

A young Black man with short hair and a goatee, wearing a red and grey patterned sweater, is looking thoughtfully to the right while holding a white smartphone in his hands. The background is a bright, slightly blurred outdoor setting.

BEYOND HASHTAGS

LEVERAGING NETWORKS FOR THE PREVENTION OF
ELECTION VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

PATRICIA TAFT AND NATE HAKEN



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ACRONYMS

AC	Action Congress
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
APC	All Progressives Congress
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
CASE	Content Aggregation System for Elections
CIEPD	Community Initiative for Enhanced Peace and Development
CITAD	Centre for Information Technology and Development
CPC	Congress for Progressive Change
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network
EiE	Enough is Enough Nigeria
EU EOM	EU Election Observation Mission to Nigeria
FFP	The Fund for Peace
FOMWAN	Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria
GIS	Geospatial Information System
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IPDU	Integrated Peace and Development Unit
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
JPDC	Justice, Development and Peace/Caritas Nigeria
JTF	Joint Task Force
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGA	Local Government Area
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NDA	Niger Delta Avengers
NDI	National Democratic Institute

ACRONYMS

NDPI	Niger Delta Partnership Initiative Foundation
NDPVF	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NNA	National Nigeria Alliance
NPC	National Democratic Party
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
NYM	Nigeria Youth Movement
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
OPC	Oodua People's Congress
P4P	Partners for Peace Network
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PIND	Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta
PRC	Provisional Ruling Council
PSN	Peace and Security Network
SDN	Stakeholder Democracy Network
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SMC	Supreme Military Council
SNA	Stakeholder Network Analysis
TMG	Transition Monitoring Group
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
VPN	Virtual Private Networks
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
YIAGA	Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement
YLAP	Young Legislators Accountability Project

INTRODUCTION

Election violence in Nigeria dates back over a hundred years, from the days of indirect rule under Great Britain to post-independence and a series of military regimes and civilian republics. The Fourth Republic, from 1999 to present day, has demonstrated the durability of democracy in Nigeria, although this era too has seen its share of election violence as sectarian, ethnic, and partisan tensions have surfaced during federal, state, and local government contests. Sometimes election violence has been characterized by public unrest; for example, in Plateau State in 2008 and in Kaduna State in 2011. More often, however, it has been the result of orchestrated violence, where citizens, especially youth, are manipulated, coerced, or coopted by powerbrokers. The research findings detailed in this Handbook also demonstrate that risks and vulnerabilities differ from national elections to state-level elections, and change depending on the peculiarities of a given election cycle.

In the last decade, social networks and information technology have developed in such a way as to contribute to the proliferation of both spontaneous and coordinated violence. However, at the same time, a robust network of peace actors has emerged to prevent and manage election violence. Over the past several years, the Fund for Peace (FFP), supported by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), has been researching the history of election violence in Nigeria and examining the power of networks in both the perpetration and prevention of violence, with a focus on the role of youth.

Given the complexity of election violence, FFP's research set out to test the premise that effective prevention must also take a systems approach; a series of randomly distributed, one-off programs, projects, and activities will not solve the problem. To do this, FFP utilized research methods and tools such as Geospatial Information System (GIS) platforms, Social Network Analysis (SNA), surveys, and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). The ready availability of such tools and data provides an unprecedented opportunity to optimize

prevention strategies. Specifically, if stakeholders know the wider patterns of hotspots and trends, and the characteristics and centrality of peace and security networks, they can proactively leverage and catalyze social capital to efficiently disseminate early warning signals, amplify messages, improve joint analysis, and organize conflict management efforts. All concerned stakeholders, from donors to security agents, community leaders and civil society, can work together more effectively to achieve their common goal. This approach to coordination is not about top-down prescription by a central actor. Rather, it is for each peace and security actor to be aware of the wider system, allowing them to take concrete steps to enhance social capital and spheres of influence where and when they are most needed, particularly during the identification of grantees, partners, beneficiaries, and participants.

In the following chapters, this Handbook will review the history of election and political violence in Nigeria over the past one hundred years, to identify some of the deeper historical factors that have arisen and continue to influence the current context. The second chapter will also specifically examine the role of youth in election and political violence, as well as their role as peace promoters, from the earliest days of Nigeria's First Republic through to present day. From there, the Handbook will take a deeper look at the role of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) and their evolution and influence on the Nigerian political landscape, using examples from prior elections. Then the book will turn to an examination of the quantitative and qualitative findings of this research, highlighting the use of certain tools and datasets. Finally, the concluding chapter will explore some best practices and a guidance note for how tools such as GIS platforms and SNA can be utilized by peace actors for effective programming in the prevention and mitigation of youth violence during elections.

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ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ELECTION VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

As Nigeria's electoral system has evolved from the colonial period to present day, popular national and local movements towards a more effective democracy have often been met with electoral violence at many levels.¹ An examination of the historical, political, and sociocultural underpinnings of election-related violence in Nigeria serves as an opportunity to apply these insights to peace-building interventions and to address the challenge of election-related violence through evidence-based preventative strategies.

COLONIAL PERIOD (1914-1960)

During the colonial period in Nigeria, divisions along religious, ethnic, and regional lines were hardened early, in the context of a system of "indirect rule" by the British. This system was ostensibly implemented to give more local ownership and legitimacy, but in its implementation it reinforced identity-based politics under a wider Nigerian framework.² In 1914, the British unified the Northern Nigeria Protectorate with the Southern Nigeria Protectorate for economic reasons, which was then followed by the creation of the Clifford Constitution, which introduced the concept of voting for the first time in 1922. However, voting rights were only granted in the South, and only for men of certain means. In 1946, the Richards Constitution replaced its predecessor in an attempt to create more unity while, at the same time, formalizing the regional divisions of North, East and West. Five years later, in 1951, the Richards Constitution was

replaced by the Macpherson Constitution, which expanded suffrage to male tax payers in the North and both males and females in the East and West. The federal balance of power under the Macpherson Constitution favored the North, which held 50% of political representation, placing the East and West at a disadvantage,³ and laying the groundwork for grievances which would escalate after independence. According to the CLEEN Foundation, even as early as the 1940s, elections exacerbated communal, political, and sectarian conflicts, becoming much worse after independence in 1960.⁴

FIRST REPUBLIC (1963-1966)

The First Republic was a failed experiment where regional, political, and demographic pressures quickly intensified and eventually led to war.⁵ Beginning in 1962, officials in the North protested the results of the recently released census, which showed massive growth in the other regions of the country, threatening to undermine the North's electoral advantage. A new census was then quickly conducted the following year,⁶ recording an additional 8.5 million people residing in the North, indicating that the region's reported population was actually larger than any other country in Africa at the time.⁷ While the census results restored the political advantage of the North, it simultaneously heightened tensions between the North and South,⁸ particularly given the "politics of allocation," concerning distribution of national wealth, including revenue from the country's extensive oil

¹ "Breaking the Cycle: Fathering After Violence," United States Institute of Peace. https://mafiadoc.com/breaking-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-in-nigeria-united-states-_59dac81b1723dd32d4ea9272.html

² "Nigeria," Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Nigeria-as-a-colony>

³ L. P. M. "Nigeria under the Macpherson Constitution." *The World Today* 9.

⁴ <http://cleenfoundation.blogspot.com/2011/07/post-election-violence-in-nigeria.html>

⁵ "Independent Nigeria." Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Independent-Nigeria>.

⁶ "The story of how Nigeria's census figures became weaponized." *Quartz Africa*. <https://qz.com/1221472/the-story-of-how-nigerias-census-figures-became-weaponized/>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Okolo, Abraham. "The Nigerian Census: Problems and Prospects." *The American Statistician*.

reserves, based on population size.⁹

While tensions were mounting between the northern and southern parts of the country, an intra-party power struggle between two political leaders in the West led to a surge in violent protests called "Operation Wetie" which killed several people in 1962 and led to the declaration of a state of emergency. This was also the first recorded major instance of ethnically-aligned political gangs being used to intimidate and kill opponents, often through the use of "necklacing," a practice of igniting tires doused in petrol and placed around someone's neck that continues in Nigeria through present day.¹⁰ Later, in the 1964 elections, tensions flared again¹¹ as the major political parties formed a series of alliances, mobilizing support based in large part on ethnic rivalries. The National Nigeria Alliance (NNA) relied on Yoruba fears of Igbo domination of the federal government while the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) stoked fears among Igbos that the Hausa-Fulani would dominate the political sphere. The 1964 election was delayed due to discrepancies between the census returns and voting rolls. Unsatisfied with the resolution of the issue, the UPGA led a partial boycott of the election, preventing polling places from opening in 51 constituencies in the Eastern Region and resulting in only four million votes being cast from an eligible pool of fifteen million. However, this move failed to nullify the election and the NNA scored a decisive victory. The first instances of electoral violence occurred shortly thereafter, when the NNA won a major victory in legislative elections in the Western Region amid widespread allegations of voting irregularities. Extensive protests erupted, and an estimated two thousand people died in the six months that followed the elections.¹²

That same year, a Tiv uprising took place against the Native

Administrative Police Force, who the Tiv perceived to be largely Hausa/Fulani and actively trying to expand the influence of the National Democratic Party (NPC) - a major party in the NNA - into the west. The first riots broke out in the south-east as local Tiv killed a pro-NPC clan head and several policemen. The violence then escalated between NPC and UPGA supporters.¹³

As tensions between the North and South grew, and violence spread to the western and southeastern regions of the country, in August 1965 a military coup was launched by several southern Army majors, many of whom were of Igbo extraction, killing twenty-two senior officials, including the Prime Minister. In 1966, as martial law was declared in the north, the cabinet announced a surrender to military rule, and Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, from present-day Abia State, became the next head of state.¹⁴ In response to the killings of many northern officers and rumors of an "Igbo coup," a pre-emptive counter-coup occurred in July 1966 which resulted in the 1966 anti-Igbo pogrom wherein thousands of Igbo civilians living in the north were systemically killed.¹⁵ Major General Ironsi was assassinated and power shifted to Lt Colonel Yakubu Gowon of Plateau State.¹⁶ During 1966, an estimated one to two million Igbo fled persecution in the north to the eastern region while, in May of 1967, Nigeria was divided into twelve states, which led to Igbos in the southeast losing control of areas with petroleum.¹⁷

In May 1967, the southeastern region seceded, declaring the Republic of Biafra.¹⁸ During the 30-month Biafran War, also known as the Nigerian Civil War, many ethnic minorities making up 40% of Biafra were persecuted by both Biafran and Federal troops.^{19,20} Additionally, many Igbo died during the attacks on Igbo communities in the north as well as during the war. Estimates of the number of civilian deaths

⁹ "Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective." Small Arms Survey. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP20-Nigeria.pdf>

¹⁰ Lawrence Chinedu Nwobu, "Remi Fani-Kayode, Akintola, Awo, The Western Region And The Crisis That Truncated The First Republic," Nigeria Village Square (August 17, 2013) <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/remi-fani-kayode-akintola-awo-the-western-region-and-the-crisis-that-truncated-the-first-republic.html>

¹¹ <https://www.withinnigeria.com/2018/03/21/power-tussle-awolowo-akintola-plunged-western-region-crises/>

¹² "The 1964-65 Elections." <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9356.html>

¹³ Vaaseh, Ehinmore. *Ethnic Politics and Conflict in Nigeria's First Republic*. Canada Social Science.

¹⁴ Siollun, Max. *Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria's Military Coup Culture (1966-1976)*. Algora. p. 237.

¹⁵ Vickers, Michael. "Competition and Control in Modern Nigeria: Origins of the War with Biafra". *International Journal*.

¹⁶ Siollun, Max. *Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria's Military Coup Culture (1966-1976)*. Algora. p. 110.

¹⁷ Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War," *The Journal of African History*. p. 123.

¹⁸ "Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970)," [blackpast.org](http://www.blackpast.org/gah/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970). <http://www.blackpast.org/gah/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970>

¹⁹ Saro-Wiwa, Ken, *Genocide in Nigeria: The Ogoni Tragedy*, Saros International Publishers.

²⁰ Omaka, Oko. "The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970." *Journal of Retracing Africa*. p. 29

vary considerably, from a low of 500,000 to a high of 6 million,²¹ though more recent work has narrowed the likely range to between one and three million.²² Most of these deaths were due to starvation and disease that spread after Nigerian troops set up a land and sea blockade in Port Harcourt in May of 1968.²³ The Biafran War ended in 1970 with Biafra's surrender,²⁴ ushering in nine more years of military rule.

SECOND REPUBLIC (1979-1983)

The Second Republic was another attempt to introduce democracy in Nigeria through the transfer of power to a civilian government. However, this hope did not last long as economic instability, conflict in the Niger Delta, and increasing corruption undermined elections. Ultimately, the Second Republic also fell to a military coup and continued the country's legacy of political volatility.

Despite the failure of the Second Republic, important reforms occurred during this period, including a rewriting of Nigeria's constitution to strengthen executive powers. Previously, the President gained power from the Legislature under a parliamentary system. However, under Decree Number 25 of 1978, these powers were separated, and the Executive was made more independent of the Legislature, similar to the system in the United States. This reform also strengthened the Senate by giving them equal powers to the House of Representatives. In the same year, a ban that had been placed on political parties in 1966 was lifted and a formal process for establishing and recognizing political parties was outlined.²⁵

The Second Republic officially began with elections held in 1979 which, despite being fraught with violence,²⁶ resulted in a power transfer to a civilian government led by President Shehu Shagari, a Muslim from the northwest. Despite these promising steps towards

civilian rule and democracy, the Second Republic did not survive long due to several weaknesses. These included a weak coalition of opposition parties against the minority rule of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and a lack of cooperation between the federal government and opposition-held states. The 1970s oil boom would have an impact that would reverberate across all sectors for decades to come, shifting Nigeria from an agricultural-based economy to a single-resource (oil) based economy, with the country eventually becoming a net-importer of food products to feed its own population.²⁷ After oil prices fell in 1981, fiscal spending continued unabated and the country's debt grew, while corruption worsened, and several scandals occurred.²⁸

During this time period, another agreement was reached that would also have far-reaching and often violent repercussions for the country for years to come. This agreement, an arrangement ostensibly made to lessen rivalries and dampen ethnic and regional tensions, came from the foundational concept of "zoning" within the coalition party, a promise made to rotate leadership between regional zones. Despite the ruling party's agreement to support a candidate from the South in the 1983 elections,²⁹ the northern incumbent Shagari ran and won in a contest that was marred by violent protests. The results of the subsequent gubernatorial elections, in which NPN candidates won in states dominated by the opposition, were also met with widespread electoral violence, especially in Ondo and Oyo states.³⁰ Citing widespread electoral malpractices, General Muhammadu Buhari led a military coup, displacing the civilian government in 1983 to become the new head of state and leader of the country's new ruling body, the Supreme Military Council (SMC).³¹ Buhari was later overthrown in a coup by SMC members in 1985, and another northerner and military general, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, became head of state. General Babangida had promised to transfer leadership to a civilian government in 1990 but the transition plan was delayed to 1992.³²

²¹ Wiseberg, Laurie S. "The statistics jungle: Measuring war, plague, fire and famine". Society. Volume 12, Issue 5

²² Heerten Lasse and Moses, A. Dirk. "The Nigeria-Biafra war: postcolonial conflict and the question of genocide". Journal of Genocide Research. Volume 16 Nos. 2-3.

²³ "Biafra 1966-1970." The Combat Genocide Association. http://combatgenocide.org/?page_id=90

²⁴ Atofarati, Abubakar. "The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt". Global Security.

²⁵ "The Second Republic." <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/75.htm>

²⁶ <http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/WP11Cohen.pdf>

²⁷ Onuoha, Elegbede. The Political Ecology of Oil and Gas Activities in the Nigerian Aquatic Ecosystem. Academic Press.

²⁸ "The Nigerian Civil War, 1979-83," Country Studies. <http://countrystudies.us/nigeria/29.htm>

²⁹ Hart, Christopher. "The Nigerian Elections of 1983." Africa: Journal of the International African Institute.

³⁰ Wright, Stephen. "Nigeria: The 1983 elections." The Round Table.

³¹ Falola, Toyin, and Ihonvbere. The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-1983. Third World Books.

³² "After Abacha | Nigeria: A history of coups." BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/83449.stm>.

THIRD REPUBLIC (1993)

After the failed attempts at instituting fledgling democratic processes and abolishing military rule during the First and Second Republics, the inception of the Third Republic was delayed by a wave of pre-election violence which led to the postponement of presidential elections from 1992 to 1993.³³ The poor organization of the elections led to low voter turnout and only 30% of the registered electorate voted in the presidential election, which was won by the SDC candidate and an ethnic Yoruba from the South, Moshood Abiola, on June 12th, 1993. However, days later, the election results were annulled by General Babangida, resulting in a widespread backlash. In August 1993, Babangida resigned and appointed Chief Ernest Shonekan as president of the interim government. A few months later, President Shonekan was overthrown by a military coup and yet another military figure, General Sani Abacha of Kano state, assumed power. During Abacha's rule, executive and legislative powers were concentrated into the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) and, in 1995, a three-year plan to transition to civilian rule was announced, while Abacha was formally adopted as the presidential candidate of all five political parties.

During Abacha's rule, there was widespread suppression of free speech and political freedom, with political dissidents targeted, arrested, and often killed. In November 1995, in an event that would spark international outrage and condemnation, and serve as a rallying cry for communities in the Niger Delta for years to come, nine environmental activists from the Ogoni community were executed, including the playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa.³⁴ The United States, Germany and Austria immediately recalled their ambassadors, and the United Nations issued a strong condemnation of Abacha and his government. Despite this, and the growing popular perception that Abacha had no intention to hold elections or transition to civilian rule, he continued as the head of state until his death in 1998. After Abacha's death, General Abubakar became interim head of state and

soon after resigned, finally handing power over to a civilian government, leading to the election of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999.^{35,36}

FOURTH REPUBLIC (1999-PRESENT DAY)

Despite the transition to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria's Fourth Republic was marked by varying levels of election violence in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011 during Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Local Government-level contests. In each instance, various factors contributed to violence and low voter turnout. For example, during the first elections in 1999, both candidates were Christians from the Southwest, which caused some unease among northerners who feared southern control of the government.³⁷ However, after Olusegun Obasanjo of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) was declared the new president on March 2, 1999, there was little in the way of violent protest as there was a strong popular desire to transition away from military rule to a civilian-led government in Nigeria.³⁸ This marked the first election of a civilian head of state after 16 years of military rule following Buhari's overthrow during the Second Republic. The day President Obasanjo took office, March 29th, was declared a public holiday commemorated as Democracy Day.^{39,40} It has since been changed to June 12th to commemorate the 1993 election of Moshood Abiola.

While the 1999 Presidential election was largely peaceful, state level elections in Bayelsa were delayed due to an outbreak of violence in response to the distribution of the state's oil wealth.⁴¹ Following the election, religious divisions also resurfaced after Sharia law was established in the northwest state of Zamfara in September 1999. At first this motion was met with little protest because over 90 percent of the population in Zamfara was Muslim. However, when the more religiously diverse state of Kaduna followed suit, violence erupted, and more than 1000 lives were lost.⁴² Additionally, there was relatively low political engagement but high unrest in response to the

³³ Pita Ogaba Agbese. "Impending Demise of Nigeria's Third Republic". Africa Today.

³⁴ "Observing The 1998-1999 Nigeria Elections." Cartercenter.org. <https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1152.pdf>.

³⁵ "Nigeria executes 9 Activists; World Outraged" CNN, November 10, 1995 <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/nigeria/>

³⁶ "After Abacha | Nigeria: A history of coups." BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/83449.stm>.

³⁷ J. S. Omotola, "Elections and democratic transition in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic," African Affairs.

³⁸ "A Winner And New Era Are Declared In Nigeria," The New York Times. <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/02/world/a-winner-and-new-era-are-declared-in-nigeria.html>.

³⁹ "Profile of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, GCFR," People's Democratic Party. http://peoplesdemocraticparty.com.ng/?page_id=439.

⁴⁰ "Nigeria: Democracy Day," All Africa. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201305290833.html>.

⁴¹ "Observing The 1998-1999 Nigeria Elections." Cartercenter.org. <https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1152.pdf>.

⁴² Johannes Harnischfeger. Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria, University of Chicago Press.

controversial issue of codifying Sharia to be used for criminal cases in 12 Muslim majority states in the north.⁴³

In the 2003 election, President Obasanjo of the PDP was re-elected over the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari, a northern candidate who had led the military coup in 1983.⁴⁴ This election represented the first uninterrupted two-term rule by a civilian government in Nigeria. Unrest surrounding the election began as early as 2001 when President Obasanjo moved to reverse the order of elections as they had been conducted before, beginning at the local level. Critics saw this as an attempt to create a "bandwagon effect" through the presidential elections. This move was also seen as a reaction to the growing power of governors in the country with National Assembly members fearing that governors would use their local political machines to undermine them.⁴⁵ Tensions leading up to the election also rose in response to flaws in the voter registration process. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had failed to adequately establish a computerized voter registry and the original registration period in September 2002 showed evidence of "disorder, intimidation and theft of registration forms." Of the 80 million registration forms distributed to the 120,000 registration centers, only 67 million could be accounted for.⁴⁶

The 2003 election was important as the first election which saw political actors arming youth as a tool of political muscle, protection, and intimidation. This contributed to the proliferation of small arms and the growth of militant groups which would lead to greater violence in subsequent elections.⁴⁷ In early 2003, widespread electoral violence broke out, killing at least one hundred people. Most of the

pre-election violence was blamed on the PDP, who were accused of using various tactics to intimidate voters.⁴⁸ Reportedly, many Nigerians expressed a lack of confidence in the credibility of the 2003 elections, claiming that winners were selected by political elites rather than being popularly elected.⁴⁹ The EU Election Observation Mission to Nigeria (EU EOM) reported widespread election fraud, a lack of transparency and credibility among the INEC, and a lack of fairness and balanced coverage by federal and state-owned media which favored the ruling party.⁵⁰ Electoral violence was only worsened by the rising tensions and public outcry during the voter registration process in the same year.⁵¹ Human Rights Watch also noted a "weak international response to political violence" during the Nigerian elections with international authorities failing to publicly condemn the electoral violence.⁵²

In the 2007 elections, PDP candidate and Muslim Hausa governor of Katsina State, Umaru Yar'Adua, won the presidency with 70% of the vote.⁵³ Yar'Adua ran against Muhammadu Buhari of the ANPP and Obasanjo's vice president, Atiku Abubakar, who broke from the PDP after allegations of corruption and ran under the Action Congress (AC).⁵⁴ Electoral violence only worsened in 2007 as the European Union called it "the worst they had ever seen anywhere in the world, with rampant vote rigging, violence, theft of ballot boxes and intimidation".⁵⁵ The use of armed thugs in 2003 contributed to a trend of increasing violence as disaffected youths who had been armed by political parties evolved into well-armed criminals or anti-government militias by the time of the 2007 election.⁵⁶ This context drove a decline in voter turnout among Nigerians who had come to expect high levels of both violence and election fraud.⁵⁷

⁴³ Suberu. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40538327>

⁴⁴ "Incumbent Obasanjo declared winner in Nigeria." CNN. <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/04/22/nigeria.election/>.

⁴⁵ J. S. Omotola, "Elections and democratic transition in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic," *African Affairs* 109, no. 437 (2010): , accessed January 19, 2018, doi:10.1093/afraf/adq040.

⁴⁶ International Republican Institute, "2003 Nigeria Election Observation Report," news release, Iri.org, accessed January 24, 2018, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/fields/field_files_attached/resource/nigerias_2003_presidential_and_national_assembly_elections.pdf

⁴⁷ "Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective." *Small Arms Survey*. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP20-Nigeria.pdf>.

⁴⁸ "Nigeria's 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0604.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Egbueze, Anthony, and Ojirika. "Electoral Violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Implications for Political Stability." *Journal of Scientific Research and Reports*.

⁵⁰ "Nigeria Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections 2003," Human Rights Watch. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20030520/Nigeria%202nd%20Preliminary%20Statement.pdf>.

⁵¹ "Nigeria's 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0604.pdf>.

⁵² "Nigeria's 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence: Summary." <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604/1.htm>

⁵³ "Huge win for Nigeria's Yar'Adua." BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6584393.stm>.

⁵⁴ "The candidates to be Nigeria's leader." BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6205876.stm>.

⁵⁵ "Nigerian election pushed back a week," CNN <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/03/nigeria.election/index.html?eref=ft>.

⁵⁶ "Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective." *Small Arms Survey*. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP20-Nigeria.pdf>.

The 2007 election also coincided with a peak in militant violence in Nigeria as well as the first attacks committed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) which had formed as a coalition of militant groups in 2006. MEND attacked oil pipelines and petroleum company executives which became a key concern of voters in the 2007 election.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, in the North, Katsina state was especially affected with problems of election fraud and low voter turnout. In Daura, the home of opposition candidate Buhari, only half of the required ballots were delivered to polling stations. In response, supporters of the ANPP rioted and burned the homes and businesses of prominent PDP officials. Overall, police forces were reportedly largely passive towards or complicit in the intimidation of voters, opposition leaders, or local INEC officials. Party members also participated in violence themselves.⁵⁹ Tensions continued to rise after senior PDP officials, including Senate President Ken Nnamani, condemned the state elections as rigged. Following the statement, President Obasanjo made a broadcast for the public to abstain from violence, for improved practices by INEC, and for security forces to uphold law and order. Despite his appeal, unrest spread as ten people were killed in Benue state after conflict broke out between AC and PDP supporters, and police stations were attacked in Kano state by a group called the "Nigeria 80".^{60,61}

However, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) did note some improvements since 2003, including a more independent and responsive judiciary, a large mobilization of civil society to monitor elections and educate voters, and more balanced and inclusive coverage by the media. In May 2006, the National Assembly rejected President Obasanjo's request to amend the constitution and extend his presidency for a third term. The courts also overturned improperly conducted trials that led to the impeachments of state

governors and reversed INEC's controversial disqualification of some candidates, including Vice President Abubakar.⁶² The reaction to the 2007 election was different from 2003 as well, as the international community, including the United States and the United Kingdom, openly condemned cases of electoral violence and election fraud.⁶³

Nigeria's 2011 elections were the most violent in the country's modern history as more than 800 people were killed in just three days following the presidential election, particularly in Kaduna State. The 2011 elections represented the greatest bloodshed in the country since the 1967-70 civil war.^{64,65} This violence was largely triggered by the loss of Muhammadu Buhari (now running under the banner of the Congress for Progressive Change [CPC]) to PDP incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the South who had assumed the presidency after the death in office of President Yar'Adua.⁶⁶ As with the reelection of Shagari in 1983, Jonathan's decision to run and subsequent victory was seen violating the unwritten agreement between North and South to share power by alternating presidential representation every two terms. Many northerners felt that as Yar'Adua had died in office during his first term, the North was still owed another full term of the Presidency and were therefore aggrieved by Jonathan's candidacy.

In addition to the 800 people killed after the election, a period of violent clashes between Muslims and Christians in central Nigeria took place before the election.⁶⁷ The clashes began in the city of Jos, in Plateau State, in January 2010, and killed hundreds. Two months later, further clashes south of the city killed hundreds more. From December 2010 to January 2011, hundreds more were killed in a series of bombings and clashes in Jos and the surrounding villages.^{68,69}

⁵⁷ "Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria." United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR263-Breaking_the_Cycle_of_Electoral_Violence_in_Nigeria.pdf.

⁵⁸ "MEND: The Niger Delta's Umbrella Militant Group." Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mend-niger-deltas-umbrella-militant-group>

⁵⁹ "Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence," Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/25/nigeria-presidential-election-marred-fraud-violence>.

⁶⁰ "Final NDI Report on Nigeria's 2007 Elections." National Democratic Institute. https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/2313_ng_report_election07_043008.pdf.

⁶¹ "Africa | Islamists attack Nigeria police." BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6564629.stm>.

⁶² "Final NDI Report on Nigeria's 2007 Elections." National Democratic Institute. https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/2313_ng_report_election07_043008.pdf.

⁶³ "Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence," Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/25/nigeria-presidential-election-marred-fraud-violence>.

⁶⁴ "Nigeria's Elections in 2011 and 2015." Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerias-elections-2011-and-2015>.

⁶⁵ "Nigeria post-election violence killed 800: rights group." Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800-rights-group-idUSTRE74F7IS20110516>

⁶⁶ "Nigeria's president Yar'Adua dies." Al Jazeera. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/05/20105523627997165.html>.

⁶⁷ "Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800>.

⁶⁸ "Nigeria religious riots 'kill 200' in Jos." BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8468456.stm>.

⁶⁹ "TIMELINE-Ethnic and religious unrest in Nigeria's Jos." Reuters News. <https://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-violence-jos-idAFLDE7IH1BL20110218>

The violence leading up to the presidential and gubernatorial elections also included political assassinations and attacks by designated terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram, and their affiliates. These attacks included the assassination of the ANPP's candidate for Borno Governor and three bombs which were set off in Plateau State in December 2011 at a ruling party election rally.⁷⁰ State level elections in two northern states were postponed after violence broke out at the announcement of Goodluck Jonathan's win and in response to claims of vote rigging in the presidential election.⁷¹ Gubernatorial elections in five states were postponed after the governors filed motions claiming that their term had not yet ended since the 2007 gubernatorial elections had been delayed until 2008.⁷² There were also reports of lower turnout for Gubernatorial elections in the South due to unrest after the presidential elections.⁷³ Also during this election period, Boko Haram continued their first wave of attacks on the Nigerian state, which initially began with uprisings in Bauchi, Borno, Kano, and Yobe states in 2009.⁷⁴

Despite the high levels of violence, many international observers reported the 2011 elections as some of the most free and transparent in decades.⁷⁵ Many improvements were made after the 2007 elections which contributed to more representative polling, including improved vetting of election officials, re-registering all voters, and greater use of media outlets to reach voters. The 2010 Electoral Act introduced primary elections to select party candidates, although these primaries reportedly lacked transparency and did little to increase the legitimacy of the election.⁷⁶

Finally, in the 2015 elections, General Muhammadu Buhari, the All Progressives Congress (APC) candidate, defeated incumbent

Presidential Goodluck Jonathan by 2.5 million votes. His win was significant as it marked the first time in Nigeria that a sitting president had been defeated at the polls.⁷⁷ It was also a game changer in that up to that point, the governance of Nigeria under the Fourth Republic had essentially been a PDP affair. For an opposition party to successfully contest at the Presidential level was unprecedented. Jonathan's loss came after INEC took extra measures against vote rigging, including issuing new biometric voter cards. The five states with the most important races for governor in 2015 included: Lagos, Rivers, Kaduna, Taraba, and Imo.⁷⁸ The majority of these five gubernatorial elections were won by the APC,⁷⁹ while the PDP lost their hold on key states. Buhari also won all states in the North and West which had been most affected by the violence from the Boko Haram insurgency.

The 2015 elections were relatively peaceful and seen as the most competitive in the country's history.⁸⁰ The majority of violence leading up to the 2015 elections was not specifically election-related, but rather attributed to attacks by Boko Haram. For example, in the spring of 2013, Boko Haram began a large-scale insurgency in the northeast and the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in affected areas, including Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa.⁸¹ In 2014, the violence escalated as girls in the village of Chibok in Borno state were kidnapped by the insurgents, launching the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. Outside of the northeast, bombings in Jos, Plateau state, in the Middle Belt, killed at least 118 people and highlighted the growing reach of the group beyond the Northeast. By July 2014, Boko Haram controlled large swathes of territory in Borno. Boko Haram's attacks and the Nigerian government's counterinsurgency operations resulted in at least 10,850 deaths during 2014 alone.⁸²

⁷⁰ "Nigeria: Loss Of Life, Insecurity, and Impunity In The Run-up To Nigeria's Elections." Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/005/2011/en/>.

⁷¹ "Violence postpones gubernatorial elections in 2 Nigeria states." CNN. <http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/21/nigeria.elections/index.html>.

⁷² "Nigeria: INEC Appeals Court Ruling Exempting Five States from Upcoming Gubernatorial Elections," Global Legal Monitor. <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/nigeria-inec-appeals-court-ruling-exempting-five-states-from-upcoming-gubernatorial-elections/>.

⁷³ "Financial Times Nigeria chooses governors amid poll tensions." Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/e11fd592-7030-11e0-bea7-00144feabdc0>.

⁷⁴ "Boko Haram Fast Facts." CNN. <https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>

⁷⁵ "Nigeria election: Riots over Goodluck Jonathan win." BBC News. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13107867>.

⁷⁶ "Final Report On The Nigeria 2011 General Elections." National Democratic Institute. https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Final%20Report%20on%20the%20Nigeria%202011%20Electionsnew_Part1.pdf.

⁷⁷ "Nigeria election: Muhammadu Buhari wins presidency." CNN. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32139858>.

⁷⁸ "Nigeria's top five governor battles." BBC News. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32239420>.

⁷⁹ "2015 Governorship Election In Nigeria: Official Results From States." Nigeria news. <https://www.naija.ng/419961-read-official-results-of-2015-governorship-election.html#419961>.

⁸⁰ "Nigeria 2015 presidential election: Significance and challenges ahead." Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/03/31/nigeria-2015-presidential-election-significance-and-challenges-ahead/>.

⁸¹ "Nigeria President Declares State of Emergency." Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/05/2013514192543867669.html>

⁸² "Nigeria." Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/nigeria>.

More specific to the election itself, however, in Rivers State intense political polarization between the APC supporters of incumbent governor Rotimi Amaechi and PDP challenger Nyesom Wike (PDP) led to lethal violence during the gubernatorial, legislative, and local elections, which continued well into 2016 as organized criminal groups and political thugs were deployed by politicians and godfathers to intimidate and coerce their respective adversaries.

THE HISTORY OF YOUTH, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND PEACE PROMOTION IN NIGERIA


Weaving through the complex and often violent history of Nigeria's trajectory from colonialism through decades of military-led governments to the institution of civilian rule and the current Fourth Republic, the role of youth in this tumultuous history cannot be overlooked or underestimated. Today Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, and also one of its youngest. With an average fertility rate of 5.6 children per woman as of 2015,⁸³ youth, 15 to 35 years of age, account for approximately half of Nigeria's population.⁸⁴ However, as the youth population has grown, so too has youth unemployment, especially in rural areas. This, in some cases, has contributed to a growing sense of disaffection and popular frustration among the country's youngest citizens. At the same time, youth are also increasingly engaged in the political sphere, with major political parties having highly active youth wings. The combination of these factors creates an environment in which youth may be manipulated by violent groups and political leaders to engage in political and electoral violence.

In all cases of political/election violence detailed in the previous chapter, whether that be Operation Wetie in Ibadan during the First Republic, post-election violence in Kaduna in 2011, or "political thuggery" in Rivers in 2015, youth tend to be the main victims as well as perpetrators. This is in part due to the demographics of age distribution, the spread of criminal networks and militant groups, as well as the general susceptibility of disaffected and unemployed youth to being recruited as "thugs" by political agents.

MECHANISMS AND ORGANIZATION OF YOUTH VIOLENCE

Youth in Nigeria are mobilized in a variety of ways to participate in

POLITICAL/ELECTION VIOLENCE FATALITIES



Data for map and bar charts from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED - www.acledata.com) and Nigeria Watch, formatted and integrated on P4P Peace Map (www.p4p-nigerdelta.org)


political violence, including through militant groups, cults or gangs, direct employment as political thugs, and general criminality.

Militant Groups: Militant groups are most prevalent in the Niger Delta region, although youth have also been militarized for political violence and propaganda prior to elections in other parts of the country as well, including in the Northeast and Northwest. Some of the better-known groups include: the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), the New Delta Suicide Squad, the Niger Delta Red Squad, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). These groups are often mobilized around historical or present-day grievances stemming from uneven distribution of natural resources, land and environmental degradation, widespread unemployment, and a general sense of exclusion or isolation. Many also coalesce around

⁸³ World Development Indicators. World Bank. <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>.

⁸⁴ "Youth Unemployment in Nigeria: A Situation Analysis." Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/09/23/youth-unemployment-in-nigeria-a-situation-analysis/>.

MILITARY FATALITIES IN THE NIGER DELTA



Data for map and bar charts from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED - www.acleddata.com) and Nigeria Watch, formatted and integrated on P4P Peace Map (www.p4p-nigerdelta.org)

ethnic sentiments and historical tensions between and among the Niger Delta’s various identity groups. For example, the Red Egbesu Water Lions, Ultimate Warriors of Niger Delta, and Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force are mostly Ijaw groups while the Isoko Liberation Movement is mostly composed of those of Isoko extraction. These groups’ primary motivations often evolve from social and political platforms to include general criminality, but they frequently continue to engage in political violence as way to secure financial gains and resources.⁸⁵ Militant groups such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) see young boys as the primary source of recruitment and the “upcoming generation” of militant group fighters, according to a NDPVF spokesman.⁸⁶

The nature, prevalence, and recruitment strategies of militant groups have changed substantially over the years since first becoming militarized in the 1990s. Initially, many militant groups relied

principally on ideology to motivate and recruit youth. However, as these groups have waxed and waned – with their two most recent resurgences occurring in the late 2000s and in 2016 – they have evolved to respond to a youth population that is increasingly motivated by economic incentives. This is closely tied to the evolving nature of these militant groups. Over the past decade, these militant groups began to expand beyond the states of Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers into the west and east, leading to a more ethnically and ideologically complex membership. For example, the NDA, although largely made up of Ijaw youth, ostensibly represents the interests of Igbo and Ogoni populations. The lines between militant groups has also begun to blur. In 2005, the MEND was formed as an alliance between several Niger Delta militant groups and made up of mostly young Ijaw men.⁸⁷ MEND first gained prominence in 2006-2007 with several attacks including kidnapping of oil workers and car bombings. Militant group attacks in the Niger Delta reportedly led to a decline in Nigeria’s oil output by a quarter to a third.⁸⁸ Then, militancy began to wane after President Yar’Adua first introduced an Amnesty Program in 2009 which promised presidential pardons, rehabilitation, and job training to militants within the Niger Delta.^{89,90} This temporarily bought peace through large payouts to militant leaders. Now, levels of militancy have begun to rise again.

In 2015, this rise in militancy was also fueled by President Buhari’s announcement of plans to reverse and defund amnesty programs. This threatened to extinguish benefits and end security contracts rolled out to ex-militants.⁹¹ Though the amnesty plan was later extended, the announcement still motivated a resurgence in militant violence. At the same time, unemployment almost doubled between 2012 and 2016, dwarfing the limited impact of the employment provisions in the amnesty program, further incentivizing militancy recruitment of Nigerian youth. As a consequence of the limitations of the amnesty program and the worsening of conditions for youth in Nigeria, militancy has intensified.

⁸⁵ “New Wave of Militancy in the Niger Delta.” Fund For Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/global/2016/07/15/new-wave-of-militancy-in-the-niger-delta/>

⁸⁶ “Nigeria: No shortage of Niger Delta youth ready to join militias.” ReliefWeb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-no-shortage-niger-delta-youth-ready-join-militias>.

⁸⁷ “New Wave of Militancy in the Niger Delta.” Fund For Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/global/2016/07/15/new-wave-of-militancy-in-the-niger-delta/>

⁸⁸ <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/nigeria-government-response-reveals-deeper-political-instability>


⁸⁹ “The Resurgence of Militancy in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta and the Dangers of Militarisation.” Al Jazeera. <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/06/resurgence-militancy-nigerias-oil-rich-niger-delta-dangers-militarisation-160608065729726.html>

⁹⁰ “Nigeria offers militants amnesty.” BBC News. June 26, 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8118314.stm>.

⁹¹ “New Wave of Militancy in the Niger Delta.” Fund For Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/global/2016/07/15/new-wave-of-militancy-in-the-niger-delta/>

Cults and Gangs: Youth are also the main source of membership for cults or gangs which originally grew out of confraternities at Nigerian universities in the 1980s. In the following decades, the confraternities evolved into violent “street wings” without a direct connection to academic institutions, but which still often used universities as a recruiting pool. The Vikings were the first of these groups and several groups splintered off throughout this period including Deebam, Deewell, the Icelanders, and later the Greenlanders.⁹² Initially, these groups primarily engaged in conflict over financial gains and natural resources including operating in a loose alliance with MEND in 2005. However they increasingly turned to political thuggery as a source of revenue and, by 2015, their activity consisted largely of perpetrating electoral violence in presidential and gubernatorial campaigns led by youth employed by local “godfathers.”⁹³ One of the largest outbreaks of cult-led political violence followed the 2007 election. Politicians associated with the PDP had employed the services of several different gangs over the previous years and rewarded them with extensive patronage, most notably in the form of contracts paid or facilitated by state government officials. After the 2007 elections, a loose coalition of gangs under the leadership of the Icelanders, who felt they were not receiving sufficient patronage, attacked the Outlaws, who had recently risen to become a favored ally of state government and PDP officials. The violence killed several dozen and wounded scores and was only ended when the Joint Task Force (JTF) intervened.⁹⁴ Greenlanders and Icelanders were also involved in the 2015 election, with violence escalating through 2016, especially in Rivers State.

Political Thugs: Youth are also commonly employed by local politicians to act as security, intimidate rival candidates as well as voters, and to commit assassinations as well as mass violence. Examples between November 1, 2006 and March 10, 2007, include four assassinations and several attempted assassinations of Nigerian politicians by political thugs from various parties.⁹⁵ According to Partners for Peace (P4P) Peace Map data, the prevalence of violence committed by youth hired as political thugs peaked in 2015, more than four times the level in 2011.⁹⁶



Ethno-Nationalist Groups: Inasmuch as ethnic and sectarian rivalries have reinforced political rivalries in Nigeria going back to the colonial period, ethno-nationalist groups such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), the Ombatse, and others have often mobilized during elections. In the 2015 gubernatorial and state house of assembly election in Nawarawa, for example, the Ombatse reportedly attacked a polling station out of anger about the results. Also, in 2015, it was reported that at least in one case IYC members attacked APC supporters in Rivers State.⁹⁷

Mass Violent Protest: While much of the election violence over the last century in Nigeria was orchestrated through the vehicles of thuggery, militancy, ethno-nationalist groups, and cultism, there have also been periods of spontaneous outbursts of popular unrest. Perhaps the most notable example of this paroxysm is the post-election riots that occurred in Kaduna in 2011 and killed hundreds. This distinction between orchestrated violence (bombings, targeted assassinations, attacks on polling stations and rallies) and spontaneous

⁹² "Rise in Cult Violence and Insecurity in Rivers State." Fund For Peace. <http://fundforpeace.org/global/2015/11/16/rise-in-cult-violence-and-insecurity-in-rivers-state/>

⁹³ Taft, Patricia, and Nate Haken. Violence in Nigeria Patterns and Trends. Springer International Publishing.

⁹⁴ "The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election Violence in Rivers State, Nigeria." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/27/politics-war/human-rights-impact-and-causes-post-election-violence-rivers-state>.

⁹⁵ Agba, Sunday, Coker, and Ogaboh. "Political Thuggery and Democratic Dividends in Nigeria." International Journal of Public Administration.

⁹⁶ "Peace Map." Partners For Peace. <http://www.tgpccloud.org/p4p/index.php?m=p4p>.

⁹⁷ <https://www.africanexaminer.com/elections-materials-hijacked-by-pdp-thugs-in-rivers-as-iyc-unleashes-violence/>

violence is important, first because popular unrest has the potential to snowball into a situation of mass casualties and also because the mitigating options are very different. The typical approach taken by most governance and democratization programs is one of peace messaging and civic education cast widely to the general public. This can be used to prevent spontaneous violence. Looking at the history of election violence in Nigeria, however, suggests that the majority of election violence is not of this spontaneous variant. In such cases, hashtag activism and radio jingles are unlikely to work very well. Responding to orchestrated violence requires a more delicate, layered, and systemic approach.

YOUTH AS PEACE PROMOTERS

Though Nigerian youth are often perpetrators of political violence, they also have the capacity to promote peace through their growing influence as leaders within the electoral system and as activists outside of it. Youth have been at the forefront of some of Nigeria's earliest movements for peace. The Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) was founded in 1934 as the first nationalist youth-led movement. The movement made significant contributions to future peace efforts by promoting national unity across ethnic lines, notably between the Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups.⁹⁸ Though the movement lasted less than two decades due to internal divisions, NYM was an important step in promoting native Nigerian participation in government and civil service during British colonial control.

Youth have also engaged in peaceful activism to challenge the electoral system and fight for democratic principles. On December 11, 1998, Ijaw youths met in Bayelsa State to form the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and put forth the Kaiama Declaration. This declaration asserted the rights of the Ijaw people and put forth concerns over the degradation of local lands by transnational oil companies. This involved the efforts of thousands of Ijaw youths who, in the following weeks, led mostly peaceful protests across the state.⁹⁹ The Kaiama Declaration is evidence that youth can be key activists in the fight for ethnic rights, the environment, and political responsibility while using peaceful

measures to do so, even in a volatile political environment like the Niger Delta. Youth have continued to be at the forefront of protests against election rigging and corruption.

Nigerian youth have also become highly involved in the electoral system itself as candidates, political supporters, and youth wings of political parties. Youth wings have continued to grow as participants in political party leadership. In 2014, the Political Parties Youth Leaders Advisory Forum requested that 30% of elective and appointive positions be made up of youth.¹⁰⁰

Youth have also played a key role in promoting peace-building initiatives and voting. The Nigerian government has long recognized this opportunity for youth to serve as peace-builders. In 1973, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was created as a compulsory one-year service for university graduates which aimed to raise national unity and cultural inclusion by exposing them to a variety of communities and backgrounds within Nigeria.¹⁰¹ In 2011, INEC partnered with NYSC by hiring them at voter registration sites and during election day polling. Not only did this engage youth in the electoral process, but it also increased public confidence in the polls and helped soothe political unrest.¹⁰²

Youth have a critical role to play in regard to catalyzing and leveraging social capital for the prevention and mitigation of violence, through networks. Indeed, without networking, by which to multiply and scale their efforts, no single individual or organization can expect to have any meaningful impact whatsoever, no matter how many resources or capacities they possess as a unitary entity. A critical enabling factor that has emerged over the last hundred years for organizing, coordinating, and mobilizing, is the flourishing of ICT and data analytics. This handbook will take a look at that dynamic and explore how to best apply the lessons learned and best practices for more effective election violence prevention, especially in Nigeria, but also around the world.

⁹⁸ Sklar, Robert L. *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation*. Princeton University Press.

⁹⁹ "Background: The Kaiama Declaration," Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria2/Nigeria993-02.htm>

¹⁰⁰ "Nigeria: Youth Wings of Political Parties Demand 30 Percent Positions." Daily Trust. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201403270164.html>.

¹⁰¹ "The National Youth Service Corps: A Bridge to Nationalism in Nigeria," Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/national-youth-service-corps-bridge-nationalism-nigeria>

¹⁰² "The Role and Performance of The NYSC in the 2011 Elections," Community Life Project. <http://communitylifeproject.org/NYSC%20Paper%20Presentation.pdf>

IMPACT OF ICT ON YOUTH MOBILIZATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) encompass a broad range of devices (computers and phones), internet services and tools (websites and mobile applications), and service providers (telecommunications and internet service providers) that allow users to send and store data and communicate with other users. Over the last three decades, there has been a flourishing in the field of ICT. Integrated into users' daily lives, ICT have been used in countless ways, and increasingly ICT have become an integral part of political accountability and messaging, election monitoring, and electoral violence mitigation.

ICT have made it easier than ever for activists to connect, plan, and mobilize large networks of like-minded individuals. Activists across the world have used Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), communication and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Messenger, Line, and Telegram, as well as mesh networking apps like Firechat that allow users to communicate in the absence of cellular networks or the internet.¹⁰³

However, despite the proliferation of ICT in the hands of civil society and other activists, it would be Pollyannaish to assume that communication technologies automatically lead to democratization. In fact, over the last twelve years, Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index has seen a net decline in political rights and civil liberties globally, with the Index's two largest single-year declines coming in 2015 and 2017.

Nigeria offers a powerful example of the importance and impact ICT can have, by helping to strengthen efforts on electoral transparency, youth mobilization, and electoral violence mitigation, while also occasionally being used to inflame group grievances. This chapter will

look at the changing nature and usage of ICT in Nigeria between the 2007 and 2015 Presidential elections, describe the ICT tools and services used by youth to improve electoral transparency with each successive election, and showcase important youth organizations that have been and continue to be integral to improving electoral transparency and confidence across the country.

CHANGES BETWEEN THE 2007 AND 2011 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

INEC Structural Changes

While the 2007 election was called out by the European Union Election Observation Mission as a process which "cannot be considered to have been credible,"¹⁰⁴ the 2011 and 2015 Nigerian Presidential elections, which coincided with the growing use of mobile phones, were considered to be the most transparent in the country's history. ICT underpinned structural changes made at the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), ensuring the government could be better held accountable in providing free, fair, and credible elections.

While previous elections, according to the Social Media Tracking Centre at the Yar'Adua Foundation, "were often manipulated behind the scenes with results altered by politicians and the electoral commission itself [and] led to apathy among voters as they felt disconnected from the political process,"¹⁰⁵ in 2011, by contrast, there was a spike in awareness and participation by citizens. This, according to the Yar'Adua Centre, was due at least in part to the use of ICT in the election process.

¹⁰³ Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2018_Final_SinglePage.pdf

¹⁰⁴ European Union http://www.eods.eu/library/PS%20NIGERIA%2023.04.2007_en.pdf


¹⁰⁵ The Social Media Tracking Centre, Yar'Adua Foundation <http://yaraduafoundation.org/files/tracking.pdf>

Voters in the 2007 elections still relied on traditional media outlets and the government to deliver the election results, which were collated at centralized locations behind closed doors. With a history of violent elections and a degree of media self-censorship to ensure continued access to politicians, voters in the 2007 elections did not have a wide array of tools to hold the government accountable to deliver free, fair, and credible elections. In 2007, at the time of the Presidential elections, the number of active mobile phone subscriptions per 100 residents (teledensity rate), was only 29.98% of the population.¹⁰⁶ ICT and the tools that were created by youth and youth-led organizations for the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections provided voters with a wider array of electoral transparency tools never seen before in Nigerian elections.

Ahead of the 2011 Presidential elections, President Goodluck Jonathan nominated Professor Attahiru Jega in 2010 as the new Chairman of INEC, who instituted sweeping changes, signaling to the Nigerian people that the government was serious about electoral reform and violence mitigation. In March 2011, the INEC asked Enough is Enough Nigeria, a coalition of youth and youth-led organizations, to help the INEC develop a strategic communications network that would include broad use of social media platforms to reach more youth voters and open direct communication pathways to all voters.¹⁰⁷ The structural changes to the INEC and the decision to embrace social media as a crucial tool for youth voter outreach demonstrates both the prevalence and the increasing importance of ICT ahead of the 2011 Presidential election.

ICT Changes

The mobile phone landscape also dramatically changed between the 2007 and 2011 Presidential elections, becoming a major contributing factor to increased transparency in the 2011 Presidential elections. Between the 2007 and 2011 Presidential elections, the per minute cost for in-network calls dropped by 35 percent, while the out-of-network cost dropped by 45 percent.¹⁰⁸ At the time of the 2011



Presidential election, the teledensity rate had reached 68.4% of the population, meaning nearly 96 million Nigerians had an active phone subscription.¹⁰⁹ Between the two elections, mobile phones became more accessible, cheaper and thus more popular. During the period, Nigeria more than doubled its import figures for mobile phones, growing from \$500 million in 2007 to approximately \$1.3 billion in 2011, mobile phone subscriptions more than doubled, and their cost dropped by nearly 50%.¹¹⁰ The adoption of mobile phones in Nigeria is driven primarily by the country’s youth; personal mobile ownership and usage rates are highest for Nigerians age 20 to 24. The higher adoption rates in this high group are particularly evident for SMS use, mobile internet use, mobile social networking, and mobile app use.¹¹¹

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) took note of this dramatic societal shift and began harnessing the power of ICT to empower citizens to connect, mobilize, and hold the government more accountable. The structural changes at the INEC in 2010 became part of a much greater period of transformation, catalyzed by new networks of information flow between citizens to increase transparency. ICT and, specifically mobile phones, empowered citizens to engage in the electoral process for more transparent results that would deliver the outcome Nigerians voted for, not the perceived predetermined outcome

¹⁰⁶ Nigerian Communications Commission <https://www.ncc.gov.ng/stakeholder/statistics-reports/industry-overview#annual-2002-2016>
¹⁰⁷ The Social Media Tracking Centre <http://yaraduafoundation.org/files/tracking.pdf>
¹⁰⁸ Nigerian Communications Commission <https://www.ncc.gov.ng/stakeholder/statistics-reports/industry-overview#view-graphs-tables-3>
¹⁰⁹ Nigerian Communications Commission <https://www.ncc.gov.ng/stakeholder/statistics-reports/industry-overview#annual-2002-2016>
¹¹⁰ Atlas of Economic Complexity <http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/stack/?country=159&partner=undefined&product=1720&productClass=HS&startYear=undefined&target=Product&tradeDirection=import&year=2016>
¹¹¹ Broadcasting Board of Governors <https://www.bbg.gov/2014/04/30/bbg-research-series-contemporary-media-use-in-nigeria/>
¹¹² The Social Media Tracking Centre, Yar’Adua Foundation <http://yaraduafoundation.org/files/tracking.pdf>

CALLING PRICE CHANGES

Period between the 2007 and 2011 Presidential Elections

In-network calls



35%

Out-of-network calls



45%

delivered by political party leaders. Youth and youth-led CSOs began developing powerful ICT tools ahead of the 2011 Presidential election to help citizens hold the government accountable, turning every citizen into a potential election monitor.

ICT TOOLS AND SERVICES AVAILABLE TO VOTERS 2011 – 2015

2011 Presidential Elections

One of the key mediums youth and youth-led organizations in the 2011 Presidential election used to improve electoral accountability was using SMS and mobile phone calls. Ahead of the 2011 Presidential election, youth-led organizations developed at least seven different platforms for reporting electoral manipulation and violence on election day. ReclaimNaija, ReVoDA, and Project 2011 Swift Count became the most popular, allowing voters to report incidents of electoral manipulation and violence by sending an SMS or calling their dedicated platforms' phone lines. The information was collected, processed, released to the websites of the respective platforms, and sent to the INEC so electoral officers could act on the information.¹¹² The stated goal of ReclaimNaija,¹¹³ ReVoDa,¹¹⁴ and Project 2011 Swift Count¹¹⁵ was to turn voters into election monitors, emboldening every citizen to reclaim the electoral process and to root out the voter apathy felt in the 2007 Presidential election. The platforms also encouraged voters to watch the live results at the polling centers and

report on the real-time results to ensure that electoral manipulation was not occurring at the INEC after votes were transmitted to the collation center. In addition to setting up the platform, Project 2011 Swift Count deployed a team of 8,000 election observers, 3,000 of which were accredited non-partisan observers, to monitor 1,500 representatively sampled polling centers in all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory.¹¹⁶

The Social Media Tracking Centre, a group of youth volunteers at the Yar'Adua Foundation, took an integrated approach, mining incident reports from seven different platforms, including ReVoDa and ReclaimNaija, monitoring social media, and analyzing the geographic distribution to better understand and provide nuance to the incident reports.¹¹⁷ Additionally, over the course of the 2011 Presidential election, the INEC received 25 million page views on their website and over 70,000 direct questions or reports of incidents around the country on dedicated phone lines.¹¹⁸

The 2011 Presidential election was the first in which ICT and social media were widely employed, and their use was visible in several outcomes.¹¹⁹ Election monitoring platforms founded on these technologies helped identify and limit voting irregularities, several candidates and CSOs used social media to connect with previously unreached voters, and citizens flocked to social media to make their voices and frustrations heard.¹²⁰ Electoral confidence among Nigerian voters skyrocketed to 51 percent in the 2011 Presidential election, up from only 19 percent in the 2007 Presidential election.¹²¹ ICT in the 2011 Presidential election empowered citizens to pressure the government for electoral transparency via social media and ICT and use those tools to hold the INEC accountable to deliver transparent and timely results.

Despite the increased confidence in the overall quality of the elections and the performance of the INEC, the immediate aftermath of the

¹¹³ ReclaimNaija, Facebook https://www.facebook.com/pg/ReclaimNaija/about/?ref=page_internal

¹¹⁴ ReVoDa <http://www.revoda.org.ng/static2015/index.html>

¹¹⁵ Transition Monitoring Group <http://www.tmgtowards2015.org/about.html>

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ The Social Media Tracking Centre, Yar'Adua Foundation <http://yaraduafoundation.org/files/tracking.pdf>

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ The Social Media Tracking Centre, Yar'Adua Foundation <http://yaraduafoundation.org/files/tracking.pdf>

¹²⁰ BBC <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13048880>

¹²¹ Gallup <http://news.gallup.com/poll/150842/africans-lack-confidence-honesty-elections.aspx>


¹²² Social Media Tracking Centre, Yar'Adua Foundation <http://yaraduafoundation.org/files/tracking.pdf>

elections saw some of the worst violence the country had witnessed since the Biafran War. Voters in northern states of the country (especially Kaduna State), angry at the perceived breakdown of the informal agreement to rotate presidents between the predominately Muslim north and the predominately Christian south, rioted following the re-election of Goodluck Jonathan. Over 800 people died in three days of rioting, fueled by misinformation, spread in part by SMS, that inflamed pre-existing religious divides.¹²² While misinformation undoubtedly precedes the spread of mobile phones, the wide uptake of the technology in Nigeria increased its speed and reach and this incident illustrates the way in which mobile phones and social media can be exploited for malicious and destructive ends as well as positive and constructive ones.

2015 Presidential Elections

Youth and youth-led organizations in the 2015 Presidential election continued to increase electoral accountability through the use of mobile internet and applications. Between the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections, the per minute cost for in-network calls dropped by 41%, while the out of network price dropped by 36%.¹²³ At the time of the 2015 Presidential election, the teledensity rate had reached 102.81% of the population,¹²⁴ meaning over 143 million Nigerians had an active mobile phone subscription¹²⁵ and over 85 million of them had an active mobile internet plan.¹²⁶

The continued growth of mobile phone usage and the rise of mobile internet plans was the impetus for the platforms used in the 2011 Presidential elections to migrate to an entirely online experience for the 2015 Presidential election. Both ReVoDa¹²⁷ and 2015 Quick Count (formerly Project 2011 Swift Count) moved their services entirely online, offering a mobile browser-based experience as well as a mobile application.¹²⁸ ReVoDa's mobile application geo-tagged all reported information, using the phone's location services, in order to



improve accuracy of reporting and send specific information to the INEC for further analysis and action.¹²⁹ ReclaimNaija continued with a browser-based experience but relied less on SMS reporting because youth voters could simply use their mobile website. Additionally, 2015 Quick Count mobilized approximately 4,000 citizen observers to monitor 1,507 representatively sampled polling units across all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory after the success of the project's citizen observers in the 2011 Presidential election.¹³⁰ In an unprecedented move, the INEC granted youth observers from the

¹²³ Nigerian Communications Commission <https://www.ncc.gov.ng/stakeholder/statistics-reports/industry-overview#view-graphs-tables-3>

¹²⁴ The percentage of mobile phone subscriptions exceeds the total population because many Nigerians own multiple phones or sim cards and because the country was undergoing a communications system change, forcing users to migrate to an entirely GSM system, instead of a mixed system of GSM and CDMA, another contributing factor to the percentage exceeding the population size.

¹²⁵ Nigerian Communications Commission <https://www.ncc.gov.ng/stakeholder/statistics-reports/industry-overview#view-graphs-tables>



¹²⁶ Nigerian Communications Commission <https://www.ncc.gov.ng/stakeholder/statistics-reports/industry-overview#view-graphs-tables-5>

¹²⁷ ReVoDa <http://www.revoda.org/ng/static2015/index.html>

¹²⁸ Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors <http://www.gndem.org/sites/default/files/The%202015%20Quick%20Count%20Report.compressed.pdf>


¹²⁹ ReVoDa <http://www.revoda.org/ng/static2015/index.html>

¹³⁰ Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors <http://www.gndem.org/sites/default/files/The%202015%20Quick%20Count%20Report.compressed.pdf>



Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement (YIAGA) access to the result collation centers in approximately 310 polling units, an act which demonstrates the INEC’s embrace of electoral transparency.¹³¹

Content Aggregation System for Elections (CASE) 2015 (formerly the Social Media Tracking Centre), a group of youth volunteers at the Yar’Adua Foundation, created another content aggregation analysis and reporting platform that improved upon the Social Media Tracking Centre’s capabilities from the 2011 Presidential election. CASE 2015 was more effective than its predecessor because it improved the technology being used and implemented process steps which included a relevance team, veracity team, and escalation team to appropriately understand the information being synthesized by the platform. During the 2015 Presidential election, the CASE 2015 platform received over




2.6 million micro reports from social media and over 11,000 reports from 9,619 registered observers in the field. The platform registered 1,542 critical incidents that were addressed by registered observers or INEC electoral officers.¹³² INEC also developed a mobile application for the 2015 Presidential election that provided election updates and connected voters to the Citizens Contact Center at the INEC Situation Room that relied on CASE 2015 to verify incidents before INEC would act upon the information.¹³³

However, CASE 2015’s activities during the 2015 presidential elections also demonstrates one of the risks of relying upon ICT systems. On the day of the elections, a denial of service attack was launched against CASE’s election monitoring platform and succeeded in rendering the system unresponsive for three hours. CASE was able to rely on its network of approximately nine thousand youth

¹³¹ Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement https://www.academia.edu/23669056/Youth_Participation_in_Nigerias_2015_General_Elections_Report_
¹³² CASE 2015, Yar’Adua Foundation http://yaraduafoundation.org/files/case_2015_final.pdf
¹³³ Ibid.


ELECTORAL CONFIDENCE OVER TIME

2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
12	19	22	10	11	51	32	18	13	61
%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
					*			**	***



* 2006 – 2011 Electoral Confidence, Gallup <http://news.gallup.com/poll/150842/africans-lack-confidence-honesty-elections.aspx>
 ** 2012 – 2014 Electoral Confidence, Gallup <http://news.gallup.com/poll/180914/ahead-poll-few-nigerians-trust-elections.aspx>
 *** 2015 Electoral Confidence, International Foundation for Electoral Systems http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/nigeria_post-election_infographic_2015_-_election_integrity_and_democracy_logo.pdf

ELECTORAL CONFIDENCE AND TELEDENSITY



Source for Teledensity data: Nigerian Communications Commission (<https://www.ncc.gov.ng/stakeholder/statistics-reports/industry-overview#annual-2002-2016>). Electoral confidence data: see above.

volunteers to handle incoming reports of electoral issues from its observers and take appropriate action while the system was restored. Even the limited success of the attack, however, illustrates one of the risks of relying on potentially fragile ICT systems and the way in which those same technologies can be used maliciously as well as beneficially in the context of elections.

The 2015 Presidential election was a period of increased accessibility to ICT, marked technological improvement in the previous incident reporting platforms, and greater electoral transparency as a result of societal pressure from youth and youth-led organizations and INEC’s desire for continued transparency in the electoral process. Electoral confidence after the election reached a new peak of 61 percent¹³⁴ and Nigeria became the second highest tweeting country in Africa in 2015 with #NigeriaDecides the most popular political hashtag on the continent that year.¹³⁵ ICT in the 2015 Presidential election helped empower youth and youth-led organizations to improve their existing electoral transparency tools with greater ease and with greater precision, coinciding with the lowest electoral fatality rates of the last three Presidential elections.

YOUTH AND YOUTH-LED COALITIONS IN AN ICT EMPOWERED NIGERIA

Youth-led mobilization and coalition-building for the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections was more effective than previous elections because of the reliance on ICT and an empowered generation of youth rallying around the idea of “Naija,” a sense of a new Nigeria led by youth in an attempt to distance themselves from the old and corrupt Nigeria perceived by youth to be the source of the country’s issues.¹³⁶ ICT provided the vehicle for youth to connect, discuss, plan, and mobilize around specific issues. Broadly speaking, youth coalitions fell into two categories during the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections: informal coalitions organized by hashtags, and more formal coalitions organized by established youth-led organizations.

¹³⁴ International Foundation for Electoral Systems http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/nigeria_post-election_infographic_2015_-_election_integrity_and_democracy_logo.pdf

¹³⁵ How Africa Tweets, Portland Communications <http://www.howafriatweets.com/Press-Release/International-Press-Release.pdf>

¹³⁶ BBC <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11447252>

Informal Hashtag Coalitions


Hashtag coalitions filled an important void in electoral transparency and violence mitigation lacking in previous elections. Hashtag coalitions are unique in facilitating the aggregation and mobilization of geographically dispersed individuals around a unified message that is entirely crowdsourced. Twitter users in Nigeria could easily see other youth around the country discussing issues that resonated nationwide, connect with each other, and plan a rally to call attention to the issue at hand. The ease with which hashtag activism imbued this process made their concerns seem less insurmountable by facilitating the most difficult aspect of motivating youth voters to act collectively — coordination. Youth in Nigeria began using hashtag coalitions in earnest around 2009 with the #LightUpNigeria hashtag which was started to shift the view of electricity from a luxury to a necessity. Empowered youth viewed this change as integral to allowing the country to grow and progress, as well as to pressure the government to address their longstanding grievance.¹³⁷ While Twitter and other social media platforms were important in the 2011 Presidential election, hashtag coalitions gained real momentum after the 2011 Presidential election, bringing attention to important governmental and societal issues in the lead up to the 2015 Presidential election, such as:

#ABSURape, a movement to raise awareness about the gang rape that occurred in 2011 on the campus of Abia State University as well as the broader issue of sexual violence in the country;¹³⁸

#OccupyNigeria, a movement triggered by the fuel subsidy increases in 2012, increasing prices across the country and disproportionately affecting low-income communities;¹³⁹

#OpenNASS/#OurNASS, a campaign in 2013 to raise awareness about the lack of transparency and accountability in the National Assembly;¹⁴⁰

#ConstantReview, a campaign in 2013 to mobilize youth to engage in the constitutional review process;¹⁴¹ and



#BringBackOurGirls/#ChibokGirls, a campaign in 2014 to raise awareness about the 276 schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram and the government’s perceived inaction.¹⁴²

While ICT were integral to increasing electoral transparency in the 2011 Presidential election, the steady rise in usage after the 2011 Presidential election to raise awareness around key issues affecting society demonstrates the increasing importance and impact of youth and youth-led organizations wielding ICT and social media platforms for greater electoral transparency ahead of the 2015 Presidential election.

During the 2015 Presidential election, youth and youth-led organizations harnessed the influence of ICT and social media for electoral transparency and violence mitigation. In the weeks before voting began, #WagePeace2015, #VoteNotFight, #RSVP (Register, Select a candidate, Vote not fight, Protect), and #ThumbPower/

¹³⁷ Global Digital Activism <http://book.globaldigitalactivism.org/chapter/project-light-up-nigeria-power-in-our-hands/>

¹³⁸ The Guardian <https://guardian.ng/features/making-social-media-driven-activism-work/>

¹³⁹ The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/11/fuel-subsidy-crisis-nigerians>

¹⁴⁰ The Case of Nigeria, Ace Project <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/elections-and-youth/the-case-of-nigeria>

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/28/obiageli-ezekwesili-bring-back-our-girls-boko-haram-school-kidnapping>

#ThumbItRight were popular hashtags encouraging youth voters to engage in the electoral process in positive ways and stressed the importance of active civic engagement.¹⁴³ As voting commenced, #NigeriaDecides became the most popular hashtag, tweeted over 800,000 times and seen over 2.5 billion times,¹⁴⁴ ultimately becoming the most tweeted political hashtag across the continent in 2015.¹⁴⁵ As vote counting began, incumbent Presidential candidate Goodluck Jonathan used his Facebook page to ease tensions across the country, calling upon his voters to wait patiently and peacefully.¹⁴⁶ After the election results were announced, users across the country used #NigeriaHasDecided to discuss the outcome of the election and ways of holding the new Buhari administration accountable to promises made during the campaign.¹⁴⁷ The ability of youth to use informal hashtag coalitions played an important role in promoting positive youth electoral engagement and peace messaging in order to increase electoral transparency and confidence in a country where they have often been lacking.

Formal Coalitions

Alongside informal hashtag coalitions, existing formal coalitions utilized ICT to amplify their message and impact. ICT can facilitate widespread awareness, discussion, and collective purpose, but translating that into offline action can sometimes be difficult without the help of existing formal coalitions. Youth-led formal coalitions were instrumental in this process by leveraging their existing networks to connect informal coalitions with relevant organizations and providing a depth of advocacy experience. The four most instrumental youth-led formal organizations and coalitions that mobilized youth for greater civic engagement during the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections were Enough is Enough Nigeria (EiE), Youth Initiative for

Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement (YIAGA), Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, and the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG).

Enough is Enough Nigeria: In the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections, EiE engaged in an array of programmatic endeavors aimed at electoral transparency and violence mitigation. EiE was the creator of RSVP¹⁴⁸ which encouraged youth to register, select a candidate, vote not fight, and protect their vote by using another EiE creation, the ReVoDa platform, to report electoral manipulation and violence.¹⁴⁹ Another creation, Shine Your Eye, provides a legislative tracker for citizens to monitor National Assembly members to ensure elected officials are fulfilling campaign promises and allows users to directly contact Assembly members.¹⁵⁰ EiE was the driving force behind the #ABSURape, #OccupyNigeria, and #OurNASS/#OpenNASS movements, drawing attention to the issues, both online and offline, and providing an organizing body for the movement on the streets.¹⁵¹ EiE boasts 41,000 followers on Facebook and 155,000 on Twitter, helping them to quickly reach a large population with these tools and programs.

Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement (YIAGA):

YIAGA began as a student organization on the campus of Jos University and has since become one of the most important youth-led organizations pushing for youth civic engagement and democratic governance.¹⁵² YIAGA created the #NotTooYoungToRun campaign which seeks to lower the age requirements for elected office, which has become a UN-backed global movement,^{153,154} as well as the #ReadyToRun campaign that is recruiting and supporting youth candidates for political office.¹⁵⁵ YIAGA has also undertaken the Young Legislators Accountability Project (YLAP), to support young legislators and hold them accountable,¹⁵⁶ #WatchingTheVote, an election monitoring system similar to Project 2011 Swift Count and

¹⁴³ The Case of Nigeria, Ace Project <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/elections-and-youth/the-case-of-nigeria>

¹⁴⁴ CASE 2015, Yar'Adua Foundation http://yaraduafoundation.org/files/case_2015_final.pdf

¹⁴⁵ How Africa Tweets, Portland Communications <http://www.howafricatweets.com/Press-Release/International-Press-Release.pdf>

¹⁴⁶ Goodluck Jonathan, Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/jonathangoodluck/posts/931358420247866>

¹⁴⁷ The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/nigeriadeclides-buhari-election-twitter>

¹⁴⁸ Enough is Enough Nigeria <http://eie.ng/rsvp/>

¹⁴⁹ Enough is Enough Nigeria <http://eie.ng/protect/>

¹⁵⁰ Shine Your Eye <http://www.shineyoureye.org/info/about>

¹⁵¹ Enough is Enough Nigeria <http://eie.ng/activism/>

¹⁵² Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement <http://yiaga.org/who-we-are/>

¹⁵³ Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement <http://yiaga.org/nottooyoungtorun/about-us/>

¹⁵⁴ Not Too Young To Run <http://www.nottooyoungtorun.org/about/>

¹⁵⁵ Ready to Run <http://www.readytorunning.org/about/index.html>

¹⁵⁶ Young Legislators Accountability Project <http://ylap.org/about/>

2015 Quick Count that uses parallel vote tabulation systems to ensure electoral transparency,¹⁵⁷ and #BounceCorruption, a campaign that gives empowered citizens and the media tools to root out corruption in politics.¹⁵⁸ YIAGA was also the driving force behind the #ThumbPower/#ThumbItRight movement on social media.¹⁵⁹ YIAGA's role in mobilizing youth to vote and act as election monitors for the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections and strong social media presence (over 50,000 in total across Facebook and Twitter) was the impetus for INEC asking YIAGA to help them create a new youth engagement strategy for the 2019 Presidential election.¹⁶⁰

Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room: The Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room is a coalition of 60 CSOs working towards electoral transparency and youth inclusion. The coalition works together to maximize the resources and strengths of each civil society organization to increase impact.¹⁶¹ The coalition was integral to the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections, registering youth election monitors, contributing field reports, and verifying reports alongside the Social Media Tracking Centre (2011) and CASE 2015 (2015) content aggregation systems at the Yar'Adua Foundation. The Situation Room also carries a considerable social media following, acting as an important message amplifier on social media for youth-led organizations, such as EiE or YIAGA, in addition to its role during elections.

The Transition Monitoring Group: The TMG was the creator and an implementing partner for the Project 2011 Swift Count and 2015 Quick Count parallel vote tabulation systems. The TMG partnered with the Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN), Justice, Development and Peace/Caritas Nigeria (JDPC), and the Nigerian Bar Association for the 2011 Presidential election, registering 8,000 citizen election monitors to ensure that electoral accountability was upheld.¹⁶² For the 2015 Presidential election, TMG registered 4,000 citizen election monitors, a sharp decrease due to ICT improvements and to avoid reduplication of election monitoring efforts conducted by other organizations, such as the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room and YIAGA.¹⁶³ The TMG's

greatest contribution to youth mobilization, electoral transparency, and electoral violence mitigation for the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections was the empowerment of youth voters through greater election day participation. The TMG approach made young voters feel, to some degree, that they had reclaimed the electoral process and were actively working towards a new Naija. Similar to the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, TMG acts as an important message amplifier on social media in between election cycles because of their considerable social media following.

Other Coalitions and Networks

While some coalitions use ICT to play an important role activism and democracy promotion in virtual space, other networks are primarily focused on organizing in real space, where they have coordinators, executive committees, chapters, and clubs that meet regularly for trainings, conflict assessments, road shows, and practical interventions on the ground. In Nigeria, four examples of this type include the Bauchi Human Rights Network (in the North), the Partners for Peace Network (P4P) located in the Niger Delta, the Peace and Security Network based in Abuja with regional representation throughout the country, and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), based nationally and internationally in West Africa.

As described in the previous chapter, face-to-face engagement is critical, and can be powerful when amplified and extended through the use of ICT for communication and coordination. It is critical for several reasons. First, despite the clear burgeoning of ICT and social media throughout Nigeria in the last ten years, many conflict-affected communities are not as connected as others, and in order for them to contribute to the stock of social capital necessary for conflict mitigation, engagement needs to be in person.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, most election violence in Nigeria over the last hundred years has been orchestrated, as opposed to occurring through spontaneous unrest. While incidents of spontaneous violence (for example, in Kaduna in 2011 or in Jos in

¹⁵⁷ Watching the Vote <http://watchingthevote.org/about-us/>

¹⁵⁸ Bounce Corruption <https://bouncecorruption.org/about/>

¹⁵⁹ The Case of Nigeria, Ace Project <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/elections-and-youth/the-case-of-nigeria>

¹⁶⁰ Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement <http://yiaga.org/2018/02/04/yiaga-partners-inec-on-youth-engagement-strategy/>

¹⁶¹ Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room http://www.placng.org/situation_room/sr/about-us/

¹⁶² TMG: Towards 2015, The Transition Monitoring Group <http://www.tmg-towards2015.org/about.html>

¹⁶³ Ibid.

2008) have the potential to expand exponentially and become extremely lethal and massively destructive, the vast majority of incidents are not spontaneous. Whether perpetrated by area boys, cultists, militants, communal militias, ethno-nationalist groups, or political actors, it is often the case that youth have been manipulated, coopted, or coerced into violence by power brokers and criminal godfathers for targeted assassinations, abductions, political thuggery to attack rallies, disrupt voting and registration, or snatch ballot boxes. The implication of this reality is that traditional methods of conflict mitigation alone (radio jingles, hashtag advocacy, and civic education) are likely to have a very limited effect in the mitigation of this particular type of election violence. What is needed, in addition, is a campaign of specific, concrete, and targeted, rapid response. This should include both: 1) a strategic communication plan linked to an early warning system, where critical influencers are prepositioned for media outreach in the event of conflict so that they can call for calm in their respective spheres of influence; and 2) a network of responders ready and able to engage directly with spoilers and power brokers to mediate and persuade, once the cycle of attacks and reprisals has been set in motion. Without this plan and this pre-positioning for rapid response, when violence begins the only recourse is the crackdown of the security agents and the positive and negative consequences of that crackdown.

This is where the P4P Network, Bauchi Human Rights Network, and WANEP excel. They certainly use ICT to collect, analyze, and disseminate early warning signals and amplify messages. But more practically, they use these tools to coordinate and replicate their work. Meanwhile, they have a real presence in real communities. One of the relative gaps in conflict mitigation efforts is in the area of conflict management/mediation. Security agents are not able to do this type of work alone. And traditional activist groups are never going to fill that gap. Organizations like P4P, however, can and do. They have convening power and present a unique opportunity for otherwise polarized stakeholder groups, such as community leaders, private sector actors, civil society, and security agencies, to collaborate, and solve problems. For example, recently, in Rivers State, the Representative of the Bori Area Commander stated that, “The (P4P) IPDU SMS platform will really help the police in the Niger Delta in the area of early warning.”

LESSONS LEARNED

Given Nigeria’s tumultuous electoral history, the positive impact that ICT and youth-led organizations had on increasing electoral transparency and confidence, youth mobilization, and electoral violence mitigation during the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections suggests that a patchwork system of grassroots, ICT-dependent, youth-led campaigns can help steadily improve electoral outcomes. As ICT increased access to information and empowered youth voters to proactively engage in the electoral process, youth-led organizations across the country harnessed ICT to connect to young voters and help mobilize them for positive electoral outcomes. However, as Kaduna’s spike in violence in 2011, and the denial of service attack on CASE 2015, both demonstrated, ICT is no panacea. Conflict mitigation efforts need to be robust and practical, not just in virtual space. Youth-led organizations still must rely on thousands of youth volunteers, especially when the technical systems fail.

The central issue moving forward for ICT and the youth-led organizations wielding them remains cooperation and coordination to reduce duplication of efforts and to create a more efficient network of peace actors by maximizing each individual organization’s strengths and resources. Although youth-led organizations, such as EiE and YIAGA, improved their technological processes to increase their capabilities between the 2011 and 2015 elections, they still failed to properly cooperate and coordinate efforts to improve the efficiency of the whole network of peace actors. For instance, EiE and YIAGA each built separate incident reporting platforms, registered citizen field monitors for election day, created legislative trackers to hold Assembly members accountable, and created and led hashtag coalitions on specific issues.

Despite the success that youth and youth-led organizations have had with ICT, however, it is important to also acknowledge the ways in which ICT can also be exploited for destructive ends. These encompass attacks on technical infrastructure, the rapid and wide distribution of inflammatory ideas, images, and video, as well as the coordination of malicious actors and organizations.

Finally, despite the rise of ICT, electoral transparency and confidence, youth mobilization, and electoral violence mitigation will always require empowered citizens to show up and work together on election day to ensure the process is free, fair, and credible.

ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

As described in the preceding chapters, election violence occurs in a complex system of social, economic, political, and security dynamics involving networks of relationships between individuals and organizations, including politicians, militants, security agents, community leaders, civil society actors, and others. Therefore, no single organization can singlehandedly contribute meaningfully to the mitigation of election violence. Instead, practitioners in the field must understand their position as being embedded in a network, not all of whose members they will be directly connected to. Furthermore, to effect meaningful change, organizations should act in concert with their network, using and coordinating the strengths and expertise of each partner and sets of partners. This handbook describes practical and cost-effective tools and methods for practitioners to do that.

Although optimizing networks is the way to improve broader impact, most existing efforts on preventing election violence have tended to link their theory of change to the institutional capacities and best practices of individual organizations. This focus has left unaddressed the questions of whether networks of peace and security organizations are focusing their efforts in the right places and how organizations can better identify partners, beneficiaries, grantees, and/or participants to optimize and leverage social capital to manage election violence more effectively.

Tools and techniques like GIS/Crisis Mapping and SNA present an opportunity to explore that research question. Perhaps more interestingly from the point of view of a practitioner, these tools and techniques can be used by Peace Agents in programming to proactively:

1. Identify leverage points, spheres of influence, and social capital that can be tapped into for broader impact at the strategic level;
2. Increase the impact of specific peacebuilding interventions and activities by ensuring that the right combination of stakeholders is “in the room”; and

3. Assess gaps in the network that can and should be filled at the broader strategic level, or the activity/intervention level.

However, before these methods can be applied in strategic planning or the design and implementation of interventions and activities, an experiment as proof-of-concept to confirm the validity of the approach quantitatively and qualitatively, as well as the utility of the techniques themselves, must be conducted.

First, a caveat: given data availability in Nigeria, it is possible to quantify different types of social capital from state to state. It is also possible to quantify the levels of election violence from state to state. However, measuring the impact of social capital on the relative levels of election violence in different Nigeria states presents methodological problems inasmuch as each state has different combinations of social, economic, and political dynamics. Any direct examination of a network’s effect would need to compare the level of observed election violence to a baseline level of violence that would have occurred had that network been absent. Constructing such a baseline would necessitate heroic assumptions. Therefore, the SNA analysis described below does not try to empirically prove a link between social capital and election violence. Instead, it focuses on describing the clustering patterns of existing networks of Peace Agents in Nigeria and measuring the ways in which they do or do not tend to organize around the most conflict prone areas, under the assumption that rich networks of organizations with a mandate for reducing election violence should focus their efforts on states where the problem of election violence is most acute.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The design of this proof-of-concept included three key components: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Applied Learning. On the quantitative side, the first step was to map the patterns and trends of election

violence at the national, state, and local levels over a period of seven years. Then data was collected on networks of hundreds of peace and security actors who worked to mitigate election violence during the 2015 election cycle, and a regression analysis was conducted to see what the characteristics of the networks were that focused on states with high levels of election violence. Having concluded the quantitative phase of the research, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted with representatives of organizations assessed quantitatively as having high social capital, to validate and contextualize those quantitative findings. Finally, identified best practices were applied in the field with a view towards catalyzing and leveraging social capital for mitigating violence in the gubernatorial elections in Edo, Ondo, and Bayelsa states.

QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT

Data Collection

There are two types of quantitative data that underpin the initial phase of the research. The first is fatalities by state during the Presidential and Gubernatorial elections in 2015 and 2016, defined as those election-related fatalities which occurred in the state during the period from one week prior to the election to one week after the election. This data was drawn from the Nigeria Watch and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) databases, which had geolocated incident data updated daily across all 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs). The platform used to triangulate the data was The Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND)'s P4P Peace Map which integrates data on conflict risks and vulnerabilities from a range of sources and provides analytical functionality for visualizing and interrogating the findings in different ways.

These GIS/Crisis-Mapping data highlighted a few key findings about the distribution of election violence in Nigeria.

- I. The first finding was that when comparing the 2011 cycle to the 2015 cycle in Nigeria, overall violence was much higher in 2011. However, if the violence in Kaduna State, which killed hundreds in the days after the results were declared on April 19, 2011, is discounted, then 2015 was generally more violent across the

country.

2. The second finding was that in 2011, the Presidential election was much more violent than the Gubernatorial elections, while in 2015, the Gubernatorial elections were more violent. However, if discounting the outlier of post-election violence in Kaduna in 2011, it turns out that Gubernatorial elections were more violent than Presidential elections in both cycles.
3. The third finding was that in breaking out the number of fatalities by state, the top ten most violent states in 2011 hardly overlapped at all with the top ten in 2015 (except for Delta State), suggesting that it's very hard to predict where violence will be most severe in any given cycle. However, when calculating the number of fatalities by state on a per-capita basis, then Bayelsa, Benue, Gombe, and Delta states were all in the top 10 most violent in both cycles. This suggests that in the runup to 2019 that donors and practitioners would do well to focus on those four states as part of their conflict mitigation strategies for the Presidential and Gubernatorial elections.

The second type of quantitative data was an SNA map, which was constructed by sending scoping surveys to all identified stakeholders who work on issues related to election violence mitigation in Nigeria and asking with whom they have partnered and where they work. The survey responses were uploaded to a visualization platform called Kumu for analysis. Three steps were taken to minimize any response rate related bias: 1) using as comprehensive an initial list as possible, 2) iteratively sending out the survey to organizations identified by initial respondents as partners, and 3) limiting the analysis to states in which at least five organizations were present.¹⁶⁴ The data collected suggests a rich web of peace and security actors across the country with 345 identified organizations and 378 connections.¹⁶⁵

By Geopolitical Zone, this breaks down as follows:

- South South: 120 identified organizations and 122 connections.
- South East: 90 identified organizations and 69 connections
- North Central: 71 identified organizations and 55 connections
- South West: 61 identified organizations and 53 connections
- North West: 41 identified organizations and 29 connections
- North East: 37 identified organizations and 31 connections

¹⁶⁴ This concern, however, seems to have persisted, as suggested by the fact that the stakeholder map contains a much higher average number of organizations for states in the Niger Delta than for states in other regions.

¹⁶⁵ Note that since this research was concluded, the number of organizations and connections has continued to rise. As of the time of publication, there are 446 organizations and 538 connections mapped.

STAKEHOLDER NETWORK ANALYSIS



Regression Analysis

The SNA platform facilitates the analysis of the place and role of organizations within the larger network, assigning each a value for three measures of centrality: betweenness (how often an organization lies on the shortest path between two other organizations), reach (the proportion of the network covered within two degrees of an organization), and eigenvector (how well connected an organization is to other well-connected organizations). These three measures reveal how well-placed a given organization is to function as a Convener (high “betweenness”), a Communicator (high “reach”), or an Implementer (high “eigenvector”). Combining these measures with the data on the locations of each organization enables the calculation of the average level of betweenness, reach, and eigenvector of organizations in each state.

To determine whether the three different types of organizations tend to cluster around the most conflict prone areas, several regression analyses were conducted. Each used the number of fatalities in gubernatorial elections as the dependent variable and used a different measure of average network centrality as the independent variable.¹⁶⁶ Given the limitation of only including states in which at least five organizations from the stakeholder map were located, these

regressions included twenty-six elections across twenty-six states. The results from the regressions suggested that there was a weaker relationship between gubernatorial election fatalities and betweenness than there was between election fatalities and either eigenvector or reach.

Additional analysis of the SNA map and its relation to the election fatality data provided the context necessary to understanding the results of the regression analysis. Although there is some differentiation of organizations by role (Communicator, Convener, and Implementer), there were three key groups of organizations that presented in the data:

1. There was a small number of versatile organizations that were well positioned within the network to function as any of the roles with the highest or among the highest score on all three measures of centrality.
2. Beyond these versatile few, those organizations that have high reach (Communicators) and/or eigenvector scores (Implementers) tend to be present in many of the states that reported higher levels of election fatalities.
3. There was also a set of organizations with high betweenness that were not focused on conflict prone-states.

¹⁶⁶ Regressions were also run using fatalities by state in the presidential election of 2015, but no significant relationship was found with any of the measures of centrality.

SUMMARY OUTPUTS

SUMMARY OUTPUT: Reach versus Gubernatorial Election Violence 2015

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.456698
R Square	0.208573
Adjusted R Square	0.175597
Standard Error	0.022144
Observations	26

ANOVA					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	0.003102	0.003102	6.324982	0.01901
Residual	24	0.011769	0.00049		
Total	25	0.01487			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	Upper 95.0%
Intercept	0.068721	0.004917	13.97531	5.02E-13	0.058572	0.07887	0.058572	0.07887
X Variable 1	0.002357	0.000937	2.514952	0.01901	0.000423	0.004291	0.000423	0.004291

SUMMARY OUTPUT: Eigenvector versus Gubernatorial Election Violence 2015

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.509941
R Square	0.26004
Adjusted R Square	0.229209
Standard Error	0.004263
Observations	26

ANOVA					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	0.000153	0.000153	8.434198	0.007784
Residual	24	0.000436	1.82E-05		
Total	25	0.00059			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	Upper 95.0%
Intercept	0.007089	0.000947	7.488126	9.97E-08	0.005135	0.009043	0.005135	0.009043
X Variable 1	0.000524	0.00018	2.904169	0.007784	0.000152	0.000896	0.000152	0.000896

SUMMARY OUTPUT: Betweenness versus Gubernatorial Election Violence 2015

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.137493
R Square	0.018904
Adjusted R Square	-0.02197
Standard Error	0.011229
Observations	26

ANOVA					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	5.83E-05	5.83E-05	0.462445	0.502991
Residual	24	0.003026	0.000126		
Total	25	0.003085			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	Upper 95.0%
Intercept	0.024885	0.002408	10.33228	2.59E-10	0.019914	0.029856	0.019914	0.029856
X Variable 1	0.000274	0.000402	0.680033	0.502991	-0.00056	0.001104	-0.00056	0.001104

The implications of these findings are that in the states that are most conflict prone, there are typically a wealth of organizations that are well positioned within the broader organizational network to serve as Communicators and Implementors. **However, there is a gap in the number of organizations positioned to serve as Conveners.** Therefore, the versatile few organizations that are positioned to play every role should embrace and emphasize the role of Convener if they wish to optimize the network. That means they should seek to facilitate stakeholder forums and provide strategic frameworks and platforms that the other organizations can key into as Implementers and Communicators. These organizations should recognize the assets they bring due to the unique combination of social capital which they have accrued and provide the needed leadership for systemic impact. Likewise, donor partners should seek to support and leverage the work of conveners, as they are critical for successful prevention of election violence. Organizations without convening power should seek out platforms and networks to join and participate in.

QUALITATIVE COMPONENT

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

The findings and implications of the quantitative analysis were validated and contextualized through KIIs with organizations with strong and numerous links to other organizations in the network, as shown through the SNA as well as through recommendations from other scholars and practitioners familiar with early warning for election violence mitigation and prevention programming in Nigeria. In sum, thirteen organizations were interviewed over the course of the project. These interviews underlined the importance of a multilateral network and coordination as well as the importance of starting early in the election cycle.

For all of the interviews, a series of questions was asked that sought to better understand and add context to two main research questions: 1) How does the election violence mitigation system work? 2) How can it work better?

To that end, a representative from each participating organization was asked the following questions:

1. What kind of election violence mitigation work does your organization do?
2. What other organizations has your organization partnered with

in the promotion of peace and security over the past five to seven years?

3. Do you partner with organizations and stakeholders that focus on other aspects of the early warning and response system? If yes, please describe how early warning data flows into analysis, intervention, resolution, etc. for your organization. If no, is there a process in place that allows your organization to share data and findings with other organizations working within different components of the system?
4. Which aspect of the system do you feel is strongest in the states where you work? Which aspect is the weakest?
5. Is the early warning and response system for anticipating, mitigating and preventing election violence equally effective in presidential vs. state-level elections? From one state to another? Examples?
6. Please explain, to the best of your knowledge and experiences, how the system currently works (e.g. trace an example of how early warning led to analysis, which led to response, which led to a positive outcome)

Based on these questions, several organizations consistently highlighted the main constraints that exist to effective coordination between and among the different actors working on preventing election violence in Nigeria. These include a sense of territoriality, competition for funding, a lack of trust in the quality of others' work, and a lack of trust in the motives between different types of organizations, especially between security forces and civil society organizations. Due to these constraints, several interviewees noted that much of the collaboration that does occur tends to be bilateral (hub-and-spoke) rather than multilateral (decentralized). Even bilateral collaboration is beneficial, but it does not provide the same level of advantages (effectiveness, sustainability, and self-organizing) that multilateral collaboration can offer. This was echoed by many respondents who described the value provided by organizations such as the Bauchi Human Rights Network, the Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD), the P4P, and others. These organizations are able to supply a platform where diverse actors can share their experiences, share information, coordinate activities, and engage in regular interactions, all of which helps increase the trust that is necessary for effective collaboration. For example, according to CITAD, a multi-stakeholder platform convened by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) was invaluable in bridging gaps in trust and getting the police to cooperate with CSOs, resulting in the establishment of a formal avenue of communication

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES

Organization	Betweenness		Eigenvector		Reach	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
USAID	0.037	33/273	0.024	9/273	0.165	8/273
NSRP	0.044	23/273	0.032	6/273	0.190	7/273
Mercy Corps	0.029	40/273	0.019	12/273	0.099	32/273
PIND	0.102	7/273	0.063	1/273	0.260	2/273
SDN	0.140	2/273	0.045	3/273	0.256	3/273
SFCG	0.117	3/273	0.040	4/273	0.220	5/273
CITAD	0.029	42/273	0.013	16/273	0.099	33/273
Nigeria Watch	0.041	28/273	0.027	8/273	0.150	9/273
CIEPD	0.010	75/273	0.022	10/273	0.117	23/273
P4P	0.033	1/273	0.049	2/273	0.304	1/273
INEC	0.041	27/273	0.030	7/273	0.225	4/273
WANEP	0.104	7/273	0.002	86/273	0.079	48/273
BHRN	0.108	4/273	0.009	25/273	0.103	27/273

and collaboration between the two.

This type of multilateral collaboration, however, takes time to build and that is one reason why numerous interviewees stated that efforts to prevent election violence must start much earlier than they currently do. Respondents noted that donors and supporting organizations often expect “miracles” in two- or three-months’ time, whereas to be most effective, efforts need to begin one to two years in advance. As one participant from the P4P Network stated, “By the time it’s two to three months out from the elections, it’s basically too far gone. People have already been recruited, made their choices, in some cases received their money, weapons, or whatever they need to create mayhem. You cannot change the course of the ship two to three months before an election, not in Nigeria; you will almost always be out-maneuvered and out-resourced by entrenched groups and interests.” The normal practice of starting late means that often youth and other actors have already committed to choices that will increase, directly or indirectly, the level of electoral violence. Similarly, interviewees asserted that donors withdraw their support too soon after elections or are much more likely to focus on national contests rather than the often more violent local ones. More generally, several respondents noted that this type of narrow focus contributes to the more widespread disproportionate focus on federal elections to the detriment of the amount of resources devoted to gubernatorial and especially off-cycle elections, which can be equally if not more violent but do not receive the same level of attention.

ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

Despite the challenges enumerated above, respondents also identified mechanisms that have allowed their organizations to successfully intervene during incidents of political violence and described how networks have been vital during election periods. Coordination between different groups--such as community leaders, women, youth, and police--has been an essential component of efforts to prevent election violence. One participant from PIND detailed how the organization was able to provide critical information to stakeholders by leveraging their data and networks. This included identification of hotspots and an analysis that identified who could serve as effective election monitors. From here, PIND was able to select and train election monitors, and utilize their situation room to relay information to security agencies. PIND's networks allowed the organization to tailor the training of election monitors to salient election-related issues. Other effective mechanisms included working with political parties to discourage violence, sensitization of youth and working with traditional and religious leaders to sensitize local populations ahead of elections. Respondents described the different roles various stakeholders have during election periods and emphasized the importance of using voices that connect with the local population. This includes local religious and traditional leaders, as well as the media. A representative from Community Initiative for Enhanced Peace and Development (CIEPD) described how the organization mainstreams collaboration with local communities into every project, which has allowed it to build positive relationships with youth groups. The respondent also described how CIEPD has been able to stage successful interventions through collaboration with local security agents. Because of these relationships, CIEPD has cultivated resources that allow the organization to conduct verification and analysis before moving to the intervention stage.

In terms of locations where interviewees from NSRP, Mercy Corps and Search for Common Ground (SFCG) thought election violence mitigation efforts had been relatively successful in 2015 across the early warning to response spectrum, some pointed to examples in the Middle Belt and North Central Nigeria, where the history of election violence in Plateau and Kano had the effect of mobilizing actors early on, particularly on the response side. In Delta State, one interviewee from NSRP noted that a prior program that brought stakeholders together in to anticipate and respond to communal tensions allowed for the same platform of stakeholders, who had built trust in working together previously, to be mobilized during election season. Others noted similar stories of prior collaborative efforts on peacebuilding, countering hate speech, and building capacity for early warning in

Rivers State as well as in other parts of the Niger Delta that had built platforms of collaboration and trust that were utilized during the 2015 elections.

In terms of how the overall system itself works, from the collection of data through to response planning and mitigation efforts, some noted that while gathering sufficient information is rarely a problem, ensuring it finds those with the mandate and capacity to respond is more problematic. For example, interviewees noted that data needs to be presented in a way that allows people to target specific sectors or areas (both geographic as well as topical) within their mandate. While others noted that the breakdown in response is often the result of actors being unwilling or unable to work outside of areas where their organizations are located, even if data on nearby hotspots indicates that more attention or immediate action is needed. According to one interviewee from Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN), "One of the main issues is that organizations are given a specific mandate and location to focus their efforts on, normally where they are headquartered. When a crisis hits during an election, even in the next LGA, they are unable to do anything about it because it is not in their approved scope. And donors aren't always flexible about changing scope at the last minute to include another area, even if it is right next door."

Some interviewees noted that the system tends to break down in areas where CSOs do not have the mandate or resources to respond to a particularly violent situation. For example, while cooperation between CSOs and security services in the initial coordination and data sharing stages has improved, particularly in some states in the Niger Delta and in the Middle Belt, CSOs who call upon security services to intervene in a particular case of violence during elections often go unanswered. Some thought that security services might suspect the CSO of being partisan, while others believed that a history of a particular CSO or group of CSOs reporting on extra-judicial force or police brutality made security services less likely to respond for fear of scrutiny. Some interviewees also noted that crucial actors are often left outside of the system, such as national and multinational corporations and businesses. In terms of corporations, one interviewee from a major international donor organization felt that the inclination to work directly with public or private security services exclusively often led to overlooking the information and resources that CSOs can bring, and thus coordinate efforts, while others noted that this is now changing but needs to be more institutionalized. For example, Chevron's example in the Niger Delta,

ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

through PIND, was cited as one of the ways that corporations are becoming more active.

Finally, several interviewees noted that traditional rulers and structures at the community level are often left out of the process or overlooked, and that they can play a critical role not only in early warning, but also in response. Interviewees from CIEPD, the Bauchi Human Rights Network, and PIND noted that traditional leaders and institutions, including religious institutions, have played a crucial role in past election cycles in dissuading youth from joining in election violence, particularly through early engagement efforts at the community level. As in the case of CSOs building platforms around other initiatives that then translated into effective mobilization during election seasons, interviewees noted that in Rivers State, efforts by the Catholic Church to create youth clubs and youth coalitions around other initiatives were able to be “piggy-backed” upon during elections. Similarly, community engagement initiatives in the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta aimed at combatting youth unemployment were able to be transformed to keep youth engaged in positive ways during the lead-up to elections, such as in countering hate speech and educating peers about how to spot inflammatory or false reporting on social media. As one interviewee noted: “We don’t have to reinvent the wheel all the time when it comes to engaging at-risk youth who can be coopted during election cycles. We can build on what is already happening in off-years, saving a lot of time and money.”

APPLICATION OF FINDINGS

In late 2015, while stakeholder network analysis was still being conducted, FFP, in collaboration with Mercy Corps’ Peace and Security Network, began to apply some of the preliminary research findings for the mitigation of election violence in Bayelsa, Ondo, and Edo states ahead of local gubernatorial contests. These elections represented three of the four occurring after preliminary results had been obtained. The fourth, in Kogi, took place in a state where the stakeholder map was comparatively thin and was also not expected to be as prone to violence during the election, so it was not targeted.

Bayelsa: Starting in October 2015, there were signs of conflict issues emerging around the upcoming December Bayelsa gubernatorial elections. In November of that year, it was clear that ex-militants, youth groups, and political parties were playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship as well as engaging in hate speech and intimidation. FFP partnered with PIND and P4P, two organizations that had been

identified in the SNA as versatile organizations well positioned to serve as conveners, to conduct a Stakeholder’s Forum in late November in an attempt to mitigate the role of youth and other stakeholders in propagating violence in the lead-up to and aftermath of the election.

The Forum brought 75 youth representatives, including many former militants or supporters of ex-militant generals, together with representatives from the local P4P Chapter, PIND, FFP, youth representatives of all parties vying for the governorate, and other key stakeholders, including women’s groups. Several stakeholders made presentations and participants were interviewed and given the opportunity to register as Peace Actors who would receive alerts and updates on escalating conflict issues in their areas. The Forum culminated in the drafting and signing of a pledge to refrain from electoral violence and commit to the democratic principles of a free and fair election as enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution. Representatives of print, television, and radio media were present at the Forum and publicized the results.

On the day of the election and over the following weeks, members of the P4P Bayelsa Chapter built on the outcomes of the Forum, calling on candidates and their supporters as well as Forum participants to remind them of their pledges for peace. As violence began to increase, PIND and P4P Bayelsa members were also able to facilitate media interviews with Forum participants who reiterated their call for peace. After being contacted by a Forum organizer, a gubernatorial candidate even released a press statement disavowing violence and calling for peace. Overall, the convening of the Forum played an important role in tightening and optimizing the linkages between early warning, planning, outreach, and mobilization efforts as well as enabling connections and relationships that made later conflict mitigation efforts possible when it counted.

Edo: The following year, in August 2016, FFP partnered with P4P and PIND again in order to hold a Stakeholder Forum in Benin City which brought together 120 stakeholders, drawn from youth groups and a diverse array of organizations that work with youth groups, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), security organizations, political parties, journalists, and civil society organizations. The purpose of the forum was to discuss intergroup collaboration and to build an integrated strategic communication campaign plan linked to an early warning system for the prevention and management of election violence. During the forum, stakeholders

ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

across the political spectrum also publicly declared their commitment to peace as well as distributed merchandise emblazoned with peace messages.

The media was engaged during and after the forum which, together with the strategic communication campaign, helped amplify their peace messages. At their height, peace messages were broadcast at primetime, three times per day on two television stations and three radio stations state-wide. In total, over twenty radio shows, four TV programs, and three newspaper advertisements were aired in the month leading up to the election and in the days after it.

As a follow-up to the forum, sixty youths from four conflict-prone LGAs, identified based on conflict trends and patterns from the P4P Peace Map, were trained in SMS-based conflict early warning reporting. This reporting fed the Conflict Early Warning/Early Response platform for analysis and interventions and incident reports generated by these field monitors were analyzed by PIND staff and sent to INEC and police.

Edo had been a state of significant concern about the potential for election violence, to the extent that the election had earlier been postponed. These concerns went largely unrealized, and the collaboration with P4P was recognized by the Coalition of NGOs in Edo State as having a significant impact in the prevention of violence by being the first to issue peace messages in a timely and effective manner. The airing of those messages by the media triggered political parties, other civil society organizations, and even the state government to issue press statements calling for calm. The success of the intervention illustrates that an integrated network-based approach to conflict mitigation can be successful, especially when informed by crisis mapping and social network analysis to determine where and how to catalyze social capital for maximum impact.

Ondo: Although Ondo has historically been one of the Niger Delta's more peaceful states, the gubernatorial election held in November 2016 was characterized by multiple opposition parties challenging an incumbent governor who had defected from the Labour Party to the PDP after his re-election in 2012. A March 2015 report by the Nigerian National Emergency Management Agency listed Ondo as among the 15 states at high risk for violence in upcoming gubernatorial elections. Concurrently with the efforts in Edo, the FFP partnered with P4P to work with local stakeholders in the state to promote multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at encouraging

collaboration and information sharing leading up to and in the aftermath of the election.

These initiatives included town hall meetings in each of the three senatorial districts with the goal of sensitizing communities on mobilizing for peaceful elections. It also included a targeted media strategy featuring peace messaging and jingles on private, state-owned, and federal radio stations. These aired before and after the election, accompanied by press releases aimed at calming tensions, particularly after the announcement of the election results. In addition, forty peace monitors were trained in early warning and response, including the use of an SMS platform to report incidents of election violence. These monitors were brought together with official election monitors, allowing them to observe polling stations and immediately report incidents of possible conflict or election-related violence, which then was transmitted to police and NSDSC officials. Finally, P4P formed a coalition with other civil society organizations and together made advocacy visits to several stakeholders, including the local police, INEC, the National Orientation Agency, and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps, to determine the level of preparedness and identify gaps.

Despite a very close election characterized by last-minute defections and intraparty political crises, the early and strategic engagement by P4P and other partners contributed to successful networking, integration, and leveraging campaigns that helped contribute to a largely peaceful outcome. The success of this intervention was predicated on two important results of the stakeholder network analysis. In addition to demonstrating the vital role played by a Convener, the intervention was begun months earlier than is typical for most donors and state- and national-level initiatives. The importance of this type of early engagement, which is critical to forming the partnerships leveraged during and immediately after the election, was highlighted often in the KIIs of the qualitative research. Second, the intervention was a clear illustration of the vital role played by a Convener.

Handoff


FFP has handed off the data that underpinned the stakeholder network analysis and the research itself to the Mercy Corps-supported Peace and Security Network, which is maintaining and updating the stakeholder map, so it can further strengthen the impact of the network going forward.

USING STAKEHOLDER NETWORK ANALYSIS & CONFLICT MAPPING TO OPTIMIZE RESPONSE


This research suggests several key best practices that should be employed for more effective conflict prevention and mitigation programs, projects, and activities.

- First, given the historical roots of election violence, practitioners should not wait until voter registration and campaigning to begin their work. Rather, this should be an ongoing and sustained priority, as local and state elections throughout the cycle influence on the dynamics heading into national elections and vice versa. Once campaigning has begun for a national election, there's limited leverage at that point to shift the momentum, expectations, norms, and grievances that drive violence.
- Related to the above, while the attention of media and donors tends to peak around national elections, data suggests that gubernatorial elections are often more violent. More attention should be paid to state and local elections for the prevention of violence.
- Third, election violence has complex social, political, and historical roots and dynamics. As such, it requires a robust network of stakeholder to prevent and manage it. Network theory posits the need for strong Communicators, Implementers, and Conveners for social capital to be optimized. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the network in Nigeria suggests that of the three types, the relative gap is in the Conveners, due to constraints and limitations in capacity, trust, and resources. As a best practice, then, donors should support multi-stakeholder platforms and practitioners should actively participate in them.
- Perhaps most importantly, going beyond the networks and coalitions that focus on activism, multi-stakeholder platforms should also engage in real space, so that community leaders, civil society, security agents, youth, and political parties can exchange information and collaborate on early warning and conflict management/mediation.

HEAT MAPPING




Heat Map of Election/Political Violence Fatalities 2009-2018 – PIND Peace Map



Cluster Map of Election/Political Violence Fatalities 2009-2018 – PIND Peace Map

TREND ANALYSIS




Monthly Trend in Nigeria Election/Political Violence Fatalities 2009-2018 – PIND Peace Map

Now, due to advances in ICT, there are simple and economical tools that can help donors and practitioners implement the best practices listed above, including GIS, email surveys, and SNA. Even just a few years ago, this would have been cost prohibitive and required a level of technical expertise well beyond the scope of most local organizations and program managers. However, because of platforms like Ushahidi, Kumu, and SurveyMonkey, even a small NGO can afford to take the steps necessary to increase effectiveness. Below are step-by-step instructions for how this might be done.


Step 1: The first step is to determine where election violence has occurred in past cycles. In the case of Nigeria there are many strong data sources available for this component of the analysis (Nigeria Watch, ACLED, P4P, TMG, CIEPD, WANEP, ECOWARN, Uppsala, etc.). After a scoping the available data, it should be analyzed to estimate trends at the national and subnational levels. GIS can be a useful tool for visualizing patterns across both space and time.

The analysis on the following page was done using the PIND Peace

ELECTION FATALITIES 2011




ELECTION FATALITIES 2015



Map, but it could also be done without GIS tools, if necessary. Either way, ideally it is best to go back at least two cycles and disaggregate by Presidential elections and State elections to better assess the drivers of election violence and extrapolate to the upcoming election of concern based on a comparison of current political dynamics and other contextual factors.

Step 2: Having examined the areas of relative risk, a SNA of those areas can help identify relative levels of social capital and spheres of influence as a way of determining entry points for your program or activity.

The purpose of a stakeholder network analysis is to provide a better understanding of the organizations working on issues of peace and security in the area of concern and how those organizations are connected to one another. The SNA can directly inform who you include as participants, grantees, partners, or beneficiaries. The analysis can also inform interventions and identify important characteristics of the broader network of organizations, such as where the network is dense and where it is sparse, which organizations are highly connected and therefore well-placed to play a communicating or convening role, how information or best practices



An image of the Nigeria-wide SNA completed as part of this research

EXAMPLE SCOPING SURVEY

1. What is the name of your agency or organization?
2. Are you planning any activities related to peace and security in the Nigeria 2019 election?
3. If yes, what type of work are you planning to do in Nigeria? [A. Conflict Early Warning; B. Conflict Management/Mediation; C. Election Monitoring; D. Peace Messaging; E. Civic Education; F. Other (please specify)]
4. Describe your planned activities in a few words
5. In a few words, describe the strategy of your election violence mitigation activities (specific objective, theory of change, approach)
6. In which region are you focusing your activities? [A. North East; B. North West; C. North Central; D. South West; E. South South; F. South East; G. National]
7. Are you partnering with any other organizations to carry out your activities? If so, please list 3-5 organizations you are working with.
8. Briefly describe any challenges your organization has faced implementing activities.
9. Briefly describe any successes your organization has achieved implementing activities.
10. Please outline the months during which your planned activities will occur.

might flow (or fail to flow) between members of the network, and where the network might be broken and/or disconnected. These findings can assist in identifying gaps or weaknesses in the existing network as well as inform the likely impacts of activities based on specific objectives and stakeholders engaged. This, in turn, helps the prioritization and formation of strategy at the country and the sub-national levels, especially through analysis of how the stakeholder network relates to the levels of risk and areas of vulnerability identified in Step 1.

From a resource allocation perspective, conducting a SNA also allows for the engagement of local stakeholders and their networks more effectively, moving beyond deploying human, financial, and technical resources to the same, well-known, actors again and again, or those most easily located in capital cities or major economic hubs. An effective SNA should allow the analyst or donor organization to understand where specific capacities exist for both local understanding as well as potential local response. This not only can help build the capacities of local organizations to address risk and vulnerabilities in a locally appropriate and holistic manner, but also allow these entities to interact and work with other actors, thereby

when a survey is received which identifies a partner not on the original list, send the survey to that partner and continue this process to the extent that time and resources allow. To use the information gained from the scoping survey effectively, you should use software to visualize and analyze the key actors, how they are connected, and the various characteristics of the broader network. One example of this type of software is Kumu, which provides a powerful visualization platform for mapping systems and better understanding relationships and is used by hundreds of organizations around the world for an extremely varied range of projects.

Kumu allows users to upload and visualize their information and, importantly, allows for extensive customization to make the result more intuitively understandable and provides powerful analytical tools. An example of the former is seen on the previous page, whereby a particular organization, such as the P4P Network, can be selected to highlight its immediate partners and their position in the broader network. Analytically, with Kumu you can calculate measures of centrality such as betweenness and reach, which reveal which organizations are well-positioned as Conveners and Communicators.

These organizations can be crucial to the success of any program, project, or activity. On the other hand, if the network is sparse, that information is also very important to know, so that your program can strategically fill gaps in the network so as to optimize the wider system for more impact on the mitigation of election violence.

Finally, if you are organizing a workshop or identifying grantees, including organizations with high levels of eigenvector, reach, and betweenness will help ensure that the information communicated in the workshop is successfully propagated throughout the broader network. It is also valuable, however, to ensure that your program strengthens and deepens this wider network by filling gaps where social capital is weak. Program activities will likely be most successful if they are designed to leverage the relative strengths of different organizations in their roles as Communicators, Implementors, or Conveners, depending on how they are positioned and oriented within the network. In this way, conflict mitigation projects can go beyond the checklist approach to programming and consider the system in which they are embedded for maximum effectiveness and sustainable impact.



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