland	**18.0**

The Failed States Index in 2013

Country Abbreviations

AE	U.A.E.	DJ	Djibouti	LI	Lithuania
AL	Albania	DK	Denmark	LV	Latvia
AM	Armenia	EE	Estonia	LX	Luxembourg
AT	Austria	ER	Eritrea	ME	Montenegro
AZ	Azerbaijan	GE	Georgia	MK	Macedonia
BA	Bosnia & Herz.	GQ	Eq. Guinea	MW	Malawi
BD	Bangladesh	GR	Greece	NL	Netherlands
BE	Belgium	HU	Hungary	QA	Qatar
BF	Burkina Faso	HV	Croatia	RS	Serbia
BG	Bulgaria	IL	Israel	RW	Rwanda
BH	Bahrain	JO	Jordan	SG	Singapore
BI	Burundi	KG	Kyrgyzstan	SI	Slovenia
BT	Bhutan	KH	Cambodia	SK	Slovakia
CG	Congo (Rep.)	KW	Kuwait	TJ	Tajikistan
CY	Cyprus	LA	Laos	TN	Tunisia
CZ	Czech Rep.	LB	Lebanon	UG	Uganda

Alert

120
110
100
90

Warning

80
70

Stable

60
50
40

Sustainable

30
20
10

Russia

EE
LV
LT
Belarus
Ukraine
MD
Romania
BG
GR

Kazakhstan

Mongolia

North Korea

Japan

South Korea

China

Taiwan

Turkey
Malta
CY
LB
IL
JO
Syria
Iraq
Iran
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Nepal
BT

GE
AM
AZ
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
KG
TJ

Egypt
Saudi
Arabia
KW
BH
QA
AE
Oman

India

BD
Myanmar
LA

Sudan
ER
Yemen
DJ

Thailand
KH

Vietnam

Philippines

Micronesia

South
Sudan
R.
Ethiopia

Somalia

Sri Lanka

Maldives

Brunei
Malaysia
SG

Democratic
public of
Congo
RW
UG
Kenya
BI
Tanzania

Seychelles

Papua New Guinea

Solomon Islands

Comoros

Indonesia

Timor-Leste

Samoa

MW
Zambia
Mozambique

Zimbabwe
Botswana

Madagascar

Mauritius

Vanuatu

Fiji

French
Polynesia

Swaziland
South
Africa
Lesotho

Australia

New Zealand

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BUILDING STRONGER COMMUNITIES IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

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An Introduction to the Failed States Index

The Methodology and the Twelve Indicators Explained

Weak and failing states pose a challenge to the international community. In today's world, with its highly globalized economy, information systems and interlaced security, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe.

Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises are ethnic conflicts. Some are civil wars. Others take on the form of revolutions. Many result in complex humanitarian emergencies. Though the dynamics may differ in each case, all of these conflicts stem from social, economic, and political pressures that have not been managed by professional, legitimate, and representative state institutions.

Fault lines emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state weakness and failure are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that create weak and failed states—and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects of state failure.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. An interdisciplinary combination of qualitative research and quantitative methodologies is needed to establish patterns and acquire predictive value. Without the right data, it is impossible to identify problems that may be festering 'below the radar.' Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Failed States Index (FSI), produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, the FSI — and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, The Fund for Peace collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries that we analyze.

The FSI is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, data from three primary sources is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI.

Millions of documents are analyzed every year. By applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators (which in turn include over 100 sub-indicators) that are the result of years of painstaking expert social science research.

The Fund for Peace's software performs content analysis on this collected information. Through sophisticated search parameters and algorithms, the CAST software separates the relevant data from the irrelevant. Guided by twelve primary social, economic and political indicators (each split into an average of 14 sub-indicators), the CAST software analyzes the collected information using specialized search terms that flag relevant items. Using various algorithms, this analysis is then converted into a score representing the significance of each of the various pressures for a given country.

The content analysis is further triangulated with two other key aspects of the overall assessment process: quantitative analysis and qualitative inputs based on major events in the countries examined. The scores produced by The Fund for Peace's software are then compared with a comprehensive set of vital statistics—as well as human analysis—to ensure that the software has not misinterpreted the raw data. Though the basic data underpinning the Failed States Index is already freely and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources.

Social and Economic Indicators

Demographic Pressures `DP`

Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Natural Disasters
- Disease
- Environment
- Pollution
- Food Scarcity
- Malnutrition
- Water Scarcity
- Population Growth
- Youth Bulge
- Mortality

Refugees and IDPs `REF`

Pressures associated with population displacement. This strains public services and has the potential to pose a security threat.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Displacement
- Refugee Camps
- IDP Camps
- Disease related to Displacement
- Refugees per capita
- IDPs per capita
- Absorption capacity

Uneven Economic Development `UED`

When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, governments tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- GINI Coefficient
- Income Share of Highest 10%
- Income Share of Lowest 10%
- Urban-Rural Service Distribution
- Access to Improved Services
- Slum Population

Group Grievance `GG`

When tension and violence exists between groups, the state's ability to provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Discrimination
- Powerlessness
- Ethnic Violence
- Communal Violence
- Sectarian Violence
- Religious Violence

Human Flight and Brain Drain `HF`

When there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human capital. Those with resources also often leave before, or just as, conflict erupts.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Migration per capita
- Human Capital
- Emigration of
- Educated Population

Poverty and Economic Decline `ECO`

Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction between the "haves" and the "have nots".

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Economic Deficit
- Government Debt
- Unemployment
- Youth Employment
- Purchasing Power
- GDP per capita
- GDP Growth
- Inflation

Political and Military Indicators

State Legitimacy `SL`

Corruption and lack of representativeness in the government directly undermine social contract.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Corruption
- Government Effectiveness
- Political Participation
- Electoral Process
- Level of Democracy
- Illicit Economy
- Drug Trade
- Protests and Demonstrations
- Power Struggles

Public Services `PS`

The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are key roles of the state.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Policing
- Criminality
- Education Provision
- Literacy
- Water & Sanitation
- Infrastructure
- Quality Healthcare
- Telephony
- Internet Access
- Energy Reliability
- Roads

Human Rights and Rule of Law `HR`

When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in its ultimate responsibility.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Press Freedom
- Civil Liberties
- Political Freedoms
- Human Trafficking
- Political Prisoners
- Incarceration
- Religious Persecution
- Torture
- Executions

Security Apparatus `SEC`

The security apparatus should have a monopoly on use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakened where this is affected by competing groups. *Includes pressures and measures related to:*

- Internal Conflict
- Small Arms Proliferation
- Riots and Protests
- Fatalities from Conflict
- Military Coups
- Rebel Activity
- Militancy
- Bombings
- Political Prisoners

Factionalized Elites `FE`

When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Power Struggles
- Defectors
- Flawed Elections
- Political Competition

External Intervention `EXT`

When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs.

Includes pressures and measures related to:

- Foreign Assistance
- Presence of Peacekeepers
- Presence of UN Missions
- Foreign Military Intervention
- Sanctions
- Credit Rating

Failed States Index 2013:
What Were You Expecting?

J. J. Messner

In compiling the 2013 Failed States Index (FSI), there was some optimism at The Fund for Peace that we would finally see Somalia climb out of first place on the Index after having been firmly anchored in top position for five straight years, especially given the encouraging signs that have been emanating from the country in recent times. It was not to be. Somalia has, for the sixth time in succession, taken top spot in the FSI.

The case of Somalia demonstrates an important facet of recovery from conflict and development. The Fund for Peace's Nate Haken has noted the political metaphor implicit in the nursery rhyme, Humpty Dumpty, as illustrative of the long- and short-term performance of countries on the FSI: Humpty Dumpty – a fragile egg-based character – had a great fall, leading to a rapid loss of structural integrity -- or, in technical parlance, a splattering. Subsequently, despite the best efforts of all the King's horses and all the King's men, they were unable to put Humpty back together again.

The Humpty Dumpty principle thus follows that when countries fall significantly, they can do so rapidly and catastrophically and it takes significant resources to reconstruct them. Though it is true that countries can also experience slow declines (as we've seen with multiple European countries), there is really only one speed of recovery – slow. Further, such recovery takes significant effort from all manner of actors. *[See our coverage on interagency and multisectoral collaboration beginning on page 31.]*

There has been, however, some progress in Somalia – a new government has been sworn in and the blight of piracy off its coast has been somewhat subdued. There are signs that commerce is recovering, albeit localized mainly in Mogadishu. There are other hopeful signs as well, reflected in the fact that Somalia was one of only two countries in the Top 10 to see their scores improve this year. As with any country in Somalia's position, it will be important for the international community to be realistic with its expectations. Yes, Somalia is number one for the sixth year in a row, but for a country facing the pressures and challenges that Somalia has since 1991, the road to recovery is inevitably a long one.

Similarly, Myanmar has been feted for its entry into the global community, with the installation of Aung San Suu-Kyi to Parliament, some promising democratic reforms, an opening up to the world economy, and even a six-hour visit from President Obama. Certainly, the advances in Myanmar are encouraging, but no country is capable of turning its fortunes on a dime. As Myanmar has opened up, it is at the same time experiencing massive

internal ethnic turmoil, and it is far from guaranteed that the political reforms will be permanent. The FSI demonstrates that Myanmar is trending in the right direction – indeed, it has improved nearly six points in four years – but real, sustained change will take time.

Another country that will require international patience by the boat-load is South Sudan. *[See also our coverage on South Sudan beginning page 23.]* There was much rejoicing at the birth of the world's newest country in 2011. As it turns out, independence was not a panacea. Violence continues, sometimes perpetrated by those in state uniforms, sometimes along ethnic lines. As much as statehood was a herculean effort, in many ways the real struggle begins now. South Sudan provisionally entered the FSI as the 4th most fragile state in 2012 and has officially ranked there in 2013 as well, albeit with a significantly worsened score.

Two countries that illustrate how slow and steady success in statebuilding really is are Sierre Leone and Timor-Leste. In the first Failed States Index, in 2005, Sierra Leone was ranked 6th. In 2013, Sierra Leone has climbed down to 33rd, having improved over ten points in eight years. Similarly, Timor-Leste, whose UN mission closed in 2012, has also slowly made its way down the FSI, improving from 20th in 2007 to 32nd this year and having advanced nearly seven points in only three years. Both have in common a slow and steady trend of improvement. During the late 1990s, both countries experienced at times vicious conflict. And now, a decade and a half later, both countries are on the verge of departing

How is the World Doing?

The chart below demonstrates the number of countries that either improve or worsen in their total FSI scores from year to year. Since 2010, more countries have improved their scores than have experienced a worsened score. This would suggest that, in general, that for the past few years, more countries have been improving than have been worsening.

* The "margin of error" is considered to be +/- 0.2. Therefore, for us to consider a country to have improved or worsened, its score must change by +/- 0.3 or more.

Global Changes from 2012 to 2013

Improved*	Unchanged*	Worsened*
107	**15**	**56**
countries	countries	countries

Year	Countries	Improved*	Unchanged*	Worsened*
2013	178	**107**	15	56
2012	177+1	**121**	18	39
2011	177	**121**	13	43
2010	177	**92**	24	61
2009	177	**43**	7	127
2008	177	**72**	22	83
2007	177	**66**	38	73
2006	147	**40**	71	36
2005	77	n/a	n/a	n/a

our "Alert" category and entering our less worrisome "Warning" designation. Neither has been a smooth trajectory, with bumps along the way and periodic returns to violence, especially in Timor-Leste.

On the topic of recovery, the most-improved nation for the 2013 FSI is Japan. After the pummeling it received in 2012 from the effects of the previous year's earthquake and nuclear meltdown, Japan has rebounded significantly in 2013, though it still has some way to go to return to its pre-earthquake standing. Though it is true that recovery is slow, Japan demonstrates that it is possible for highly resilient countries with legitimate, representative, and professional institutions to recover fairly rapidly from serious shocks. The next most improved country, Iceland, has similarly demonstrated a high level of resiliency, recovering from the economic shocks of previous years.

Similarly, countries with relatively high capacity can soften shocks that would otherwise send a state into a tailspin. As the economic crisis continues in much of Europe – with Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal in particular experiencing continued economic suffering – it is perhaps interesting that none of these countries' scores changed significantly in 2013.

Instability courses from country to country in waves taking on different forms depending on the sociopolitical context and the response of leadership. What happened last year in Tunisia affected Libya and Syria, which this year affected Mali and Mauritania. States are not isolated from the wider international and transnational context. Mali is by far-and-away the most-worsened country in the 2013 FSI, having worsened by 11.4 points and shot up 41 places to 38th on the Index, as a result of the conflict in the north of the country. Neighboring Mauritania is 2013's second-most worsened country. Syria is again the third-most worsened country, having worsened by a cumulative 11.5 points between 2011 and 2013 as the civil war continues to rage.

Comparing the FSI from year to year can provide useful validation of things we already suspected to be true. Somalia being the country most at risk of state failure; Mali and Syria worsening significantly due to conflict; Japan rebounding from natural disaster. None of this is news to anyone, nor does it take the FSI to tell us these things.

What the FSI does do is demonstrate long-term patterns and trends, allowing us to possibly formulate new theories (or provide validation to existing ones) about conflict risk and lessons for peace building. At a

national level, we are able to chart the progress of countries recovering from conflict, like Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. We are able to chart the gradual worsening that led to phenomena such as the Arab Spring. *[See our analysis beginning page 21]* Such observations can help us understand patterns of political, social and economic upheaval, hopefully improving our abilities in early warning and charting successful development.

Ultimately what the FSI teaches us is to be realistic and -- to an extent – to be patient. Certainly, countries can decline both rapidly and gradually. Without significant capacity and a high-level of resiliency, however, the road to recovery will be a long and rocky one, filled with potholes and setbacks. As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Failed States Index, the focus should increasingly be placed on the overriding trends of every country. The discourse should not be about where a country ranks, but rather, is that country better off than it was last year? Or ten years ago? Is a country facing rising pressures or diminishing capacities? By asking questions such as this, the international community can best help alleviate pressures in the short term and strengthen capacity in the longer term. Ultimately, that is the purpose of the Failed States Index.

J. J. Messner is Director of Sustainable Development & Security at The Fund for Peace and is also Co-Director of The Failed States Index.

Most Worsened for 2013

Top 10 Most Worsened 2012-2013 (by Score)

Move		Country	2012 Score	2013 Score
+11.4 ▲		Mali	77.9	**89.3**
+4.1 ▲		Mauritania	87.6	**91.7**
+2.9 ▲		Syria	94.5	**97.4**
+2.8 ▲		Burkina Faso	87.4	**90.2**
+2.6 ▲		China	78.3	**80.9**
+2.3 ▲		Tunisia	74.2	**76.5**
+2.2 ▲		South Sudan	108.4	**110.6**
		Senegal	79.3	**81.4**
+2.1 ▲		Yemen	104.8	**107.0**
		Niger	96.9	**99.0**
		Swaziland	83.5	**85.6**

Top 10 Most Worsened 2012-2013 (by Rank)

Move		Country	2012 Position	2013 Position
41 ▲		Mali	79th	**38th**
11 ▲		Tunisia	94th	**83rd**
10 ▲		China	76th	**66th**
7 ▲		Senegal	71st	**64th**
		Mauritania	38th	**31st**
6 ▲		Swaziland	55th	**49th**
		Sao Tome and Principe	97th	**91st**
		Burkina Faso	41st	**35th**
5 ▲		Angola	48th	**43rd**
4 ▲		Spain	153rd	**149th**
		Micronesia	103rd	**99th**
		Belarus	85th	**81st**
		Algeria	77th	**73rd**

Most Worsened 5-Year Trend 2008-2013 (by Score)

Move		Country	2008 Score	2013 Score
+14.5 ▲		Libya	70.0	**84.5**
+13.7 ▲		Mali	75.6	**89.3**
+11.6 ▲		Yemen	95.4	**107.0**
+10.9 ▲		Tunisia	65.6	**76.5**
+10.5 ▲		Senegal	70.9	**81.4**
+9.8 ▲		Guinea Bissau	91.3	**101.1**
+7.6 ▲		Eritrea	87.4	**95.0**
+7.3 ▲		Syria	90.1	**97.4**
+6.5 ▲		Haiti	99.3	**105.8**

Mali

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
38th	**89.3**	↗	79th	77.9

Mali: Trend 2006-2013

Mali: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

2012 saw Mali's embroilment in a series of compounding political, security and humanitarian crises.

- An armed conflict has broken out in northern Mali since January 16, 2012 involving several insurgent groups rebelling against the Malian government for the independence of the northern region of Azawad.

- Further complications arose when Malian soldiers, dissatisfied over the handling of the crisis, ousted Mali's President Touré in a coup d'état on March 21st. Widely condemned by the international community, the coup led to harsh sanctions by Mali's neighbors and the military chain of command collapsed. This allowed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) – the rebel group that led the Tuareg rebellion in January – to swiftly take control of the northern region by April 2012.

- Islamist insurgents, who had initially backed the MNLA, expanded their presence in the country's vast, Saharan North imposing strict Sharia law. Incapable of reconciling conflicting goals, the MNLA began fighting against Islamist groups, including Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and ultimately lost control of most of northern Mali's cities by July 2012.

- In response to Islamist territorial gains, a second coup d'état in December, and a request from the Malian government for help in repelling insurgent advances toward the south, the French launched military operations on January 11th, 2013.

- Compounding the political and security crises is a humanitarian crisis with six million people at risk of food insecurity.

Most Improved for 2013

Top 10 Most Improved 2012-2013 (by Score)

Move			2012 Score	2013 Score
-7.4 ▼		Japan	43.5	**36.1**
-4.4 ▼		Iceland	29.1	**24.7**
-4.0 ▼		Latvia	51.9	**47.9**
-3.8 ▼		Australia	29.2	**25.4**
-3.3 ▼		Poland	44.3	**40.9**
-2.9 ▼		New Zealand	25.6	**22.7**
-2.6 ▼		Belgium	33.5	**30.9**
-2.5 ▼		Botswana	66.5	**64.0**
		Indonesia	80.6	**78.2**
-2.4 ▼		Malaysia	68.5	**66.1**
		Norway	23.9	**21.5**

Top 10 Most Improved 2012-2013 (by Rank)

Move			2012 Position	2013 Position
13 ▼		Indonesia	63rd	**76th**
10 ▼		Laos	48th	**58th**
		Moldova	73rd	**83rd**
8 ▼		Azerbaijan	68th	**76th**
		Ecuador	67th	**74th**
		Gabon	92nd	**99th**
7 ▼		Kyrgyzstan	41st	**48th**
		Venezuela	82nd	**89th**
		Israel/West Bank	67th	**61st**
		Malaysia	110th	**116th**
6 ▼		Morocco	87th	**93rd**
		Thailand	84th	**90th**

Most Improved 5-Year Trend 2008-2013 (by Score)

Move			2008 Score	2013 Score
-9.5 ▼		Turkmenistan	86.2	**76.7**
-9.4 ▲		Lebanon	95.7	**86.3**
-9.2 ▼		Moldova	85.7	**76.5**
-7.8 ▼		Bosnia & Herzegovina	84.3	**76.5**
		Bangladesh	100.3	**92.5**
-7.7 ▼		Belarus	84.4	**76.7**
		Barbados	58.5	**50.8**
-7.6 ▼		Germany	37.3	**29.7**
-7.3 ▼		Zimbabwe	112.5	**105.2**
-7.2 ▼		Solomon Islands	92.4	**85.2**

● Japan

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
156th	**36.1**	↘	**151st**	**43.5**

Japan: Trend 2006-2013

Japan: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

Japan continues to recover with relative speed from the triple crisis of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear plant meltdown that devastated the country on March 11, 2011.

- After the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami tore through the country's north-eastern coastal communities of Miyagi, Iwatu and Fukushima, at least 20,851 people died or remain missing. This figure includes the confirmed number of dead, 15,881, those who are missing, 2,668, and 2,303 others who died from disaster-related issues.

- The crisis caused the displacement of some 400,000 people. It also destroyed 300,000 buildings and damaged a further one million. Reasonable estimates for direct economic loss from the earthquake and tsunami are around $275 billion with an additional $65 billion in damages as a result of the Fukushima nuclear plant incident. Indirect losses could be in the order of $185 to 345 billion across the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear plant.

- After two years and a $260 million long-term budget funds, almost all of the 27.6 million tons of debris left behind after the crisis has been transported to areas for waste disposal (approx. 75%) or to permanent locations (approx. 20%). Various criticisms have been made concerning how reconstruction funds have been spent as only 10% of permanent housing for the region has been completed. Still, as Patrick Fuller of the Red Cross pointed out, Japan's progress over one year compares to that achieved over three years in places like Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami.

The Troubled Ten in 2013

J. J. Messner and Kendall Lawrence

Though it is called the Failed States Index, that is not to say that every country on the FSI is a failed state — after all, Finland is ranked on the FSI. That is also not to say that *any* country on the FSI is necessarily failed — though Somalia might be the closest approximation to what many people may consider to be a failed state. Rather, the Failed States Index measures the pressures experienced by countries and thus adjudges their susceptibility to state failure. Ranking top on the FSI does not in and of itself mean that a

country is failed — it simply means that of all countries, that one country is the most at risk of failure.

Even when we talk about state failure, the description itself is in many ways too loose. A country may, for example, experience levels of state failure in certain geographical areas (such as ungoverned or poorly governed territories). Mexico, for example, is nationally ranked 97th, yet it could be argued that the state has failed in some geographical areas now under the influence of drug cartels more than the state itself. Or, a state may experience a level of failure in certain facets. North Korea, for example, is quite militarily proficient but its social and economic indicators are under serious pressure. So even where it is experienced, state failure may only be experienced in part.

Is Somalia a failed state? And if so, is it failed in whole or in part? We will leave that for others to decide. What we will do however is present our assessment of the pressures experienced by Somalia — and 177 other countries.

Nevertheless, as with any index, there must be a top and a bottom. The top ten countries in the Failed States Index for 2013 are detailed here to provide some basic context as to their recent performance and to begin to illustrate why they find themselves at the wrong end of the FSI.

Overall, there was little movement in the Top 10 since 2012. The standings in the Top 10 are affected by the official introduction of South Sudan at 4th, which has effectively pushed most countries down one rank simply by muscling them out of the way. Somalia, D.R. Congo, and Sudan are unchanged in their rankings. Similarly, were it not for South Sudan's introduction, the rankings of Chad, Afghanistan, and Haiti would also have been unchanged.

Rankings, of course only tell part of the story. Of more interest are the scores themselves. Though the Top 10 is largely unchanged in terms of ranks, most of them experienced a worsening in their score in 2013, the exceptions being Somalia and Zimbabwe.

Failed States Index Top 10 Lists, 2005-2013

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
1.	Cote d'Ivoire	Sudan	Sudan	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia
2.	Congo, D.R.	Congo, D.R.	Iraq	Sudan	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	Congo, D.R.	Congo, D.R.
3.	Sudan	Cote d'Ivoire	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
4.	Iraq	Iraq	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	Zimbabwe	Congo, D.R.	Chad	South Sudan
5.	Somalia	Zimbabwe	Chad	Iraq	Congo, D.R.	Congo, D.R.	Haiti	Zimbabwe	Chad
6.	Sierra Leone	Chad	Cote d'Ivoire	Congo, D.R.	Iraq	Afghanistan	Zimbabwe	Afghanistan	Yemen
7.	Chad	Somalia	Congo, D.R.	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Afghanistan	Haiti	Afghanistan
8.	Yemen	Haiti	Afghanistan	Cote d'Ivoire	C.A.R.	C.A.R.	C.A.R.	Yemen	Haiti
9.	Liberia	Pakistan	Guinea	Pakistan	Guinea	Guinea	Iraq	Iraq	C.A.R.
10.	Haiti	Afghanistan	C.A.R.	C.A.R.	Pakistan	Pakistan	Cote d'Ivoire	C.A.R.	Zimbabwe

★ Somalia

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
1st	**113.9**	↘	**1st**	**113.4**

Somalia: Trend 2006-2013

Somalia: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

2012 was a year of change for Somalia. After the deterioration of 2011, the country rebounded slightly on the FSI.

- In September, al-Shabaab was forced to withdraw from its main strongholds, most notably Kismayo, after an impressive effort undertaken by African Union troops to dislodge the group. Despite this victory, there continued to be large numbers of suicide attacks in Mogadishu carried out by members of the group.
- The famine that claimed an estimated 260,000 lives in 2011 finally ended, although over 2 million people still remained food insecure.
- Pirate attacks, an international scourge over the past five years finally began to fall, from 233 reported attacks in 2011 to 70 in 2012, largely due to innovative regional and international efforts.
- Following a UN-brokered peace process, the first formal parliament in 20 years was sworn in and presidential elections then followed, with the charismatic Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared the winner.

Despite some notable improvements, Somalia is still considered one of the most dangerous places on the planet and certainly one of the least stable. However, the changes seen in 2012 have engendered a cautious optimism that perhaps, for the first time in FSI history, the country may find itself out of the top spot in coming years.

🇨🇩 Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
2nd	**111.2**	↗	**4th**	**111.9**

D.R. Congo: Trend 2006-2013

D.R. Congo: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has continued its climb on the FSI, slowly creeping up on Somalia's claim to top place on the Index.

- Throughout 2012, the DRC remained in political turmoil with a large rebel presence, known as M23, continuing to operate on its territory. The group, which has been accused of human rights abuses including random and indiscriminate attacks such as rape and torture on civilian populations, are alleged to have been receiving support from Uganda and Rwanda.
- In addition to the M23 rebels, the poorly trained and equipped Congolese army has also been accused of perpetrating gross human rights violations against civilians, particularly in Eastern Congo. The continued instability in the DRC displaced thousands and created an ever-worsening humanitarian crisis in a country that never seems to get a break.
- On top of the rampant violence that took place during 2012, DRC has faced outbreaks of disease, specifically Ebola and Cholera, with wholly inadequate medical facilities.
- The DRC is classified as one of the worst countries for abuses against women with the eastern part of the country being dubbed 'the rape capital of the world'. All forms of sexual violence, including acts perpetrated against children, are rampant in the DRC with a report by the American Medical Association stating that up to 40% of women in the eastern part of the country had reported having been raped in their lifetimes.

Sudan

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
3rd	111.0	↗	3rd	109.4

Sudan: Trend 2006-2013

Sudan: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

Continued strife between Sudan and South Sudan added to the pressures that both states experienced during 2012.

- Armed conflict took place between South Sudan's Unity state and Sudan's South Kordofan over control of the oil fields and the pipelines in the highly contested Abyei territory.
- The lack of agreement over the demilitarized zone and Abyei territory has impeded discussions on South Sudan exporting oil through Sudan. Sudan's decrease in oil revenue was due largely to delays in South Sudan's production coming online, thus preventing Khartoum from earning the export fees for its role in bringing South Sudanese oil to market.
- Fighting between Sudan's government forces and rebels within Sudan, largely in Unity and South Kordofan states, displaced an estimated 655,000 people and created short-term food and medical crises.
- In June, austerity measures implemented by the government in the face of reduced oil revenues led to large-scale student protests in Khartoum, which turned into violent clashes with police, further underscoring Sudan's precarious dependence on a single resource economy.
- The lack of economic diversity has led to Sudan's continued decline on the FSI and underlines the need for economic and political reform with a focus on economic diversification, stronger public services, and a more professional security sector to deal with civil unrest.

South Sudan

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
4th	110.6	↗	n/r	108.4

South Sudan: Trend 2012-2013

South Sudan: Individual Indicator Trends, 2012-2013

South Sudan's first complete year on the FSI shows it sinking into the same cycles of instability that many of its neighbors face. Despite the large volume of aid that has flowed into the country since independence, it has been unable to effectively utilize those resources towards actual capacity building.

- Corruption is endemic in South Sudan, with an estimated $4 billion of public funds having gone stolen or unaccounted for by mid-2012 alone.
- Migration between South Sudan and Sudan continues to be high; upward of 170,000 refugees crossed the border from Sudan into the new state during 2012. This added to South Sudan's food shortages following the drought that the country faced during 2012 as well as contributed to overall population pressure in a place ill-equipped to provide even the most basic services.
- Armed conflict with Sudan over oil rights and disputed pipeline fees prompted the government in Juba to halt oil production in January, a risky move as 98% of their income was projected to come from oil production.
- International aid groups are beginning to accuse the government and other factions of perpetrating gross human rights violations including rape, torture, and execution. Media freedom was also sharply curtailed. A notable journalist was killed after speaking out against government-sponsored corruption and violence.

Independence has failed to provide the South Sudanese population with a reprieve from conflict with continued tensions over land and resources.

🇹🇩 Chad

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
5th	**109.0**	↗	4th	107.6

Chad: Trend 2006-2013

Chad: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

Although Chad shifted down one slot on the FSI this year because of the addition of South Sudan, its actual individual score worsened.

- Throughout 2012, Chad received large numbers of refugees from both Sudan and the Central African Republic as a result of their internal conflicts and growing humanitarian crises. Its own number of IDPs increased by an estimated 90,000 individuals over the year with the government having little to no capacity to address the additional needs created by the increase in refugees and IDPs.
- There was continuing concern in Chad throughout 2012 due to increased desertification and drought, as the semi-arid land is strained by high demand on scarce resources.
- There was an increase in the number of youth reportedly joining armed gangs and radical movements due to high rates of unemployment and few opportunities for alternative livelihoods. Already experiencing instability along religious and tribal lines that have been exacerbated in the past by the large influx of refugees from neighboring conflicts, Chad is confronted by increased overall volatility and a spike in small arms and trained individuals proliferating into the country, particularly along the borders.
- Overall, Chad continued to be one of the poorest countries in the world, with a dire lack of resources and public services. Instability was exacerbated by increased flows of refugees and arms and an increasingly radicalized youth population.

🇾🇪 Yemen

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
6th	**107.0**	↗	8th	104.8

Yemen: Trend 2006-2013

Yemen: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

Yemen's FSI score has been steadily getting worse since 2007 with 2012 representing its poorest showing on the Index so far.

- In the shadow of the Arab spring, protests in Yemen over massive human rights violations including arbitrary detention, attacks on free speech, and the use of child soldiers, caused President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down at the end of 2011. This raised hopes for stabilization and democratization in the highly factionalized country. The transitional government that succeeded him faced many challenges and was confronted by the wide-ranging abuses Saleh's regime perpetuated as well as addressing the conflict between the North and South, neither of which the state was adequately prepared to address.
- Adding to the challenges facing Yemen, the U.S. continued to conduct the highly controversial campaign of covert piloted and drone attacks on alleged al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula militants in Yemen. U.S.-conducted operations increased during 2012 — hugely unpopular in Yemen. The drone strikes further underscored the belief on the part of many Yemenis that the government was complicit in attacking its own citizens.
- As the number of IDPs doubled in 2012 to nearly a half million, reports indicated that a record 10 million people lacked sufficient food, half the population did not have access to clean water, and reductions in access to health care have led to increased outbreaks of disease.

🇦🇫 Afghanistan

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
7th	**106.7**	↗	**6th**	**106.0**

Afghanistan: Trend 2006-2013

Afghanistan: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

Afghanistan, 12 years and billions of dollars later, continues to represent one of the most unstable countries in the world.

- Although the United States and its NATO allies have begun their drawdown, the process was hampered in 2012 by high rates of 'green on blue' violence, with members of the Afghan military and police attacking their international partners. This led to an initial halt in joint patrols and then increased vetting for new recruits and re-vetting of current recruits in an attempt to enhance security. Overall, these incidents also cast a pall over operations as a continued lack of trust continued despite years of effort and resources.
- The drawdown process was also hindered by the large-scale violent protests that took place across the country following reports of NATO troops burning copies of the Koran and other religious items at a base.
- In March of 2012, an American soldier entered a village in Kandahar province and killed 16 sleeping Afghan civilians, including women and children, triggering further backlashes against the occupation.
- Assassinations of local Afghan political figures and religious leaders by the Taliban and other groups continued to undermine efforts at an inclusive peace process, most notably with the assassination of Arsala Rahmani of the High Peace Council, a former Taliban Minister and key figure in negotiations with rebel factions.

🇭🇹 Haiti

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
8th	**105.8**	↗	**7th**	**104.9**

Haiti: Trend 2006-2013

Haiti: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

Haiti continues its slow struggle towards recovery following the devastating earthquake of 2010, improving slightly in its score from last year's FSI.

- The country's capacity to cope with the onslaught of natural disasters and resulting disease remains low. Despite a large influx of aid since the 2010 earthquake, Haiti remains extremely fragile, with widescale corruption and limited government capacity hindering efforts at recovery and impairing its ability to provide basic goods and services for most of the population.
- In 2012, there were several large protests over the cost of living and President Martelly's proposal to revive Haiti's Army, leading to calls for his resignation. With the violent history of the Haitian army, many believe that any reemergence of the military would return the island nation to its brutal past.
- The forced eviction of residents from temporary housing that they had occupied since the 2010 earthquake also created controversy. Many aid organizations protested this reaction by the government stating that adequate housing was still not available. Police brutality and an inappropriate use of force by security services was also widely reported in the process.
- In addition, the dire state of the public services in Haiti, including an abysmal medical system and a dearth of trained professionals from all sectors, continued to hamper the country's progress.

Central African Republic

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
9th	**105.3**	↗	**10th**	**103.8**

Central African Republic: Trend 2006-2013

Central African Republic: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

The Central African Republic (CAR) rose from 10th to 9th on this year's FSI with an increase in its individual aggregate score of 1.5 points.

- Throughout 2012, natural disasters in the form of flooding impacted both the food supply and the level of disease in a country that already struggles with inadequate infrastructure and public services.
- There was an increase in violence and abductions during the year due to the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in southeastern CAR. With the LRA in the southeast and armed groups in the north, over 27,000 people were displaced in 2012 from fighting and overall insecurity.
- There were violent protests throughout the year over government policies as well as riots that culminated in attacks on prisons, freeing inmates.
- Protests also erupted in December as French troops were deployed to Bangui to reportedly protect French nationals and facilitate their safe escort out of the country. Protestors accused the French of trying to prop up the beleaguered government as rebel forces closed in on the capital. Both the UN and the US also issued evacuation orders for their staff and citizens.
- By December of 2012, rebels had overtaken most of the CAR, including the capital, forcing the government to flee in to exile. The coup was widely condemned by the international community.

Zimbabwe

Rank	Score	Overall Trend	2012 Rank	2012 Score
10th	**105.2**	↘	**5th**	**106.3**

Zimbabwe: Trend 2006-2013

Zimbabwe: Individual Indicator Trends, 2006-2013

Zimbabwe saw a significant improvement on the 2013 FSI moving from 5th place in 2012 to 10th this year, the fourth year of consecutive improvement.

- The economic situation in Zimbabwe improved as the European Union (EU) lifted sanctions on members of government, though not President Mugabe himself. The biggest improvement came at the end of the year as the EU lifted further restrictions and began giving foreign assistance directly to the Zimbabwean government. Although sanctions against the government were relaxed, there was not immediate reports of improvement in the economic situation on the ground for regular Zimbabweans.
- Widespread human rights violations continued throughout the country. The violations included arresting members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise during peaceful protests on human rights and economic conditions. Other groups considered threats to the government were also harassed.
- Political tensions were high at the beginning of 2012 with reports of Mugabe's illness. Rumored to be on his death bed in Singapore, he returned to Harare in seemingly good health in April.

With elections reported to take place during the second half of 2013, it remains to be seen if Zimbabwe can hold on to its trend of improvement or if elections will send it into a political tailspin. Overall, although its score did improve in 2012, the country remains extremely fragile and much of its population in dire circumstances.

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Kendall Lawrence is a Research Associate at The Fund for Peace.

Anatomy of a Storm:
Regional Impacts of the Arab Spring

Nate Haken

Does state failure matter? Obviously it matters mostly for the population of that country, but even for its neighbors, the answer is a resounding yes. Chaos in a single country can often impact an entire region.

In 2011, as measured in the 2012 FSI, Tunisia and the wider "Arab Spring" were the case in point. In 2012, Mali — the most worsened state in the 2013 FSI — dragged the Western Sahel into a vortex of instability. Though neither Tunisia nor Mali were among the countries most at risk as measured by the FSI, when the social, economic, political, and security pressures spiked in those countries and the states convulsed, it would eventually affect others in the region. Underscoring the point, what happened in Mali this year actually started in Tunisia two years prior.

Since 2011, debates have raged about the Arab Spring. Observers have sought to identify root causes, proximate causes, and triggers, positing various combinations of factors like corruption, food prices, poverty,

median age, youth unemployment, and social media. Countless pundits have opined on the short, medium, and long term implications: good, bad, or neutral for democracy, human rights, or national and regional stability – or more parochially, for American national interests and security. Such questions, of course, do not have simple answers, except perhaps in hyper-partisan discourse.

Though it is difficult to make definitive pronouncements about what it all might mean in the long-term, we can with some degree of confidence describe what happened. This is possible using holistic analytical frameworks like CAST, upon which the Failed States Index is based. For the FSI, CAST triangulates data from pre-existing data sets, qualitative review, and original data generated through content analysis of millions of media reports using search strings and algorithms. Each of the three methods has its strengths and weaknesses. Content analysis is particularly strong in its ability to track trends in dynamic indicators at varying levels of spatial-temporal granularity, a helpful feature when attempting to analyze complex systems, which underlie the pathology of state failure in rapidly changing environments.

Drilling into the content analysis data, CAST tells the story of a storm birthed in North Africa, which had been brewing for some time. In 2009, the international community had not considered the potential impact of massive protests and popular uprisings sweeping across borders and governments in North Africa. But the CAST indicators for Group Grievance and Human Rights were gradually and inexorably getting worse. In

November 2010, there was a dramatic regional increase in the State Legitimacy score (based on a regional average) that has yet to come back down. A month later, thousands took to the streets in Tunisia, taking the world by surprise. This is not to say that CAST could have predicted the Arab Spring — but the trends were there to be seen.

In 2011 and 2012, the storm twisted east through the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant, and south through the Western Sahel region of Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, taking on different forms and patterns along the way. From the Sahel to the Levant, the storm manifested itself variously as popular, peaceful protest leading to political reform (Morocco), peaceful revolution (Egypt), violent revolution (Libya), and protracted civil war (Syria). Governments that tried to cling to the status quo were fighting a losing battle. This storm was too big to manage without reforms.

Patterns and Trends

Mapping the storm over time and space, and the sequence of indicators as they spiked in successive waves, both the long term trends and sudden volatility indicated the scope of the challenge. In Tunisia where it all started, a group of CAST indicators spiked in October of 2009, based on content analysis of media reports at the time, when then-President Ben Ali won a fifth term in office in flawed elections. In November 2010, pressures began to spike again dramatically a month before a man named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire and ignited a revolution.

North Africa: Group Grievance & Human Rights Indicators

North Africa: State Legitimacy Indicator

North Africa vs. The Levant: State Legitimacy Indicator

North Africa vs. The Levant: Security Apparatus Indicator

Along with Tunisia, State Legitimacy was worsening in the fourth quarter of 2010 in Libya and Egypt as well. Trailing the State Legitimacy score by three months, pressures on the Security Apparatus manifested as security forces responded to massive protests using varying degrees of repressive force.

The storm then spun into Syria, which lagged behind the North African countries by about three months.

Turning South

Now, waves of instability have moved south from North Africa to the Western Sahel region. According to the UN Security Council's Group of Experts, weapons from the 2011 civil war in Libya moved rapidly throughout the region, particularly Chad, Niger, and into Mali where January 2012 attacks in the North drove refugees into Mauritania. In April-May 2012, rebels declared independence in the northern part of Mali, and refugees and fighters from Mali crossed porous borders into neighboring countries. Forces were drawn in from abroad to fight on both sides, regionalizing the impacts of the conflict.

Given this fact, it is perhaps not surprising that as measured by content analysis, there was an unmistakable echo of Mali's indicator scores in countries throughout the region, particularly Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso where there was an increased number of refugees and border disputes. Even as far south as Nigeria, militants from the Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad (known as Boko Haram) have reportedly fled to Mali for training and safe haven. As counterinsurgency escalates in the northeastern part of Nigeria, refugees are fleeing north into the neighboring country Niger, where the United States has begun setting up a base from which unarmed Predator drones can conduct surveillance over the Sahel region.

When states fail they don't fall alone; they pull neighbors into their wake. This is nothing new; when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, it was a "Spring" of sorts for democracy but it did lead to paroxysms across former Soviet bloc countries and Yugoslavia as the balance of power was suddenly upended, patronage dried up, and populations were displaced. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, promotion of sustainable human security requires more collaboration at every level, including those in the public, private, and nongovernmental sectors. In a place like the Sahel, drones and counterinsurgency will not solve the longer-term challenges. The long-term problems will not be solved from the top down, particularly as the international community wearies of state building.

The Dark Side of State Building:
South Sudan

Nate Haken and Patricia Taft

For sustainable human security, state building is the only endgame. Absent the state, traditional mechanisms and authority structures might indeed manage communal issues, perhaps even better than would the state. Trans-communal issues like environmental degradation, complex humanitarian emergencies, and large scale conflict, however, go beyond the jurisdiction and capacity of such entities. Building a legitimate, professional, and representative state, therefore, is the only way to address the problems of the modern, interconnected world. This process is inherently messy, however, as demonstrated in the case of the world's newest state, South Sudan, number four on this year's Failed States Index.

We must be clear-eyed about what state building means. New states bring with them many things, and foremost is often unrealistic expectations. A state is not an exogenous entity dropped in from above to solve the problems down below. A polarized society gives rise to a polarized state.

Institutions can be co-opted and power abused, especially in the early years as militias are subsumed into the public security forces and warlords are appointed or elected into positions of national leadership.

When South Sudan finally gained independence in July of 2011, it had come at a huge cost. Between 1983 and 2005, over two million people died in a war that for decades seemed to have no end. A popular narrative of the war spread in capitals around the world describing the conflict as one of a Christian South suppressed and plundered by a Muslim North. This narrative represents a portion of the truth. A small group of Northerners did control, marginalize and wage war against a group of mainly Southerners. But it did not reflect the full reality of the conflict and history of the country.

In addition to the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, destroyed property and infrastructure, and near total economic devastation in the South, there were deeply ingrained cleavages throughout society exacerbated by years of fighting. Along with the well-defined fault lines between rival armies and militias and the political leadership of the "two Sudans," groups divided further along tribal and religious lines as well as over issues such as land, political control and the economic opportunities created by the conflict. Nevertheless the "North bad/South good" perception helped spur action to end the conflict and push for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 which resulted in the Republic of South Sudan.

Following the heady days of independence, ceremonies and gestures of goodwill buffered the new country for some time. Development projects and money flooded into the country to repair the damage of decades of war. Focus shifted to supporting the new government, nominally made up of the "good guys," to expand their reach and create a sustainable state, from building police posts to large scale agricultural schemes. However, not even six months after the country was born, violence flared again internally, most notably in Jonglei state where ethnic groups pitted against each other in a conflict that has its roots in history but was raised to a new level with the easy availability of small arms and the heightened stakes of independence. A disarmament campaign, launched by the government and logistically supported by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), aimed to curb the violence but only exacerbated tensions as it initially targeted a minority group, the Murle, and reports of abuses by the security forces during the exercise abounded. Nearly a year and a half after the campaign was launched, the conflict and its effects continue. In November 2012, a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) report accused the government of hindering relief efforts for internally displaced people in the state by refusing to grant permission for their staff to travel to those areas. Statements and reports over the disarmament abuses, continued fighting between the South Sudanese military (SPLA) and rebel groups, threats to civilians, and challenges to providing emergency aid have trickled out mainly from civil society and NGOs but there has been a surprising lack of noise from international governments and the UN

South Sudan: Political and Military Indicators

SEC
FE
Aggregate
SL
HR

10.00
9.00
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00

2011 Q1 2011 Q2 2011 Q3 2011 Q4 2012 Q1 2012 Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4

Monthly trends as measured by content analysis only.

South Sudan: Social Indicators

REF
GG
DP

10.00
9.50
9.00
8.50
8.00
7.50
7.00
6.50
6.00

2011 Q1 2011 Q2 2011 Q3 2011 Q4 2012 Q1 2012 Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4

Monthly trends as measured by content analysis only.

about the ongoing violence.

At best, the government can do little to stop the violence and accompanying humanitarian crises. At worst, whispers echo that the violence in Jonglei and elsewhere like Warrap and Upper Nile is being spurred on by politicians and power brokers who are interested in land, money, and revenge. The government most often points the blame at Khartoum, which was in fact found complicit in providing assistance to South Sudanese rebels. There was never much consideration given, however, to the idea that there are also legitimate grievances and deep internal divisions underlying the conflict that have nothing to do with Khartoum. The usual answer to outbreaks of conflict in South Sudan has been heavy SPLA crackdowns sometimes accompanied by one-off peace conferences that leave behind a trail of unfulfilled recommendations for development, infrastructure, political representation, and security.

Compounding the outbreak of fighting and humanitarian emergencies that gripped the country throughout 2012, the new government in Juba struggled to reconcile its former rebel roots with its newfound responsibilities to lead a democratic and developing country. Media freedom was increasingly curtailed in 2012. The killing of a well-known commentator and journalist in December, the arbitrary arrest, beatings, and detention of members of the press, and the failure of the government to enact media laws were all strongly condemned

internationally, leading the country to rank 124 of 180 on the 2013 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters without Borders. The South Sudan National Security Services, a security apparatus whose functions and mandate have never been clearly defined by law, was repeatedly cited as carrying out attacks on journalists, including harassment and illegal detention. This fueled speculation that the new government routinely engages such praetorian forces to deal with dissent rather than go through official state-sanctioned channels, perhaps a hangover from its early days as a guerrilla movement. In addition, international organizations have begun to confront a familiar problem as some international aid workers are forced, for seemingly political reasons, to leave the country with little public resistance or outcry from their agencies or other international observers.

South Sudan may have lots of window dressing but as of yet none of the actual underpinnings of viable statehood. While shiny 4x4 vehicles, hotels, new banks and stores are popping up in the capital of Juba, outside there is the near complete absence of development or infrastructure. The new government, reliant for 90% of its revenue from oil, was nearly bankrupt by the end of the year because months of disputes with Khartoum had led Juba to turn off the pump in January of 2012. A mid-year attempt by the government to begin collecting taxes was also met with widespread reluctance amid reports that government officials had "misplaced" and "stolen" nearly US$4 billion.

Officials urged citizens not to worry as international donors would fill the budget shortfalls further fueling speculation that not only did the new government lack the necessary skills to run a state absent international assistance, it also had little incentive to try. The U.S. government obliged with an international conference in April 2013 aimed at increasing investment and development funding for the fledgling state. Only time will tell if this actually translates into something meaningful.

Throughout 2012, the "good" guys of South Sudan were suddenly not looking so great. This should not be surprising. Experiences from southeastern Europe in the late nineties and early 2000s and our experiments in state building in Afghanistan and Iraq have repeatedly shown that imposing a state structure, democratic or otherwise, on top of a country or territory that has been in a constant state of warfare for decades is bound to be chaotic. For those who cared to look behind the narrative, the signs that all was not well in South Sudan were there years before the referendum on independence. We must again acknowledge that state building is not a technical exercise but an inherently political process that brings inevitable tensions between the extension and empowerment of state authority and accountability and the upholding of human rights. In the case of South Sudan, the recognition that this tension exists and tradeoffs have been made by those in

The Recovery of Somalia:
Check Back With Us Again Next Year

Felipe Umaña

Somalia has been what many would describe as the quintessential "failed state" since the inception of the Failed States Index (FSI). Struggling with an occasionally unforgiving semi-arid topography in much of the North, widespread poverty as a result of tight competition for few resources, and mired by high levels of insecurity, an inchoate political system, and a disjointed sovereignty, Somalia has performed poorly in virtually every indicator measured on this and other global indices.

Somalia today represents a hollow shell of the state it was prior to the collapse of its government in 1991. Although the international community still recognizes Somalia as an integral nation, much of the North is beyond the governance of Mogadishu — the de facto independent Somaliland and neighboring Puntland make up a substantial chunk of the country's territory. Today, an ailing post-transitional government headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud continues to make strides to unite the autonomous northern regions

and return Somalia to the peace and unity it once enjoyed. Because of these and other state pressures, it may come as little surprise that Somalia is once again at the top of the FSI for the sixth year in a row.

Overall trends seen in the last five years of the FSI underline many of Somalia's destabilizing factors, though small improvements have been more plentiful than expected. Despite some gains in the 2011 FSI, last year saw the worsening again of many indicators as security and development declined and insurgency, crime, and lawlessness increased, even as al-Shabaab's insurgency was largely quelled around the capital city. Somalia's 2012 FSI score was actually the highest ever seen in the history of the FSI.

Notwithstanding, the 2013 FSI — which included the numerous advancements and improvements in security won in 2012 — sees Somalia improving in six indicators and actually earning its lowest score ever. The Security Apparatus and State Legitimacy indicators improved due to gains against al-Shabaab and a marked decrease in maritime piracy. The near-unanimous passing of a new Provisional Constitution, the inauguration of the Federal Parliament of Somalia, and a peaceful democratic presidential election have also demonstrated that a confident government could make strides even in uncertain times. Additionally, the Group Grievance score also improved, likely due to a decrease in discrimination and violence against religious and ethnic groups targeted by al-Shabaab.

Somalia's informal economic networks have burgeoned in spite of poor security

conditions and have hardened to these conditions over the years. Furthermore, although a worsening in the Human Flight indicator may mean lower numbers of skilled or educated individuals choosing to remain in Somalia, this outflow of talent has been partially offset by remittances sent from abroad that have in turn helped to keep Somalia's economy afloat.

Somalia's food security conditions also improved marginally in 2012, decreasing its Demographic Pressures score. The improvement is in part due to the rainy season in the Fall of 2012, which raised crop output and helped end Somalia's 2011 famine; likewise, distribution of emergency food aid was better facilitated by stronger security around distribution sites. The situation in Somalia, however, remains far from stable. Indeed, though the rains were welcome to the success of crops, they also caused substantial damage and displaced over 20,000 people, thus impacting the Refugees and IDPs score to the highest it can possibly get on the FSI.

Somalia's long-standing lack of any widely accepted central authority, combined with the existence of numerous disparate informal political institutions, particularly rural clans, lend to Somalia's abysmally high Human Rights and Factionalized Elites scores. All in all, Somalia's improvements on the FSI 2013 reflect a rise in government confidence, a slight movement towards increased economic activity, and a somewhat stronger security apparatus, though still small enough to get lost in Somalia's multitude of other stresses.

Yet, what has persisted in making Somalia

the epitome of what some regard as a "failed state"? For one, the manner in which the international community and President Mohamud's government have window-dressed the country's myriad of issues is problematic. The international community, for instance, has focused its assistance on sectors like humanitarian aid, health and sanitation, meaning aid has been funneled more towards the symptoms rather than the existing structures that encapsulate these very problems. Without the explicit targeting of Somalia's existing economic, political, and social institutions, it is likely that Somalia will be unable to escape its ailments. This is critical as international actors must help Somalia develop and grow by allowing their existing institutions to bear the weight of reconstruction.

Moreover, by ignoring the peripheral informal institutions — rural tribes and clans, who usually view the central government with distrust — and focusing only on top-down forms of assistance, international donors risk alienating those in clan-aligned areas. The absence of a strong central government since 1991 has allowed for the development of informal, but stalwart, civil, religious, and customary structures in rural regions, which have the necessary authority to organize local Somalis. If both informal and formal institutions are not reconciled, in what

President Mohamud called "a very delicate balance," the crab-in-the-bucket mentality could prevail. This could pit clans and the federal government against each other and any progress towards greater unity could be lost.

Lastly, many viewed the London Conference on Somalia this past May as a diplomatic event dealing mainly with the symptoms in Somalia, not the more intractable, sensitive issues. Critics complained that the international community has no consensus on Somaliland vis-à-vis Somalia, for instance, and have sent mixed messages to both governments, excluding one from deliberations with the other. Others see Somalia's government as ignoring reality, and still, many view the international community as blind to the actual nuts and bolts on the ground. Though international forums like these could prove useful in many ways, they must move away from obscuring the country's pressures.

Instead of disguising Somalia's problems, the international community should practice smart development. In by-passing typically corrupt aid-delivery structures, governments and private companies can work together and improve conditions on the ground. The international community can also move towards developing regions outside of Mogadishu, which has been the

focal point for most assistance. Though this might be limited to areas not under insurgent control, parts of Puntland and the central state of Galmudug, as well as others, could benefit from increased international attention.

One of Somalia's greatest problems has been the absence of a widely accepted political authority capable of bringing together Somalis under a common set of goals. Although President Mohamud's administration has made some strides in the political arena, much more needs to be done to remove Somalia's "failed state" moniker and help the country rebuild. This is critical not only on a moral ground, but also for global security. Somalia's widespread lawlessness over the last decade has made the country a hotbed for jihadists and rampant criminality. Though efforts to stifle these threats on both land and sea have improved security conditions, for the most part, these and other issues stand to continue to threaten the stability of the country, Africa, and the international community as a whole. Tackling these crises will undoubtedly involve substantial costs for global actors. If they are not dealt with promptly and effectively, however, Somalia and the world will face greater costs in the future.

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Anatomy of a Storm: Regional Impacts of the Arab Spring

Short term security and humanitarian emergencies can perhaps be addressed on an ad hoc basis at mounting cost as the world pivots from crisis to crisis. But for better or worse, state building is the only solution in the end, which is why holistic frameworks and dynamic data analysis of risk factors at the regional, national, and

local levels are critical. The process of data gathering and analysis must be owned, with the support of the international community, by local civil society so that they can actively use the information to promote reconciliation, improved governance, increased public services, and infrastructure development. Effective collaboration requires shared information on compatible platforms so that data can be meaningfully

integrated, cross-validated, and analyzed. More important than good data and analysis, is the application of that information by a broad group of stakeholders, from local to international and from public to private, to use it in a collaborative way for building practical and sustainable conflict mitigation and peace building strategies.

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The Year of Red-Line Diplomacy

Patricia Taft

The top several tiers of the annual Failed States Index (FSI) are often occupied not only by weak and fractured states at risk for conflict, but also states that have, over the years, been the proverbial thorns in the side of the international community. Each year these chart toppers, often impervious by either choice or circumstance to reform, test the mettle of world leaders tasked with coming up with strategies for dealing with their dangerous behavior. Once we recognize that states — such as those near the top of the FSI — are a threat to the international system, what is the appropriate strategy for dealing with them? For 2012, that strategy can be summed up as the year of red line diplomacy.

The two most notorious recipients of red line diplomacy in 2012 were Iran and Syria, both around the development or deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In both cases, the United States and Israel issued what appeared to be stark ultimatums to each country that once certain red lines were crossed, harsh retaliatory action would be taken. The problem, in both cases, was that neither Israel nor the U.S. seemed to be on the same page as to what constituted a red line and, if indeed crossed, what specific actions would be taken.

Other states on the Index have also, at various times, been subjected to rhetoric that, if not specifically invoking the term "red line," was similarly ominous. North Korea, Pakistan, and China have been duly warned for wide-ranging transgressions from unfair trade practices to harboring designated terrorist networks. However, as pointed out by Rosa Brooks in a May 2, 2013 article on *Foreign Policy*'s online National Security series, in addition to red line diplomacy, the usage of such terms as "intolerable" and "unacceptable" have been increasingly employed by political leaders to indicate that if a state does not cease and desist in specific actions and policies, an uncertain and potentially hostile fate awaits.

In embracing terminology meant to intimidate and isolate, the range of options available in dealing with rogue or fractured states also becomes increasingly narrow. As further pointed out by Brooks, when we treat fractured and fragile states and their leaders like misbehaving brats, we greatly limit our range of available diplomatic, non-lethal options. Red line diplomacy has made for a confusing and potentially dangerous game of political brinkmanship when dealing with rogue, fracturing and fragile states.

One of the lessons from recent red line diplomacy in Iran and Syria to our eight-year involvement in Iraq is to not define the nature of states solely through the personalities that represent them. In dealing with weak and failing states held together by strong men, we are calling into question the actions of the individual and not the state. A leader's bellicosity or intransigence, such as in Iran and Syria, often provoke knee-jerk reactions of the "or else" variety. When the threat or action we are trying to prevent or stop is coming from an individual and not the state, red-line diplomacy may not only leave us backtracking, as demonstrated by the recent kerfuffle over Syria's possible use of chemical weapons, but may serve to further encourage the very behavior we are trying to prevent.

Whether red line diplomacy works depends on the context, of course, and also the very changing nature of fragile states. Yesterday's pariah can be today's rebounder, such as Myanmar, the state everyone loved to hate only a couple of years ago. Many would argue, however, that the rehabilitation of Myanmar was not the result of years of isolation and hectoring but rather of a quiet and gradual effort at multisectoral statebuilding. Many, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have argued that red lines were successful during the Cold War nuclear arms race as the ultimate deterrent, citing the Cuban missile crisis and Moscow's ultimate withdrawal of its missiles. Many others would be quick to question, however, whether successful red line diplomacy should be celebrated at the knife's edge of a nuclear Armageddon. States and their leaders can also be vilified, rehabilitated, and then vilified again, permanently, as Colonel Qaddafi would most certainly attest

"At this late hour, there is only one way to peacefully prevent Iran from getting atomic bombs. That's by placing a clear red line on Iran's nuclear weapons program"

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at United Nations General Assembly (October 2012)

"We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is [if] we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized."

President Barack Obama, Impromptu Press Conference (August 2012)

— if he could. In Libya's case, red line diplomacy might be said to have worked because the threat was eventually followed by action. At the same time, however, it did create unrealistic expectations on how other international bullies might be dealt with in the future. And, of course, there is the perennial favorite, the Hermit Kingdom, where the opacity of the state and the dangerous eccentricities of the leadership combine to create one of the world's most vexing foreign policy challenges. Multiple lines have been drawn in the sand for North Korea over the years, sometimes leading to negotiations and other times leading to yet more saber-rattling and dangerous nuclear one-upmanship. Overall, however, North Korea appears impervious to such ultimatums, and perhaps for good reason.

Red line diplomacy is rife with uncertainties that are difficult to manage once unleashed. One man's red line is another man's red cape, particularly when bullying states and their leadership have few friends but large arsenals. Plus, as in the case of the American and Israeli red lines over Tehran's

nuclear weapons program, red lines can shift over time and for different purposes, creating confusion that can possibly lead to further entrenchment. If a red line is being used as a deterrent, as one assumes in the case of Iran, then continuously moving the red line can make it an ineffective tool. Similarly, regarding Syria, President Obama's threshold of "a whole bunch of chemical weapons" is extremely difficult to quantify and qualify, leading to further confusion and dithering.

Furthermore, as pointed out by Paul Pillar, a former career CIA analyst and current Georgetown University professor, red lines can serve to relieve domestic pressure to act, such as in the insistence from Congress that President Obama take a harsher stance on both Iran and Syria. However, as Pillar was quoted in a May 2013 *National Journal* article, "Now that Syria seems to have crossed [Obama's] red line, we're seeing that such short-term diplomacy of the moment carries long-term risks."

In the case of Iran and North Korea,

multiple and contradictory red lines can lead to leaders walking up to the threshold, or even crossing it, purposely or inadvertently. A red line meant for domestic consumption can become a taunt on the international stage, and sometimes it may be accepted. The risks can include very real human costs, like the 80,000 and counting lives lost in Syria as red lines have been set, reached, and crossed. Moreover, as Syria continues to fracture, it risks becoming like the Yugoslavia of the 1990s, where Slobodan Milosevic called our "boy who cried wolf" bluff and an entire region was ultimately sucked into conflict before decisive action was finally taken years, and tens of thousands of deaths, later.

It seems that only time will tell in the cases of Iran, Syria and North Korea how red line diplomacy will fare. To be certain, while red line diplomacy became the rage in 2012, it may ultimately be determined that it carries far too many risks with too few benefits and at too high of a cost in dealing with weak and failing states.

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The Dark Side of State Building: South Sudan

Continued from page 24

power seems to have come belatedly or simply remains behind closed doors. The first step is not to ignore or paper over these problems in the name of "keeping it together" but to deal with them honestly and fully in order to avoid compounding existing grievances and divisions that will

continue the cycle of violence and marginalization.

South Sudan has a long road ahead of it to create a democratic and prosperous nation, and it will undoubtedly take time and the efforts of many. Nobody understands this better than the average South Sudanese who deal everyday with the contradictions

of living in a state born to be free and peaceful but who are currently insecure and restricted. Those who have pledged to help these citizens achieve what South Sudan was meant to be should confront the realities they experience and not the narratives or politics others create.

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Patricia Taft is Director of Transnational Threats at The Fund for Peace.

Multidimensional Solutions:
The Four D's of Human Security

Krista Hendry

Tackling state fragility — once it has been identified by tools such as the Failed States Index (FSI) — is by no means a simple or straightforward task. Nor is it a one-dimensional task that can be undertaken alone. Building a state and society that protects human security requires a multifaceted strategy by a team of committed actors to stand any chance of being effective.

Such a collaborative strategy is "The 3 D's" – Defense, Diplomacy, and Development – a framework for promoting a whole-of-government approach (or whole-of-alliance approach as in the case of NATO) in addressing the needs of conflict and post-conflict states. It was formulated as a response to the recognition that military might would not be enough to protect U.S. interests abroad, but other types of power were needed as well. Touted and critiqued over the years, the 3 D's called for agencies of government to work together that often had inadequate experience in doing so. As has been raised in several articles in this publication, we believe there must be much

wider collaboration beyond the government, to include the private sector, civil society organizations, and local communities. The 4 D's is a framework that seeks to define the original 3 D's more broadly than they traditionally have been and adds a fourth critical "D" to the mix – Data Analysis.

Defense from a government perspective often refers to a wide range of military functions from kinetic operations to stabilization and disaster response. When we think of human security, however, there are other roles for the military beyond intervention and there are also other actors that can help create a more secure environment. Many militaries also play a critical role in the military-to-military (or "mil -to-mil") arena, which can include training and institution building, activities that can also support diplomatic efforts.

For long-term security within a country, of course, the development of police capacities is also incredibly important. Here too, the police-to-police (or "pol-to-pol") work that is undertaken internationally includes both training and institution building. Beyond public security, there is also a role for the private sector to play. Strained government budgets have meant a greater reliance on private security providers. When we think of private security in the U.S., we often think of the contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan that have been so much in the news and a source of controversy. But private security also includes the unarmed guards at grocery stores, other businesses, and even sometimes in front of gated communities. And when operating in weak and failing states, companies and NGOs

(and even governments) will employ private security or have direct employees providing security.

Diplomacy has traditionally been thought of in two ways — official government-to-government diplomacy (Track I) and unofficial diplomacy (Track II), which includes a range of other actors. This parallel track to diplomacy sought to take advantage of other actors and not make diplomacy merely a role of government. There is also the diplomacy that takes place within multilateral institutions like the UN and various regional and sub-regional bodies.

Within a country, there is also diplomacy taking place between the different levels of government: local government authorities often have to advocate for resources to trickle down from federal coffers. Regional land planning is also a form of diplomacy with multiple stakeholders working together to identify development needs to create the best land-use options. Corporations also have targeted diplomatic efforts at various levels in the countries in which they operate. They may advocate for greater services for their local communities, for example, particularly when they are operating in rural, impoverished areas where government is weak or completely lacking. We also have to take into account traditional governments, like tribal leaders, including in particular indigenous groups who are recognized as not being part of the governed but having autonomy.

Development in the traditional 3D approach referred to governmental and NGO efforts to build the economic, social, and political

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DEFENSE	DIPLOMACY	DEVELOPMENT	DATA ANALYSIS
Military Intervention	Multilateral Institutions	Foreign Aid	Satellite Imagery
Mil-to-Mil Training	State-to-State	Local Capacity Building	Aerial Imagery
Military Institution Bldg	Federal Capacity Building	Entrepreneurship Building	Indices
Pol-to-Pol Training	Fed-to-Local	Access to Capital	Expert Opinion
Police Institution Bldg	Local Gov't Capacity Building	Access to Market	Media
Private Security Companies	Corporate Government Affairs	Local Supply Chain Development	Statistics & Surveys
Security Personnel	Community Org. Development	Foreign Direct Assistance	Local Citizen reports

Data integration platforms

foundations of stable communities and societies. The expectation was that if there was basic security and enough development, the private sector would make investments in the form of foreign direct investment. Local markets, supported also by efforts of governments and NGOs to build capacity and access to capital to local entrepreneurs, would then begin to grow. Here too the private sector is an actor that should be considered as crucial in the defining of development. Increasingly, we are seeing that foreign companies, desperate to reduce their costs and increase their positive impact by being able to source more locally, also develop and resource projects focused on increasing entrepreneurship and access to capital. Development often took a "if we build it, they will come" approach, sometimes failing to ask the private sector directly what their priorities were so they could be calculated earlier into development plans.

The fourth D – Data Analysis – has always been there. The analysis of data drives our decision making in all three categories and every sector uses it. As with the other D's,

we need to make investments in data analysis to improve human security and assess whether we have all the right tools in our toolbox and how those tools are working. For this reason, we believe it deserves its own category. Before data can be analyzed, of course, it must be gathered. In each sector, an amazing amount of time and resources are spent gathering data when it exists and generating it when it does not. And this data comes from a vast spectrum of sources and levels. The highest would be satellite imagery and the data that can be generated from analysis of that imagery. Coming down a bit one can also gather aerial imagery. Back on earth, we have indices, like the FSI and many others that have taken vast amounts of data and sought to create new data through the selection and integration of specific data sets. Then there is quantitative data – i.e. statistics. This data, though sometimes old or unreliable, provides not only an important snapshot about an environment but the trends in the statistical data also become a new set of data. Added to this myriad of data are surveys, expert opinion polls, media content, and data gathered

from local community-based organization, as FFP does with its UNLocK program in Liberia and Nigeria. This data may be collected through local workshops or, following training, via SMS or Internet when it is available.

Obviously, this fourth D is cross-cutting, because everyone needs it and everyone generates it. We would argue, however, that all of the D's are crosscutting in a sense. Just as diplomacy is a set of tools used by any sector, development is also a tool again used by all sectors. For example, when a military helps another country develop its security-related institutions through training and other capacity-building exercises, it is doing both institution building and diplomacy – clearly a focus of development and political settlements. This broad view of the 4D's, with the recommendation that they be viewed as toolboxes, not silos of actors, is being presented so that we can, as a community, review what tools we have, how we are using them, and whether they are working.

Are the right actors using the right tools in the rights ways to address the wrongs in this world? We believe there are opportunities being lost because actors have a narrow view of where they fit, and what tools they can utilize, in the community seeking to address the challenges. As the FSI demonstrates, we cannot afford to miss any opportunity to create greater human security. In adding another dimension to the traditional 3D's, we hope to help broaden and deepen the ways in which data and cross-cutting analysis can enhance our abilities to build stable and secure states that give back to their citizens.

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No State is an Island:
The Importance of a Multisectoral Approach

Krista Hendry

In the 2013 Failed States Index (FSI), we call attention to the linkages between the underlying causes of state fragility. Essentially, no state is an island, and pressures in one state, no matter how seemingly isolated, often lead to wider destabilization. The pressures that can underlay and lead to conflict are normally a combination of economic, social, environmental, and political factors that can reinforce each other, pushing countries or communities into greater instability if not addressed. Sometimes addressing or relieving one pressure, however, can actually intensify another, necessitating a much better understanding of how we can develop programs to support reducing some pressures while not exacerbating others. We also must better understand both the local context in which state fragility occurs as well as local abilities to manage potential conflict drivers if we are to work to increase those capacities rather than relying on external support indefinitely.

With our increasingly connected world, issues such as slavery, genocide, child labor, and poverty spill over borders in the form of people, weapons, and conflict. Only by working in collaboration, across sectors and issues, but also locally and internationally, do we stand a chance to drive the real change needed to reduce the major global challenges highlighted in the FSI. In particular, the need for multisectoral collaboration is being increasingly recognized. For too long, we have worked in silos – stove piped into various sectors and areas of expertise. In recognition of the interrelatedness of the issues that drive state fragility, we must take a holistic approach both to understanding the challenges and in developing programs to increase human security. Furthermore, beyond working across sectors at the international level, if we do not also figure out how to better collaborate and integrate local knowledge and ownership, we will constantly be chasing our tail, and human beings will suffer for it.

In the last ten years, there has been a dramatic increase in initiatives known as 'MSIs' (multistakeholder initiatives or multisectoral initiatives). Experience has repeatedly shown that it takes the combined efforts of companies, governments and civil society to actually implement programs on the ground to address complex challenges, develop good practices and programs, and make an impact where it matters most — with the people most impacted by the symptoms of state weakness.

With today's financial constraints on aid and development projects, we have to get increasingly smarter about how we find and use resources. The private sector is a powerful actor but was previously an afterthought in development projects and rarely included in programs designed to address what were seen as "social issues." They have often been an afterthought in initial state building. While their money was welcome, their expertise was underutilized. If actors in the private sector see a business case for committing to multistakeholder initiatives and supporting programs to address challenges, they can be an important contributor — not just of financial resources but of expertise and new perspectives.

One MSI that has made change at local levels and improved conditions is the Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights (VPs). The VPs is an initiative that began in 2000 by companies, their home governments, and non-governmental organizations, including The Fund for Peace. Initially the group drew up a set of broad principles for ensuring that companies have the policies and procedures in place to prevent human rights-related security incidences. It then created a forum to meet annually to discuss how the three pillars, as they became known, would collaborate to implement the principles to which they had agreed.

The first change that the VPs contributed to was one of mindset. The oil and mining companies that had come together to create the VPs had traditionally seen security as an issue of protecting the company from potential threats from the community. With the creation of the VPs, they were signaling a change to industry, which has since been adopted much more widely, that security was for the company

and the community. They also previously saw a risk as something to prevent by deterring access. They now were assessing risks by seeking to understand the stresses on the communities and encourage programs that would seek to reduce those stresses as a means of reducing the security risk. Today, companies consider the social and economic situation of the communities in and around their operations as this may increase the potential risk of a security incident. Working more closely with community relations and others, security managers are seeking to understand where the risks lie and what can be done, beyond protection and prevention of access, to increase security by reducing tensions that may exist with or within the local communities. This mindset change has created a direct benefit to the communities, as livelihoods and human rights programs are developed in collaboration with local government, companies, NGOs, and the communities themselves.

The VPs are only one example of an MSI. MSIs exist to cover a range of issues — environmental, human rights, human security, economic development — the list goes on. They exist across a range of industries. There are some commonalities amongst them all but, first and foremost, they are all about compromise. Of the many challenges in collaboration, learning how to compromise while still ensuring the value of bringing different perspectives and expertise around the table is not easy. As the VPs demonstrate, however, that compromise has real value to our ability to learn how to make a difference in communities suffering from the pressures we highlight on the FSI.

The most basic requirement for collaboration is mutual respect and trust. This takes time to develop and often starts with the individuals and then needs to be institutionalized. A very basic and major challenge to building that trust is communication. The same term can mean very different things to different people. We also think in different time periods — some are focused on short-term symptom alleviation while others are focused on long-term solutions. The term "sustainability" is a great example. For a company, it most likely means that a challenge has been solved in a way that can continue without the additional need for charity. For an NGO, a program may be sustainable when they perceive an ongoing revenue stream to continue delivering services, whether that revenue stream is philanthropic or not. Taking the time to understand what we are saying when we use terms like sustainability is critical to the success of any collaboration. Otherwise, we all may think we are on the same path, but when we get to the destination, we may find ourselves in either different places or lost altogether.

For addressing the myriad challenges highlighted in the FSI that negatively impact human security, it will take many more initiatives at various levels — international, national and local. While most of the work does need to be done at the local level, where the people are suffering and the underlying conditions need to be resolved with local ownership of the solution, international MSIs do provide important platforms for pooling resources and expertise, creating better understanding of how different efforts can work together, and ensuring cross-sectoral learning and information sharing. Together we are smarter and can be more efficient, and to cure some of the suffering, that's exactly what we need to be.

Krista Hendry is Executive Director of The Fund for Peace.

Failed States Index 2013:
Best and Worst by Indicator

Social and Economic Indicators

Demographic Pressures `DP`

Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will.

Best Performers			Worst Performers		
178th	Iceland	1.6	1st	Congo, D.R.	10.0
177th	Luxembourg	1.7	2nd	Niger	9.8
176th	Finland	1.9	3rd	Ethiopia	9.7
175th	Norway	2.0	4th	Haiti	9.6
=173rd	New Zealand	2.1	=5th	Chad	9.5
	Switzerland	2.1		Somalia	9.5

Refugees and IDPs `REF`

Pressures associated with population displacement. This strains public services, and has the potential to pose a security threat.

Best Performers			Worst Performers		
=177th	New Zealand	1.1	=1st	Congo, D.R.	10.0
	Singapore	1.1		Somalia	10.0
=175th	Ireland	1.4		South Sudan	10.0
	Slovenia	1.4		Sudan	10.0
174th	Switzerland	2.1	5th	C.A.R.	9.8

Group Grievance `GG`

When tension and violence exists between groups, the state's ability to provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.

Best Performers			Worst Performers		
=177th	Iceland	1.0	=1st	Iraq	10.0
	Sweden	1.0		South Sudan	10.0
175th	Finland	1.4		Sudan	10.0
174th	Ireland	1.6	=4th	Nigeria	9.8
173rd	Portugal	2.3		Israel	9.8

Brain Drain and Human Flight `HF`

When there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human capital. Those with resources also often leave before, or just as, conflict erupts.

Best Performers			Worst Performers		
178th	United States	1.0	1st	Haiti	9.1
177th	Australia	1.1	2nd	Somalia	8.9
=175th	Austria	1.6	3rd	Samoa	8.8
	Norway	1.6	4th	Zimbabwe	8.6
173rd	Sweden	1.7	=5th	Grenada	8.5
				Guyana	8.5

Uneven Economic Development `UED`

When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, governments tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract.

Best Performers			Worst Performers		
178th	Finland	1.0	1st	Angola	9.4
=176th	Luxembourg	1.5	=2nd	C.A.R.	9.2
	Norway	1.5		Nigeria	9.2
175th	Denmark	1.6	=4th	Eq. Guinea	9.1
=173rd	Iceland	1.7		Haiti	9.1
	Sweden	1.7		P.N.G.	9.1

Poverty and Economic Decline `ECO`

Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create class friction.

Best Performers			Worst Performers		
178th	Luxembourg	1.5	1st	Haiti	9.7
177th	Sweden	1.7	2nd	Somalia	9.4
176th	Canada	1.8	3rd	North Korea	9.3
=173rd	Austria	1.9	=4th	Guinea	9.2
	Denmark	1.9		Yemen	9.2
	Norway	1.9			

Political and Military Indicators

State Legitimacy SL

Corruption and a lack of representativeness in the government directly undermine the social contract.

Best Performers				Worst Performers			
=176th		New Zealand	0.5	=1st		Chad	9.8
		Norway	0.5			Guinea	9.8
		Sweden	0.5			North Korea	9.8
=175th		Switzerland	0.8	4th		Guinea Bissau	9.6
=171st		Australia	1.0	=5th		Congo, D.R.	9.5
		Denmark	1.0			Sudan	9.5
		Finland	1.0			Syria	9.5
		Netherlands	1.0				

Public Services PS

The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are key roles of the state.

Best Performers				Worst Performers			
178th		Luxembourg	1.3	1st		Chad	9.9
=175th		Denmark	1.4	=2nd		Somalia	9.8
		Norway	1.4			South Sudan	9.8
		Sweden	1.4	4th		Haiti	9.6
=171st		Austria	1.5	=5th		C.A.R.	9.5
		Finland	1.5			Congo, D.R.	9.5
		France	1.5			Niger	9.5
		Netherlands	1.5			North Korea	9.5

Human Rights and Rule of Law HR

When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in its ultimate responsibility.

Best Performers				Worst Performers			
=177th		Luxembourg	1.0	1st		Somalia	10.0
		Netherlands	1.0	=2nd		Chad	9.8
=176th		Finland	1.1			Congo, D.R.	9.8
=175th		New Zealand	1.2	4th		North Korea	9.7
		Iceland	1.3	5th		Egypt	9.6
=172nd		Ireland	1.3				
		Sweden	1.3				

Security Apparatus SEC

The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakened where this is affected by competing groups.

Best Performers				Worst Performers			
=177th		Finland	1.0	=1st		Congo, D.R.	10.0
		Iceland	1.0			Iraq	10.0
=175th		Austria	1.1	3rd		Afghanistan	9.9
		New Zealand	1.1	=4th		Pakistan	9.8
174th		Switzerland	1.4			Sudan	9.8
						Syria	9.8
						Yemen	9.8

Factionalized Elites FE

When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract.

Best Performers				Worst Performers			
178th		Switzerland	1.0	=1st		Somalia	10.0
		Finland	1.1			Sudan	10.0
=175th		New Zealand	1.1	3rd		South Sudan	9.8
		Norway	1.1	=4th		Guinea Bissau	9.7
=173rd		Ireland	1.3			Zimbabwe	9.7
		Portugal	1.3				

External Intervention EXT

When the state cannot meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs.

Best Performers				Worst Performers			
=173rd		Australia	1.0	=1st		Afghanistan	10.0
		Canada	1.0			South Sudan	10.0
		Finland	1.0			Sudan	10.0
		New Zealand	1.0	4th		Haiti	9.9
		Sweden	1.0	5th		Liberia	9.8
		United States	1.0				

Failed States Index 2013:
A-Z Country Scores by Indicator

		DP	REF	GG	HF	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	FE	EXT	Total
7th	Afghanistan	9.3	9.2	9.2	7.2	7.8	8.2	9.4	8.8	8.4	9.9	9.4	10.0	106.7
119th	Albania	4.7	3.1	4.8	6.6	4.8	5.3	7.0	4.8	6.0	5.5	6.3	6.3	65.2
73rd	Algeria	5.8	7.0	7.8	5.1	6.2	5.8	7.4	5.9	7.7	7.4	7.3	5.2	78.7
43rd	Angola	8.9	7.2	6.8	5.9	9.4	5.1	8.6	8.4	7.3	6.1	7.3	6.1	87.1
128th	Antigua & Barbuda	4.6	3.0	4.1	7.6	5.6	4.5	5.8	4.0	4.4	4.9	3.7	5.8	58.0
144th	Argentina	4.1	2.0	5.0	3.0	6.0	4.0	4.4	3.9	4.1	3.0	2.7	3.8	46.1
105th	Armenia	4.9	7.0	5.7	6.0	5.6	5.9	6.6	4.4	6.8	5.3	7.0	6.2	71.3
169th	Australia	3.3	2.7	3.6	1.1	3.3	2.1	1.0	1.8	2.2	1.7	1.6	1.0	25.4
= 166th	Austria	2.3	2.4	4.3	1.6	4.0	1.9	1.5	1.5	2.0	1.1	2.7	1.6	26.9
= 76th	Azerbaijan	5.3	7.9	6.9	4.7	6.1	4.7	8.2	5.1	7.6	6.9	7.8	6.9	78.2
133rd	Bahamas	6.6	2.8	4.4	5.6	5.6	4.5	4.9	4.4	2.8	4.3	4.5	4.3	54.7
124th	Bahrain	4.6	2.5	7.3	3.3	5.7	3.2	7.6	2.4	7.5	6.1	7.1	5.6	62.9
29th	Bangladesh	8.1	7.3	8.6	7.5	7.8	7.3	8.3	8.0	7.3	7.7	8.9	5.8	92.5
137th	Barbados	3.8	2.7	4.4	6.2	5.7	5.8	3.6	2.7	2.5	4.2	4.2	5.0	50.8
= 81st	Belarus	5.7	3.6	6.8	3.9	5.7	6.2	9.0	5.2	8.3	6.3	8.3	7.6	76.7
164th	Belgium	2.5	1.6	4.1	1.8	3.8	3.5	2.1	2.2	1.5	2.0	3.9	2.0	30.9
114th	Belize	6.5	4.9	4.4	7.1	6.6	5.5	6.0	6.0	4.1	5.5	4.3	6.3	67.2
78th	Benin	8.3	6.5	3.6	6.2	7.2	7.1	6.0	8.6	5.1	5.8	6.1	7.3	77.9
= 62nd	Bhutan	6.4	6.9	7.3	6.8	7.5	6.3	6.0	6.9	7.3	5.6	7.5	7.3	81.8
= 67th	Bolivia	6.9	4.0	7.1	6.4	8.9	6.2	7.2	6.8	6.3	6.7	8.0	6.3	80.8
= 83rd	Bosnia & Herzegovina	4.4	6.8	7.7	5.6	6.2	5.2	6.7	4.4	6.4	6.4	8.7	8.0	76.5
= 121st	Botswana	8.3	5.8	4.8	5.0	7.5	6.1	4.4	6.0	4.4	3.5	3.3	4.8	64.0
126th	Brazil	7.0	3.6	5.9	3.9	8.3	3.3	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.9	4.9	3.3	62.1
123rd	Brunei Darussalam	4.5	3.3	6.2	4.6	7.8	2.8	7.4	2.6	6.9	5.6	7.4	4.1	63.2
132nd	Bulgaria	4.4	3.1	4.6	4.9	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.4	3.7	4.7	5.3	5.0	55.0
35th	Burkina Faso	9.4	7.4	5.3	6.3	8.4	7.7	7.7	8.7	6.8	7.2	7.3	8.0	90.2
20th	Burundi	8.9	8.8	8.1	6.2	7.6	9.1	8.4	8.3	7.9	7.7	7.9	8.7	97.6
41st	Cambodia	7.2	6.2	7.0	7.4	7.3	6.4	8.3	8.1	7.8	6.2	8.0	8.0	88.0
27th	Cameroon	8.3	7.3	7.8	7.2	7.8	6.1	8.5	8.4	8.1	8.0	9.2	6.8	93.5
168th	Canada	2.6	2.1	3.1	2.1	3.5	1.8	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.5	1.0	26.0
94th	Cape Verde	6.7	4.1	4.2	8.3	6.9	6.1	6.3	6.5	5.1	5.7	5.5	8.2	73.7
9th	Central African Republic	8.6	9.8	8.5	6.1	9.2	7.7	9.0	9.5	8.6	9.7	9.1	9.4	105.3
5th	Chad	9.5	9.7	8.8	8.0	8.9	8.0	9.7	9.9	9.8	9.4	9.5	7.9	109.0
152nd	Chile	4.9	2.4	3.5	2.8	5.5	4.1	3.8	4.3	3.5	2.9	1.4	3.2	42.3
66th	China	8.1	6.1	8.3	5.0	8.0	3.6	8.1	6.8	9.4	6.5	7.2	3.8	80.9
57th	Colombia	6.5	8.3	7.5	7.3	8.1	3.8	7.3	6.1	7.3	6.8	7.7	7.1	83.8
56th	Comoros	7.4	4.5	5.3	7.2	6.4	8.2	7.4	7.9	6.6	7.5	7.5	8.1	84.0
2nd	Congo (D. R.)	10.0	10.0	9.4	7.1	8.8	8.5	9.6	9.5	9.8	10.0	9.5	9.7	111.9
36th	Congo (Republic)	8.2	8.0	6.0	6.2	8.2	7.0	8.7	8.7	7.5	6.7	6.7	8.2	90.0
139th	Costa Rica	4.9	4.1	4.1	3.5	6.1	4.3	3.5	4.6	2.4	2.5	3.8	4.9	48.7
12th	Côte d'Ivoire	7.8	9.3	9.0	7.3	7.8	7.7	9.3	8.5	8.6	9.1	9.4	9.7	103.5

		DP	REF	GG	HF	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	FE	EXT	Total
135th	Croatia	3.7	5.5	5.3	4.4	4.4	5.1	3.9	2.9	4.7	4.8	4.4	5.0	54.1
101st	Cuba	6.6	5.3	4.8	6.3	5.9	5.2	6.5	4.7	7.5	6.3	6.9	6.7	72.8
115th	Cyprus	4.0	4.4	7.3	4.8	7.0	5.8	5.5	3.0	3.3	5.0	7.9	9.0	67.0
154th	Czech Republic	2.5	2.2	3.8	3.4	3.8	4.5	4.1	3.7	2.4	2.1	4.2	3.2	39.9
174th	Denmark	2.5	1.6	3.4	1.9	1.6	1.9	1.0	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.4	2.0	21.9
50th	Djibouti	8.3	7.2	6.2	5.2	7.3	6.9	7.8	7.4	7.0	6.6	7.5	8.1	85.5
= 95th	Dominican Republic	6.4	5.5	6.1	7.9	6.9	5.5	5.4	6.2	5.7	5.2	6.5	5.9	73.2
74th	Ecuador	5.8	5.7	7.2	6.8	7.4	5.6	7.2	6.9	4.9	6.7	8.2	6.2	78.6
34th	Egypt	7.2	6.5	8.5	5.4	7.1	8.2	8.9	5.6	9.6	7.3	8.7	7.7	90.6
= 95th	El Salvador	7.4	5.5	5.7	6.9	7.0	6.5	5.9	6.5	6.1	6.4	4.3	5.1	73.2
47th	Equatorial Guinea	8.3	3.3	6.6	6.6	9.1	4.5	9.6	7.6	9.4	7.5	8.2	5.5	86.1
25th	Eritrea	8.7	7.4	6.1	7.3	6.9	8.3	8.7	8.4	9.1	7.5	8.1	8.6	95.0
= 145th	Estonia	3.5	3.3	5.9	3.9	4.3	3.5	3.8	3.0	2.4	2.9	5.5	3.3	45.3
19th	Ethiopia	9.7	8.7	8.6	6.7	7.6	7.7	7.3	8.7	8.7	8.4	8.7	8.1	98.9
= 67th	Fiji	5.2	3.8	7.3	7.0	7.4	7.3	8.8	4.9	7.3	7.0	7.9	6.9	80.8
178th	Finland	1.9	1.6	1.4	2.3	1.0	3.2	1.0	1.5	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	18.0
= 161st	France	2.7	2.2	5.9	1.9	4.3	4.0	2.2	1.5	2.4	2.3	1.9	1.4	32.6
= 99th	Gabon	6.8	5.6	3.3	5.5	7.3	5.2	7.6	7.0	6.8	5.4	7.1	5.4	72.9
= 62nd	Gambia	7.7	6.4	3.7	7.1	6.8	7.8	7.6	7.5	8.0	5.5	6.8	6.9	81.8
55th	Georgia	5.2	7.5	8.0	5.2	6.3	6.4	8.6	5.4	6.4	7.9	9.4	7.9	84.2
165th	Germany	2.4	3.6	4.3	2.2	3.9	2.6	1.4	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.0	1.4	29.7
110th	Ghana	6.7	5.5	4.9	7.3	6.5	6.1	5.1	7.6	4.7	3.8	5.0	6.0	69.1
138th	Greece	4.3	2.0	4.8	4.4	4.3	6.4	5.4	3.9	3.0	3.9	3.0	5.1	50.6
120th	Grenada	5.2	3.2	3.9	8.5	5.9	5.8	6.2	3.6	3.7	5.3	5.6	7.7	64.6
70th	Guatemala	7.3	6.0	7.3	7.1	8.1	6.1	6.9	6.9	6.6	7.0	6.0	5.4	80.7
14th	Guinea	8.4	8.2	7.6	7.7	8.2	9.2	9.8	8.9	8.4	9.1	8.9	7.0	101.3
15th	Guinea Bissau	8.4	7.8	5.7	8.0	8.1	8.7	9.7	8.8	7.6	9.5	9.7	9.0	101.1
107th	Guyana	5.8	3.8	5.9	8.5	6.8	6.6	6.2	6.0	4.4	5.8	5.1	5.9	70.8
8th	Haiti	9.6	8.6	7.0	9.1	9.1	9.7	8.8	9.6	7.6	7.9	9.0	9.9	105.8
75th	Honduras	7.0	3.9	5.8	6.6	8.1	6.9	6.9	6.8	6.3	6.8	6.3	6.9	78.3
141st	Hungary	2.5	2.9	4.1	3.9	4.9	6.0	5.9	3.1	3.4	2.3	4.8	3.8	47.6
171st	Iceland	1.6	1.6	1.0	2.8	1.7	3.7	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.0	1.8	5.2	24.7
79th	India	7.5	5.2	8.2	5.4	8.1	5.4	5.2	6.7	5.9	7.8	6.8	5.2	77.5
= 76th	Indonesia	7.5	6.0	7.3	6.3	6.9	5.5	6.4	6.1	6.5	6.8	7.0	5.9	78.2
37th	Iran	5.5	7.3	8.8	6.1	6.7	6.5	8.9	5.0	9.4	8.6	9.4	7.5	89.7
11th	Iraq	8.3	8.8	10.0	8.3	8.4	7.3	8.6	7.6	8.6	10.0	9.6	8.5	103.9
170th	Ireland	2.2	1.4	1.6	2.8	2.5	3.9	1.9	1.9	1.3	1.8	1.3	2.2	24.8
= 67th	Israel (including the West Bank)	6.2	7.4	9.8	3.2	7.5	3.7	6.7	5.9	7.6	7.1	8.1	7.7	80.8
147th	Italy	3.8	3.3	4.7	2.6	3.6	4.8	4.7	2.4	2.9	5.0	4.8	2.0	44.6
118th	Jamaica	5.6	3.4	4.0	7.2	5.9	6.6	6.1	5.7	5.0	6.3	3.7	6.3	65.6
156th	Japan	5.4	3.7	3.8	2.0	1.8	3.7	2.2	2.5	3.0	1.7	2.6	3.7	36.1
87th	Jordan	6.7	7.8	7.1	4.2	6.5	6.5	6.5	4.3	7.4	5.8	6.8	6.2	75.7
109th	Kazakhstan	5.3	3.8	6.2	3.6	5.3	6.2	7.8	5.1	7.1	6.4	7.7	5.3	69.8
17th	Kenya	9.1	8.7	9.0	7.8	8.3	7.6	8.3	8.1	7.1	8.1	9.0	8.5	99.6
127th	Kuwait	5.1	3.8	4.6	3.7	5.3	3.4	7.6	2.6	6.8	4.4	7.9	4.4	59.6
48th	Kyrgyz Republic	6.2	5.6	8.4	6.4	7.0	7.6	8.4	5.9	7.6	7.4	8.0	7.3	85.7
58th	Laos	7.5	5.8	6.1	6.8	6.1	5.7	8.6	7.3	8.3	6.6	8.3	6.6	83.7
140th	Latvia	3.6	3.3	5.4	4.2	4.9	4.0	4.5	3.4	3.2	3.3	4.3	3.8	47.9

		DP	REF	GG	HF	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	FE	EXT	Total
46th	Lebanon	6.3	8.5	8.5	6.0	6.2	5.3	7.2	5.6	6.8	8.5	9.2	8.2	86.3
71st	Lesotho	8.8	4.9	4.7	6.8	6.7	8.5	6.0	8.2	5.4	5.2	7.0	7.2	79.4
= 23rd	Liberia	8.8	9.2	6.5	7.0	8.0	8.3	6.6	9.1	6.4	7.1	8.3	9.8	95.1
54th	Libya	5.5	5.4	7.4	4.2	6.7	5.0	8.4	7.3	9.0	8.9	8.0	8.8	84.5
150th	Lithuania	3.8	2.9	3.7	4.1	5.2	4.5	3.8	3.4	2.9	2.5	3.0	3.2	43.0
172nd	Luxembourg	1.7	1.8	2.8	2.1	1.5	1.5	1.9	1.3	1.0	2.3	3.4	2.0	23.3
112th	Macedonia	3.9	5.2	7.8	6.1	6.2	5.9	6.1	3.9	4.3	6.0	7.0	5.6	68.0
61st	Madagascar	8.1	4.3	4.9	5.5	7.9	8.2	7.2	8.6	5.9	7.0	7.5	7.7	82.7
40th	Malawi	8.9	6.5	5.7	8.1	8.0	8.4	7.5	8.2	6.8	5.0	7.6	8.4	89.2
116th	Malaysia	5.6	4.6	6.1	4.8	5.9	4.1	6.2	4.5	7.1	6.0	6.8	4.4	66.1
88th	Maldives	5.4	5.3	4.9	6.2	4.4	6.5	8.3	6.7	7.6	5.8	8.0	6.4	75.4
= 38th	Mali	9.3	7.6	7.6	7.8	6.8	8.1	6.0	8.5	6.5	8.1	5.0	8.0	89.3
151st	Malta	2.8	5.2	4.0	4.1	3.5	3.6	4.1	2.3	3.3	3.7	2.0	3.8	42.4
31st	Mauritania	8.5	8.3	7.2	5.7	6.5	8.0	7.7	8.4	7.4	7.8	8.2	7.9	91.7
148th	Mauritius	3.8	2.2	3.5	3.6	4.8	4.1	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.2	4.6	44.5
= 97th	Mexico	6.5	4.0	6.1	5.9	7.2	5.2	6.1	6.6	6.3	7.9	5.2	6.1	73.1
= 99th	Micronesia	7.1	3.1	4.2	8.4	8.0	7.5	6.3	6.3	3.1	5.4	5.6	7.9	72.9
= 83rd	Moldova	5.9	5.0	6.0	6.9	5.9	6.4	6.9	5.7	6.0	7.2	7.7	6.9	76.5
129th	Mongolia	5.5	2.2	3.7	2.5	6.3	4.7	5.3	5.7	5.4	4.4	5.5	6.5	57.8
134th	Montenegro	3.9	4.5	6.5	3.0	3.5	4.6	4.2	3.6	4.4	4.6	6.2	5.3	54.4
93rd	Morocco	5.8	5.9	6.5	7.0	6.9	5.3	6.7	5.9	6.6	6.3	6.6	4.9	74.3
= 59th	Mozambique	9.2	4.6	4.9	7.2	8.0	8.0	7.0	8.5	6.4	6.5	5.6	6.8	82.8
26th	Myanmar	7.6	8.5	9.0	5.4	8.4	7.3	9.0	8.1	8.3	7.8	8.6	6.6	94.6
108th	Namibia	6.9	5.6	5.3	6.5	8.7	6.7	4.1	6.7	4.9	4.9	3.5	6.5	70.4
30th	Nepal	7.6	7.7	9.0	5.9	8.1	7.3	8.1	7.3	7.9	7.6	8.2	7.1	91.8
= 166th	Netherlands	3.0	2.4	4.1	2.2	2.3	3.5	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.8	2.6	1.5	26.9
173rd	New Zealand	2.1	1.1	3.5	2.4	3.4	3.6	0.5	1.8	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	22.7
72nd	Nicaragua	6.6	4.8	5.9	7.8	7.9	6.8	7.5	6.8	5.4	5.6	6.8	7.3	79.2
18th	Niger	9.8	7.9	7.8	6.3	7.9	8.4	8.1	9.5	7.6	8.3	8.9	8.5	99.0
16th	Nigeria	8.5	6.6	9.8	7.3	9.2	7.5	8.8	9.3	8.6	9.5	9.4	6.3	100.7
= 23rd	North Korea	8.0	5.0	6.6	4.4	8.3	9.3	9.8	9.5	9.7	8.4	7.7	8.4	95.1
= 175th	Norway	2.0	1.9	3.6	1.6	1.5	1.9	0.5	1.4	1.9	2.7	1.1	1.3	21.5
136th	Oman	5.0	2.0	2.7	1.8	3.6	4.5	6.1	4.4	7.5	5.3	6.6	2.4	52.0
13th	Pakistan	8.9	9.1	9.7	6.9	7.9	7.5	8.4	7.3	8.7	9.8	9.2	9.6	102.9
131st	Panama	5.9	3.7	5.0	4.5	7.9	3.8	4.7	5.0	4.4	5.1	2.5	3.3	55.8
53rd	Papua New Guinea	7.6	5.0	6.6	7.5	9.1	6.9	7.1	8.9	6.2	6.6	7.1	6.3	84.9
104th	Paraguay	6.1	2.4	6.5	4.9	8.6	5.1	7.9	6.1	6.1	6.1	7.9	4.2	71.8
103rd	Peru	5.9	4.7	7.0	6.1	7.8	4.1	7.1	6.4	5.0	7.0	6.7	4.5	72.3
= 59th	Philippines	7.1	6.5	7.9	6.2	6.5	5.6	7.6	6.4	6.7	8.7	8.0	5.5	82.8
153rd	Poland	3.5	2.8	3.8	5.0	3.9	3.5	3.4	2.8	2.9	2.5	3.6	3.3	40.9
= 161st	Portugal	2.8	1.6	2.3	2.6	3.4	5.4	2.1	3.5	2.7	1.6	1.3	3.3	32.6
143rd	Qatar	4.3	2.1	4.9	3.1	4.8	2.9	5.9	2.0	5.6	2.5	5.0	4.0	47.1
130th	Romania	4.3	2.7	6.3	4.7	5.3	5.7	6.4	4.3	3.9	4.1	5.2	4.6	57.4
80th	Russia	5.7	5.3	8.2	5.1	7.0	3.5	8.1	5.1	8.6	8.5	8.0	4.0	77.1
= 38th	Rwanda	8.4	7.9	8.2	6.9	7.7	6.7	6.5	7.6	7.7	5.5	8.2	8.0	89.3

		DP	REF	GG	HF	UED	ECO	SL	PS	HR	SEC	FE	EXT	Total
111th	Samoa	6.8	2.5	4.8	8.8	6.0	5.9	6.0	4.8	4.5	5.5	5.1	8.0	68.7
91st	Sao Tome	6.6	4.3	4.8	7.9	6.3	7.9	6.6	6.4	4.3	5.8	6.3	7.3	74.6
102nd	Saudi Arabia	5.5	5.2	7.4	3.1	6.4	3.6	7.8	4.0	8.9	7.2	8.0	5.6	72.7
64th	Senegal	8.3	7.0	6.3	6.8	6.8	7.2	5.9	7.8	6.2	6.2	6.6	6.3	81.4
92nd	Serbia	4.7	6.6	8.0	4.7	5.9	6.5	6.3	4.7	5.5	6.5	8.0	7.0	74.4
= 121st	Seychelles	5.2	3.3	4.8	4.9	6.6	5.2	6.3	3.5	5.2	6.4	5.7	6.9	64.0
33rd	Sierra Leone	9.0	8.1	5.9	8.0	8.5	8.6	7.3	9.0	6.1	5.4	7.9	7.4	91.2
158th	Singapore	2.5	1.1	2.7	3.3	3.7	3.0	3.2	1.9	4.9	1.5	4.0	2.2	34.0
= 145th	Slovakia	3.2	2.0	5.0	4.5	4.6	5.2	4.3	3.5	3.0	2.3	3.7	3.9	45.3
163rd	Slovenia	2.5	1.4	3.3	3.2	4.5	3.6	2.8	2.1	2.5	2.5	1.6	2.3	32.3
= 51st	Solomon Islands	7.7	4.9	6.8	5.7	8.3	7.8	7.3	8.0	5.9	6.7	8.0	8.2	85.2
1st	Somalia	9.5	10.0	9.3	8.9	8.4	9.4	9.5	9.8	10.0	9.7	10.0	9.4	113.9
113th	South Africa	7.8	6.5	5.7	4.3	8.0	5.9	5.3	6.3	4.2	5.1	5.6	2.9	67.6
157th	South Korea	3.0	2.0	3.1	3.9	2.9	2.0	2.9	1.9	2.6	2.1	3.6	5.4	35.4
4th	South Sudan	8.9	10.0	10.0	6.5	8.9	8.6	9.1	9.8	9.3	9.6	9.8	10.0	110.6
149th	Spain	2.8	2.3	5.8	3.0	4.1	5.5	3.3	3.3	2.2	4.1	6.0	2.0	44.4
28th	Sri Lanka	6.8	8.4	9.5	7.3	7.8	5.9	8.2	5.5	9.0	8.5	9.3	6.8	92.9
3rd	Sudan	8.8	10.0	10.0	8.4	8.5	7.8	9.6	8.8	9.3	9.8	10.0	10.0	111.0
106th	Suriname	5.7	3.0	6.1	7.6	7.0	7.1	6.1	5.3	5.4	5.8	5.8	6.3	71.2
49th	Swaziland	9.0	4.9	3.6	6.3	7.5	8.9	8.7	7.8	8.3	6.0	7.0	7.5	85.6
177th	Sweden	2.5	2.4	1.0	1.7	1.7	1.7	0.5	1.9	1.3	2.2	1.8	1.0	19.7
= 175th	Switzerland	2.1	1.5	3.5	2.1	2.3	2.3	0.8	1.4	1.7	1.4	1.0	1.4	21.5
21st	Syria	5.6	9.5	9.3	6.2	7.2	6.4	9.6	7.0	9.5	9.8	9.2	8.1	97.4
= 51st	Tajikistan	7.4	5.3	6.7	5.9	6.2	8.0	9.1	6.3	8.2	7.4	8.3	6.4	85.2
65th	Tanzania	8.6	6.8	6.0	6.4	6.4	6.8	6.2	8.8	6.2	5.5	5.7	7.7	81.1
90th	Thailand	7.9	6.4	8.1	3.5	6.4	3.5	6.2	4.6	7.3	7.8	8.8	4.6	75.1
32nd	Timor-Leste	8.7	7.4	6.8	6.4	6.7	7.9	8.0	8.5	6.0	8.3	8.3	8.5	91.5
42nd	Togo	8.2	7.1	4.8	6.8	7.6	7.4	8.3	8.3	7.8	7.4	7.5	6.5	87.8
125th	Trinidad	5.3	3.0	4.4	7.8	6.1	4.6	5.6	5.2	5.2	5.7	5.6	4.2	62.6
= 83rd	Tunisia	4.9	4.2	7.8	5.0	6.0	6.0	7.9	5.0	8.4	7.2	7.8	6.3	76.5
86th	Turkey	5.7	7.4	9.0	3.9	6.8	5.3	5.9	5.5	5.5	7.9	7.3	5.6	75.9
= 81st	Turkmenistan	5.9	3.9	6.7	4.9	6.5	5.4	9.3	6.1	8.7	7.1	7.7	4.6	76.7
22nd	Uganda	9.1	8.4	8.0	6.7	7.8	7.4	8.1	8.3	7.9	8.2	8.6	8.2	96.6
117th	Ukraine	4.7	3.2	5.9	5.7	5.3	5.4	7.8	3.6	5.7	4.4	8.0	6.2	65.9
142nd	United Arab Emirates	3.9	2.5	4.3	2.4	4.8	3.5	6.5	2.9	6.4	2.9	3.6	3.5	47.3
160th	United Kingdom	2.5	2.7	5.0	2.1	3.6	4.1	1.6	2.3	1.8	2.7	3.5	1.3	33.2
159th	United States	3.0	2.3	4.2	1.0	4.8	3.2	2.3	2.4	3.2	2.2	3.9	1.0	33.5
155th	Uruguay	3.8	1.9	2.8	4.7	4.4	3.6	1.7	3.4	2.3	3.7	2.7	3.5	38.4
44th	Uzbekistan	6.7	6.0	7.5	6.3	7.6	7.2	9.0	5.4	9.2	7.9	8.7	5.4	86.9
89th	Venezuela	5.4	4.8	6.4	5.8	6.9	5.4	7.6	6.5	7.7	6.5	7.3	4.9	75.3
= 97th	Vietnam	5.9	4.7	5.7	5.7	5.8	6.2	7.8	5.8	7.5	5.4	6.9	5.6	73.1
6th	Yemen	9.3	9.2	9.0	7.4	8.1	9.2	9.3	8.7	8.7	9.8	9.5	8.7	107.0
45th	Zambia	9.3	7.4	6.0	7.4	8.0	8.3	8.0	7.6	6.7	5.0	5.7	7.2	86.6
10th	Zimbabwe	9.2	8.7	8.4	8.6	8.6	8.6	9.2	9.1	8.9	8.4	9.7	7.8	105.2

About The Fund for Peace

Conflict Early Warning and Assessment

Transnational Threats

Sustainable Development and Security

The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security.

We promote sustainable security through research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers.

A leader in the conflict assessment and early warning field, The Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing

states. Our objective is to create practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers.

The Fund for Peace adopts a holistic approach to the issues stemming from weak and failing states. We work at both the grassroots level with civil society actors and at policy levels with key decision makers. We have worked in over 50 countries with a

wide range of partners in all sectors: governments, international organizations, the military, nongovernmental organizations, academics, journalists, civil society networks, and the private sector.

The Fund for Peace offers a wide range of initiatives focused on our central objective: to promote sustainable security and the ability of a state to solve its own problems peacefully without an external military or administrative presence. Our programs fall into three primary thematic areas:

- Conflict Early Warning & Assessment;
- Transnational Threats; and
- Sustainable Development & Security.

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